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In the winter of 2002, The Boston Globe published an exposé on clergy sexual abuse in 
the Boston Archdiocese which quickly sparked a global Church crisis. Following the 
exposé, there was a swell of media attention, a growing public outcry, increasing 
litigation over alleged abuse and cover-ups, and the emergence of issue-driven 
grassroots organizations. Despite the vocal involvement of numerous stakeholders in the 
crisis, the hierarchy’s communicative response to the situation followed relatively 
traditional crisis management strategies which sought to deny, minimize, remediate, and 
retain exclusive jurisdiction over the crisis. This strategy contrasts with other 
stakeholders’ attempts to defer closure, draw out underlying issues, amplify non-
dominant voices, contest dominant interpretations, and collaborate on possible solutions. 
What has emerged is an on-going situation in which an organization’s attempts at 
strategic communicative crisis management are being contested publicly by key 
stakeholders. 
Arguing that existing models for understanding public relations discourse are 
insufficient for tracing the polyvocality of crisis communication, this study crafts an 
alternative (i.e., dialogic) model for analyzing crisis communication. This model 
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decenters the source organization by tracing the contextual (macro) and interactive 
(micro) aspects of public relations texts created by three organizations central to the 
crisis (the United States Council of Catholic Bishops, Voice of the Faithful, and 
Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests). 
By viewing crisis communication through the lens of a particular notion of 
dialogue (i.e., a sustained, symbol-based, contextualized, collaborative-agonistic process 
of interactive social inquiry which creates meaning and a potential for change), this 
study traces how organizations use Public Relations (PR) to co-construct an 
organizational crisis. Discursive reconciliation, the central process of the proposed 
model, allows the researcher to sift the discourses of stakeholder organizations against 
one another, using each as a standard for evaluating the others. This allows for an 
evaluation of how stakeholder organizations manage the potential for communicative 
interactivity. The proposed model offers an expanded capacity to understand how crises 
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INTRODUCTION AND CASE 
In the winter of 2002, The Boston Globe published an exposé on clergy sexual abuse in 
the Roman Catholic Church. Although this was not the first time U.S. Catholic priests 
were accused of sexual exploitation, this was the first time that substantive allegations of 
systemic complicity were levied publicly against the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the 
United States. During the weeks and months following the initial exposé, there was a 
swell of media attention, a growing public outcry, increasing litigation over alleged 
abuse and cover-ups, and the emergence of issue-driven grassroots organizations. 
Escalating public involvement with the issue of clergy sexual abuse challenged the U.S. 
Catholic bishops’ attempts to internalize and thus retain exclusive control of the 
situation. As the U.S. Roman Catholic hierarchy lost exclusive jurisdiction over the 
situation, it became clear that sexual exploitation by priests could no longer be delimited 
as a few isolated incidents in the Boston Archdiocese. It had escalated into an 
international organizational crisis. 
Not only was the hierarchy repeatedly confronted with allegations of systemic 
complicity with abuse, but its attempts to manage the crisis were contested vigorously by 
a variety of stakeholders. The early Globe articles paved the way for an increasingly 
audible public discourse on the phenomena of clergy sexual abuse. Key stakeholders  
 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Management Communication Quarterly.
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weighing in on the issue include grassroots groups focused on supporting those 
victimized by clergy (advocacy groups) and on changing the Church (dissent groups), 
individuals alleging sexual exploitation (victims/survivors) and their families, civil and 
criminal courts, members of the laity and the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and a wide 
variety of media. These stakeholders have found expression in many venues, from 
depositions to press releases, from to promotional materials to newsletters, from books 
to conferences, from media releases to personal letters, from court briefs to news reports, 
from protests to petitions, from movies to interviews, and so on. 
Despite the vocal involvement of numerous stakeholders in the crisis, the 
hierarchy’s communicative response to the situation has followed relatively traditional 
crisis management strategies (i.e., apologia and image restoration discourse) with the 
goal of single-handedly ‘resolving’ the crisis. This communication (in the form of 
policies, homilies, surveys, press releases, self-audits, meetings, apologies, etc.) has 
sought to deny, minimize, remediate, and control the crisis, all under the exclusive 
auspices of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. This discursive position stands in contrast to 
other stakeholders’ attempts to defer closure, draw out underlying issues, amplify non-
dominant voices, contest dominant interpretations, and collaborate on possible solutions. 
What has emerged, then, since the winter of 2002 is an on-going situation in which an 
organization’s attempts at strategic communicative crisis management are being 
contested publicly by a variety of stakeholders. 
In order to unpack the discourse of this communicative situation, it is essential to 
move beyond an organization-centered perspective of crisis communication. Restricting 
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the analysis to the U.S. Roman Catholic Church’s crisis discourse, even accounting for 
its defensive (and thus reactive) nature, would fail to engage the polyvocality of the 
situation. In turn, this would obscure ways in which crisis communication is used to 
leverage organizational power, and how it is used to affect the unfolding crisis. To 
foreground the contested co-construction of crisis communication, this dissertation 
argues for a fundamental shift in how researchers view crisis communication. 
Rather than an organization-centered assessment of crisis communication, with 
an emphasis on the strategic communication of what might be called the ‘source’ 
organization, this study decenters the source organization in order to engage the 
polyvocality in crisis communication. The driving argument of this dissertation is that a 
dialogical analysis will offer an expanded capacity to understand the way in which crises 
are constructed discursively. To test this assumption, the study constructs and applies a 
particular (as will be further specified) dialogical perspective on crisis communication. 
In order to contextualize this study, the following section gives a more particular 
overview of the clergy sex abuse crisis. 
The Case 
In looking for a way to summarize the key events of the clergy abuse crisis, it 
makes sense to turn to The Boston Globe’s Pulitzer Prize winning coverage. With 
Boston the undisputed epicenter of the crisis, The Globe was uniquely positioned to 
track the situation. Further, as the only major US archdiocese in which over half of the 
population is Catholic (i.e., 2 million Catholics out of 3.8 million citizens), Boston 
offered an interesting context for the crisis (The Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002, 
 4
p. 7). A special investigative team from The Globe broke the story in January 2002, 
subsequently writing over 300 articles, a book (Betrayal, 2002) and creating an 
extensive website (www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/) on the subject. 
Although The Globe began with a focus on Boston, it expanded its coverage as 
the crisis spread. According to The Globe, its original story became “an international 
story about how the rights of powerless individuals are pushed aside in the interests of a 
powerful institution, about how mortals can damage an immortal faith” (The Boston 
Globe Investigative Staff, 2002, p. 8). (Note that even The Globe’s critique is couched in 
essentially reverential view of Catholicism.) In its chronology of the crisis, the United 
States Council of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) describes The Globe’s exposé this way: 
“The Boston Globe launches a series of articles on the case of Father John Geoghan and 
the handling of clerical sex abuse cases in general in the Archdiocese of Boston which 
eventually sparks a national crisis for the Church in the United States” (USCCB, n.d., 
“USCCB Efforts to Combat”). 
According to The Globe’s (2002) book on the subject, what had been a latent 
problem in the US Roman Catholic Church broke into an undeniable organizational 
crisis in June 2001. In a court filing at that time, the Archbishop of Boston, Cardinal 
Bernard Law, admitted to knowingly reassigning an alleged sexual abuser (Rev. John 
Geoghan) without disclosing his problematic record. For Globe reporters, “that 
document was a turning point: a story about a priest who was accused of molesting 
children was now a story about a bishop who protected that priest” (The Boston Globe 
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Investigative Staff, 2002, p. ix). At stake was the difference between an isolated case and 
a systemic problem.  
Rev. Thomas Doyle, a priest and canon lawyer whose cautionary 1985 report 
(with Ray Mouton and Michael Peterson) on clergy sex abuse was largely ignored by the 
Catholic hierarchy, argues that the most recent chapter of the Church’s historic problem 
with clergy sexual abuse began with the 1984 case of Father Gilbert Gauthe in Lafayette, 
Louisiana. In this case, Gauthe was indicted on 34 counts of sexual misconduct against 
11 children and admitted to having sexual contact with boys in each of every parish he 
had ‘served’ since his ordination (Filosa, 2002). After years of legal wrangling, Gauthe 
entered into a plea bargain that sentenced him to a 20-year prison term. He was released 
after ten years due to a legal loophole, however, and was quickly arrested for assaulting 
a three-year-old (Filosa, 2002). The Gauthe case cost the Lafayette diocese $20 million; 
it also spurred Mouton (Gauthe’s defense lawyer) and Doyle (then a Vatican Embassy 
canon lawyer) to co-author the report mentioned above. 
In Doyle’s view, the current chapter in this crisis stands out due to the clergy’s 
response to allegations of abuse. Instead of aiding alleged victims, “Church officials 
routinely responded to victims by intimidating them in hopes of obtaining their silence.  
They also manipulated, stonewalled, deceived and threatened victims” (Doyle, n.d., “A 
Very Short History”). The result was that victims pursued justice in civil rather than 
canonical courts. As noted in the opening paragraphs, this externalization of the crisis 
fundamentally challenged the hierarchy’s capacity to control the situation. 
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The Globe staff concur with Doyle’s assessment, arguing that although the 
problem had been known since the mid-1980s, this was the first time that the hierarchy 
were shown to have “repeatedly put the welfare of their priests ahead of that of the 
children in their care” (The Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002, p. x). Cardinal Law 
responded to the growing public outrage with an apology. He quickly agreed to release 
names of accused priests, and declared a zero-tolerance policy for abusers and support 
for victims (The Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002, p. x). In general, this initial 
response, an example of traditional apologia, was favorably received. However, as 
Law’s rhetoric began to clash with his actions, public outcry increased. Strong response 
came from the laity (many of whom called for Law’s resignation and/or withheld 
donations), state legislators (who passed a bill making clergy mandatory reporters), law 
enforcement officials (who began issuing arrest warrants for accused priests), victims 
(who began stepping forward publicly) and lawyers (who began refusing silent 
settlements) (The Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002, p. x, 3-5). At this stage, the 
number of active (and vocal) participants in the crisis increased rapidly. 
A history of secrecy (in the church and the court system) had left little to no trace 
of previous claims of abuse. It was not until The Globe levied a court challenge that 
documents in the watershed case were made public. As a result of the paper’s claim that 
“the public interest in unsealing the documents outweighed the privacy concerns of the 
litigants,” papers in the Geoghan case were unsealed in January 2002 (The Boston Globe 
Investigative Staff, 2002, p. xi). Within weeks of publishing its initial exposé, dioceses 
around the nation found themselves grappling with how to respond to the burgeoning 
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crisis. Despite the hierarchy’s attempts to delimit the crisis to a few perpetrators, then to 
one archdiocese, it had grown to national proportions. 
By February 19, 2002, Bishop Wilton Gregory, president of the USCCB had 
added his own formal apology to that of Law; he had also called for a combined 
lay/hierarchy effort to ensure the safety of Catholic children. At the same time, Voice of 
the Faithful (VOTF), a Boston-based lay organization, was emerging in response to the 
crisis. Although it began as a "listening session" of 30 parishioners in St. John the 
Evangelist church in Wellesley, Massachusetts, VOTF grew to over 25,000 global 
members within a few months (Thorpe, n.d., “The Voice of the Faithful Story”). 
Apparently this was not the type of combined lay/hierarchy effort that the hierarchy 
wanted, since VOTF was banned from numerous New England parishes. The lay group 
spent much of its first year clarifying its identity and justifying its ties to the church. 
By March 14, 2002, the USCCB’s Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse 
(AHCSA) had been commissioned to make a preliminary study of the situation. Then, in 
April 2002, in an unusual gesture, the Pope called all US cardinals to Rome. In a reversal 
of earlier designations, the Pope described the sexual abuse of minors to be not only a 
sin, but a crime (The Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002, p. 5). This was a significant 
shift, since it opened the door for the inclusion of civil authorities in cases of abuse. By 
this time, the crisis had spread globally (The Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002, p. 
6), and public talk swirled around a variety of issues, including the sex, marital status, 
and sexual orientation of priests; the training of seminarians; the Church’s culture of 
secrecy; and the intimidation and infantilization of the laity. 
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On June 14, 2002, the USCCB passed the “Charter for the Protection of Children 
and Young People” by a vote of 239-13. Canonical “Essential Norms” were also passed 
and sent to the Vatican for recognitio or approval. Both Charter and Norms were revised 
under the direction of the Vatican, were passed by the USCCB, and received Vatican 
recognitio on December 8, 2002. During this time, the USCCB had also named a 
National Review Board (NRB) and created the Office of Child and Youth Protection 
(OCYP). 
In spite of the hierarchy’s attempts to manage the crisis through the creation of 
committees, policies, and studies (see below), by the end of 2002, approximately 500 
individuals had come forward alleging abuse and approximately 1,200 priests had been 
accused; further, at least six US prelates had resigned due to abuse-related issues by 
2003 (The Boston Globe, n.d., “Scandal and Coverup”). By November 2004, the 
Archdioceses of Portland, Tucson, and Spokane had filed for bankruptcy in response to 
multimillion dollar claims levied against each of them. By June 2005, the Boston 
Archdiocese had paid $150.8 million to settle sex abuse claims (Simpson, 2006). Rather 
than receding in response to the hierarchy’s management, the crisis seemed to grow. 
In order to understand the scope of the crisis, it is helpful to turn to a series of 
surveys commissioned by the USCCB to track the nature and extent of the problem and 
to (self-) monitor the Church’s crisis management. The Gavin Group of Boston and the 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice were commissioned in March 2003 to conduct a 
“compliance audit on diocesan implementation of the Charter” and a descriptive 
analysis of the “nature and scope of the problem” respectively. Additionally, the NRB 
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issued a report on the crisis in February 2004. In February 2005, the second Charter 
compliance report was issued, which included a survey by the Center for Applied 
Research in the Apostolate (CARA). This survey addressed new allegations, the accused 
clergy, and financial cost of managing these allegations. (Another source of information, 
not addressed in this study, is the AHCSA’s March 2005 survey of clergy sexual abuse 
survivors.) 
Although the research produced at the behest of the USCCB is consistently (and 
rightly) critiqued by other stakeholders for its bias (Survivors Network of those Abused 
by Priests [SNAP], 2004, January 1; SNAP, 2004, December 13; VOTF, 2004, 
December 13; VOTF, 2005, March), it remains one of the most detailed sources for 
measuring the crisis. Even when one accounts for the limitations of these studies (self-
report measures, internal accountability, a sometimes rigorous resistance to disclose 
information, time and resource constraints, etc.) they paint a sobering landscape of abuse 
and complicity. The following paragraphs present a brief review of the John Jay study 
and the 2005 Annual Survey of Allegations and Costs. 
The John Jay Report, begun March 2003 and published June 2004, surveyed 195 
(97%) of dioceses and 140 (100%) of religious communities in the US (pp. 16, 26). It 
studied the years between 1950 and 2002, and looked at the number and nature of 
allegations by those under 18 years of age, the status and management of the accused, 
characteristics of alleged victims and their abuse, and the financial impact on the 
Church. Of 4,392 credibly accused priests between 1950 and 2002 (approximately 4% of 
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active priests during the period) (pp. 26, 28), the study found that 143 (33%) faced 
allegations in multiple dioceses, eparchies, or religious communities (p. 57). 
Although allegations were levied by 10,667 individuals during this time, it is 
unclear how many cases remain unreported (p. 69). Of the alleged victims, 51% were 
11-14 years old, 27% were 15-17, 16% were 8-10, and nearly 6% were under 7 (p. 53). 
Of the total number, 81% were male and 19% female (p. 69). Whereas the police had 
been contacted about only 1,021 (24%) of the accused priests, 37% of alleged abusers 
had participated in treatment programs (pp. 60, 100). Of those reported to the police, 384 
have led to criminal charges (p. 60). From the information available, the researchers 
calculated that 252 (6%) of all accused priests were convicted and at least 100 (2%) 
received prison sentences (p. 61). At the time the John Jay study was released, the total 
cost paid by the church exceeded $500,000,000 (p. 105). This number continues to rise 
as settlements are reached around the nation. 
Additional information emerges from the 2005 Annual Survey of Allegations and 
Costs. In 2004, The Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate at Georgetown 
University was commissioned by the USCCB to take an annual survey of new 
allegations of clergy sexual abuse and its financial impact. (CARA’s survey results help 
comprise the USCCB’s Annual Report on the Implementation of the Charter.) Tables 1-
3 present the total number of allegations, victims, offenders, and costs reported to CARA 
by dioceses, eparchies, clerical, and religious institutes for 2004 and 2005, the only years 
for which this data is currently available (Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, 
2006). Table 1 shows a decrease in allegations from 2004-5. On the other hand, Table 2 
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shows an increase in allegation-related expenditures from 2004-5. Table 3 shows a 
comparison between allegation-related expenses and child protection expenses, with 
greater increase in settlement spending than in child protection spending. The picture 
that emerges through this data is that of an organization reducing its offences while 
increasing its financial outlay for restitution. Although this is consistent with the 
USCCB’s overall public relations (PR) during the crisis, it is contested through the PR of 




New Credible Allegations Reported (Source: CARA, 2006, p. 45) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 2004 2005 Change (+/-) 2004-2005 
Victims 1,083 777 -306 
Allegations 1,092 783 -309 






Costs Related to Allegations (Source: CARA, 2006, p. 45) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 2004 2005 Change (+/-) 2004-2005 
Settlements $106,241,809 $399,037,456 +$292,795,647 
Therapy for Victims $7,406,336 $8,404,197 +$997,861 
Support for Offenders $1,869,330 $13,669,138 +$11,799,808 
Attorneys Fees $36,251,445 $41,251,640 +$5,000,195 
Other Costs $6,033,891 $4,571,041 -$1,462,850 







Costs for Settlements and Child Protection (Source: CARA, 2006, p. 46) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 2004 2005 Change (+/-) 2004-2005 
Settlement-related $157,802,811 $466,933,472 +$309,130,661 





As noted, numerous criticisms may be made against the rigor and trustworthiness 
of USCCB-sponsored research. Interestingly, even though the USCCB was ultimately 
responsible for each of these studies, there was marked resistance to participation by 
many in the hierarchy. In response to his experience trying to gather data, Governor 
Frank Keating, the first director of the NRB, compared members of the hierarchy to ''La 
Cosa Nostra'' (i.e., the American branch of the Mafia) due to their propensity to hide and 
suppress information (Paulson, 2003). In fact, conflict over this very reticence to 
cooperate led to Keating’s resignation from the board. On one hand, critics argued that 
self-reports were biased in favor of the hierarchy; on the other hand, the hierarchy was 
markedly reticent to participate in even organizationally-controlled surveys. That the 
hierarchy was hesitant to participate in internal audits seems revealing. Despite this, 
Doyle, writing from the position as a contested expert and an insider-without, notes: 
From the late 19th century into the early 21st century the church’s leadership has 
adopted a position of secrecy and silence.  They have denied the predictability of 
clergy sexual abuse in one form or another and have claimed that this is a 
phenomenon new to the post-Vatican II era.  The recently published reports of 
the Bishops’ National Review Board and John Jay College Survey have 
confirmed the fact of known clergy sexual abuse since the 1950's and the church 




For Doyle, the hierarchy is incriminated by its own biased research. 
Be that as it may, the data presented in these reports, the chronology presented by 
the USCCB, the overview of the crisis constructed by The Boston Globe, and Doyle’s 
historical overview of sex abuse in the Church (each a source for this section) give some 
indication of the scope of the case. Given the (admittedly limited) overview presented in 
this chapter, it is clear that systemic clergy sexual abuse is a crisis for the (US) Catholic 
Church. As such, it has provoked a crisis communication from the USCCB as well as a 
variety of other organizations. In order to understand the lens through which this study 
views the crisis discourse, it is important to present a brief rationale for the analytical 
perspective taken by this dissertation. The next section does so. 
The Perspective 
As mentioned in the opening section, this dissertation takes a dialogical 
perspective on crisis communication. This perspective emerges from a central tension 
between strategic and dialogic approaches to PR (Leitch & Neilson, 2001, p. 128). This 
tension is also indicated by Grunig’s (1989) distinction between instrumental (i.e., 
asymmetrical) and reciprocal (i.e., symmetrical) models of PR (in Leeper, 2001, p. 99). 
Although strategic (i.e., instrumental, asymmetric) approaches dominate the field 
(Gandy, 1992; Leitch & Neilson, 2001, p. 128), dialogic (i.e., reciprocal, asymmetric) 
approaches offer a substantive alternative approach (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 
180; Leeper, 2001, p. 99; Leitch & Neilson, 2001, p. 128). Strategic approaches to PR 
emphasize the consumption of organizational messages by targeted publics; dialogic 
approaches depict an equal discursive interaction between an organization and ‘its’ 
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publics (Leitch & Neilson, 2001, p. 128). In both models, however, the organization is 
given the subject position; publics are understood from this perspective (Leitch & 
Neilson, 2001, p. 128). The result is a bias toward an ‘organizational perspective’ 
throughout the literature (Leitch & Neilson, 2001). Thus, although extant approaches to 
crisis communication are illuminating, they are generally limited to the perspective of a 
single dominant organization (Leitch & Neilson, 2001, pp. 128-9). 
Interestingly, this is as true for extant dialogical approaches to PR as it is for 
strategic approaches (Cheney & Christensen, 2001; Leitch & Neilson, 2001; McKie, 
2001). This is an unfortunate state of affairs, since dialogic approaches have the potential 
to reveal a more nuanced understanding of the co-construction of public relations 
discourse than do strategic approaches. According to Cheney and Christensen (2001), an 
uncritical application of extant symmetrical models may unintentionally lead to 
corporatism (p. 181). This would occur when organizational decision makers invite 
strategic stakeholders into exclusive dialogues (p. 181). Further, Leitch and Neilson 
(2001) argue that even Grunig’s symmetrical model of PR is a strategic organizational 
choice; by obscuring power and failing to differentiate conceptually between an 
organization and a public, this model fails to offer any ethical advantage to asymmetrical 
models (p. 129). 
By obscuring the communicative complexities and power dynamics of crisis 
management, an organization-centered orientation to crisis communication compounds 
what might be called PR’s managerial-egalitarian paradox. This paradox is anchored 
between the espoused egalitarian ideal and consistent managerial bias of PR scholarship 
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and practice. It emerges where PR research uncritically advances managerial interests 
while glossing over inherent power divides between organizations and their publics. This 
study argues that challenging the managerial-egalitarian paradox of PR requires a 
fundamental shift away from the organization-centered perspective undergirding 
traditional approaches to crisis communication. Again, it is essential to note that even 
‘dialogical’ models of PR such as Grunig’s two-way symmetrical model fail to engage 
the polyvocal interactivity of PR. As such, they are nominally dialogical. In order to 
understand public relations as a contested communicative process, this dissertation offers 
a more developed (yet still contestable) notion of a dialogical framework for PR 
research. 
By crafting a more rigorous dialogical framework, it is possible to fundamentally 
challenge the managerial bias in PR research. Rather than describing crisis 
communication from the perspective of the source organization, a dialogical perspective 
takes an inclusive perspective. Rather than arguing that only those with ‘actual’ power 
speak into an emergent crisis and thus dismissing or downplaying non-dominant voices, 
this perspective listens to the asymmetrical polyvocality of crisis communication. This in 
turn opens the door to a more complex understanding of how participants seek to control 
one another and influence the unfolding crisis through the generation of public relations 
discourse. Key here is acknowledging how the polyphony of voices in crisis PR 
discursively manages power. 
An extended dialogical perspective also makes it possible to challenge the 
idealism of public relations scholarship. Rather than prescribing strategic best practices, 
 16
this study traces how PR functions in the clergy abuse crisis. Rather than promoting 
dialogue as a linear, rational model for PR practitioners, this study uses dialogue as a 
lens through which the fluid, open, constitutive nature of PR is revealed. As a descriptive 
approach to PR, a dialogical assessment of crisis communication illuminates actual PR 
discourse in such a way that challenges the idealism of prescriptive approaches to public 
relations practice. Key here is listening to the complexity of public relations discourse. 
Thus, in order to offset the linked limitations of managerialism and idealism in 
public relations, this study challenges and extends the predominant ‘dialogical’ model of 
PR. In so doing, it responds to Cheney and Christensen’s (2001) call for a critical 
assessment of “so-called two-way symmetrical systems” (p. 181). In order to illuminate 
the communicative complexities of crisis communication, this study seeks to apply an 
extended dialogical framework to analyze a crisis situation. As Cheney and Christensen 
(2001) write: “As we contemplate both the utility and the further development of the 
two-way symmetrical model, we must take a more realistic view of power and adopt a 
full appreciation of the postmodernist challenges to the idea of rational dialogue” (p. 
181). 
The Document 
Before applying a dialogical framework to the crisis communication generated in 
the clergy abuse crisis, it is necessary to map the terrain of public relations, crisis 
communication, and dialogue research. To that end, Chapter II introduces the scholarly 
domain of public relations, focusing on its historical development, its atheoretical nature, 
and its treatment of communication. Chapter III focuses on crisis communication as a 
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subset of public relations. In this chapter, extant approaches to crisis scholarship are 
reviewed, forming the backdrop for the current approach. Chapter IV reviews the broad 
and complex literature on dialogue. Here, the goal is to trace the schools of thought in 
dialogue scholarship from which the conceptualization of dialogue used in this study 
emerges. Chapter V reviews the study’s methodology, tracing both the study’s approach 
to theorizing practice and the research process. 
Chapter VI and VII are data analysis chapters. Six traces the data at a macro level 
by assessing each stakeholder organization’s discursive presence across time, general 
orientations to dialogic terms, and stakeholder contextualizations of the crisis. Seven 
presents a micro approach to the data by comparing initiative/response patterns to 
offensive/defensive orientations, (non)topicality, and enabling/constraining responses. 
This level of focus gives way to a broader perspective on the study in Chapter VIII. 
Here, the emergent framework and research process are restated in a more coherent 
fashion. The goal here is capturing the analysis in a way that it might be further 
developed in other studies. Additionally, implications for both crisis communication 
scholarship and the clergy abuse case are presented, as are limitations of this study and 
areas for future research. 
The overarching goal of this study is to theorize a dialogical framework for 
understanding the communicative construction of crises. Such an orientation to crisis 
communication is seen as an essential extension of extant public relations scholarship, 
the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
A REVIEW OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 
In order to contextualize the current study, it is essential to review three scholarly 
domains: public relations, crisis communication, and dialogue. The literature on public 
relations and crisis communication illuminate the communicative domain to be studied; 
the literature on dialogue illuminates the epistemological framework driving the data 
analysis. Since crisis communication is a type of public relations, it makes sense to open 
the study with an overview of PR. 
This chapter opens with a brief argument for the communicative nature of public 
relations. Next, a review of the historical development of the field is presented, which 
leads to a review of an important, yet contested model of PR. Some limitations of PR 
scholarship are drawn from these reviews, and lead to a discussion of the role of theory 
in public relations scholarship. The chapter concludes by tracing the interplay between 
the disciplines of public relations and organizational communication, paving the way for 
a review of the literature on crisis communication. 
Public Relations as Communicative 
PR is, by origin and definition, communicative. It has its origins in mass 
communication and journalism (Heath, 2001b, p. 2), and may be defined as “the 
management of communications between an organization and its publics” (Hainsworth 
& Meng, 1988, p. 21).More particularly, PR is the management of organizational 
identity, image, and issues through various channels including news releases, press 
releases/statements, press conferences, press kits, and events. It engages a variety of 
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audiences including organizational members, community members, shareholders/ 
investors, the media, special publics, and/or consumers. It is comprised of internal, 
external, and boundary-spanning communication. It draws on communication that is 
face-to-face, written, and technologically mediated. It can be mapped on axes of 
proactivity-reactivity and defensiveness-offensiveness. It is premised on the need to 
influence meaning-making, agenda-setting, and/or policy-making. It is a site of contest 
and a means through which power is enacted and resisted. It may be analyzed, as any 
communication is, according to direction, channel, style, content, relational components, 
recursivity, chronology, context, etc. Clearly, public relations is enacted discursively. 
Despite the essentially communicative nature of public relations, PR scholarship 
has traditionally drawn on relatively unsophisticated transmissional understandings of 
communication (not unlike other areas of early communication research), as a review of 
its historic development shows. Although it might be critiqued as an artificially coherent 
narrative of the development of the field (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 168), Cheney 
and Vibbert’s (1987) assessment offers a succinct historical review sufficient for 
contextualizing the current discussion. It forms the basis of the following section. 
Public Relations’ Historic Development 
Although, according to Grunig and Hunt (1984), the U.S. first press agents 
appeared in the mid-1800s, public relations did not become a named organizational 
process until the late 1880s (Cheney & Vibbert, 1987, pp. 166-167). Cheney and Vibbert 
(1987) describe the U.S.’s earliest public relations as “a curative response to unfavorable 
public opinion … the public defense of actions” (p. 167). Here, PR is clearly defensive 
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and retrospective. In this nascent stage, American public relations “consisted primarily 
of publicity generated to blunt the attack of another, with a somewhat wary eye focused 
on both the public and the activity adopted to reach them” (p. 168). 
This focus on defensive publicity was influenced by a shift toward propaganda in 
the 1920s (p. 168). At this time, the work of PR practitioners (defending an organization 
to its publics) began to be augmented by the work of PR scholars (informing PR practice 
with scientific principles). This served to institutionalize PR by adding a focus on 
rationality and control to organizational defense (pp. 168-169). Although PR researchers 
began drawing information from publics for their research, it was generally one-way 
communication that served organizational ends. 
The emergence of public relations as a profession followed 30 years later (p. 
171). By the 1960s, public relations became more visible (by entering common social 
discourse), yet more exclusive (by relying increasingly on private lobbying and links 
with highly segmented and targeted publics) (p. 172). According to Cheney and Vibbert, 
this shift was set in a dynamic social context (c.f., the Vietnam War, the civil rights 
movement, economic shifts) in which the mass media was vilified and lobbying became 
a common PR function. This marks the advent of the advocacy function of public 
relations (p. 173). 
By the 1970s, PR was seen as a type of public policy management (p. 173). Both 
the concept of advocacy and that of public policy management indicate another key shift 
in public relations. To its publicity and defensive functions was added a proactive 
involvement in larger social processes. This function may play out as image 
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management or issue management. However, despite the potential of this new angle to 
challenge PR’s bias toward the ‘source organization,’ it largely continued to be viewed 
from the position of the source organization. Ultimately, social involvement in the public 
sphere became another avenue for advancing organizational goals. 
Bringing their overview of public relations to the 1980s, Cheney and Vibbert 
(1987) posit that PR “addresses the margins of overlap between an organization and its 
publics in distinctive and strategic ways” (p. 173). McKie (2001) argues that such an 
emphasis on organizational strategy (from the Greek strategia or generalship) 
emphasizes that which is done “out of sight of the enemy [and] … points to ongoing 
assumptions…about the adversarial nature of communication with publics” (p. 77). 
Cheney and Vibbert’s conceptualization of PR as an essentially communicative function 
in which organizational actors “attempt … to control the ways internal and external 
environments discuss such key concepts as values, issues, images, and identities” (p. 
173) seems to carry McKie’s point. Although a diversity of stakeholders or publics is 
relevant in Cheney and Vibbert’s view, organizational control remains the main goal of 
public relations. As conceptualized to this point, PR is clearly bounded by 
managerialism and a bias toward the source organization. This makes sense, given the 
(neo)classical (i.e., functionalist) underpinnings of the field (Botan, 1997, p. 195; 
Trujillo & Toth, 1987, pp. 204, 208). This dissertation argues that both of these biases, 
rather than inherent to PR, stem from a monological orientation to the practice of public 
relations (Botan, 1997, pp. 195-6). 
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Grunig’s Model of Two-Way Symmetrical PR 
An attempt to challenge to the traditional orientation undergirding the PR 
literature comes from Grunig et al’s research (Botan & Taylor, 2004, p. 652). From his 
early categorizations of synchronic and diachronic PR communication, Grunig (1984) 
developed four models of PR practice: the press agentry/publicity model, the public 
information model, the two-way asymmetrical model, and the two-way symmetrical 
model. These models were then used by Grunig and Hunt (1984) to trace the historical 
development of PR in the United States and to typify contemporary PR practice (Grunig, 
2001, p. 11). 
The first two models represent one-way approaches to public relations, that is, 
“the dissemination of information from organizations to publics, usually through the 
media” (Grunig & Grunig, 1992, p. 288). By applying emerging principles of social 
science to PR, Freud’s nephew Edward Bernays (inadvertently) opened the possibility of 
two-way public relations. In order to generate scientific principles of PR, practitioners 
exchange information with publics (Grunig & Grunig, 1992, p. 288). The shift led to 
two-way asymmetrical models, in which the organization and its publics were connected 
through an imbalanced relationship. The goal here is using research to “identify attitudes 
and to develop messages that appeal to those attitudes that persuade publics to behave as 
the organization wants” (Grunig, 1993). Thus, while this model is relational, it is not 
dialogic. Two-way communication is uncritically applied to advance organizational 
ends. 
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The fourth model of public relations identified by Grunig and Hunt (1984) is 
two-way symmetrical. In this model, the goal is mutual understanding between an 
organization and its publics rather than unidirectional persuasion (Grunig & Grunig, 
1992, p. 289). This model presumes that achieving the goal of mutual understanding 
requires an exchange of communication between an organization and its publics. For 
Grunig and Grunig (2000), publics are stakeholders (those who are affected by or can 
affect an organization) who are aware and/or active. Publics merit organizational 
communication to the degree they: perceive themselves as involved with an 
organization’s actions, conceptualize an organization’s actions as problematic, and are 
unconstrained in responding to an organization (Grunig & Grunig, 2000, p. 312). 
According to Grunig (2001), symmetrical PR occurs “where groups come 
together to protect and enhance their self-interests. Argumentation, debate, and 
persuasion take place. But dialogue, listening, understanding, and relationship building 
also occur because they are more effective in resolving conflict than are one-way 
attempts at compliance gaining” (p. 18). In this model, Grunig attempts to challenge the 
fundamental conceptualization of managerially biased public relations. Although the 
shift to an inclusive view of PR practices is important, and paves the way for more 
rigorous interpretive or cocreational, (e.g., dialogic) approaches to PR (Botan & Taylor, 
2004, p. 652), Grunig’s model is rightfully critiqued on several accounts, two of which 
are reviewed below. 
First, despite Grunig’s disclaimer that he “never viewed the two-way 
symmetrical model as one of pure cooperation or of total accommodation of a public’s 
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interests” (2001, p. 12), this model fails to fully problematize the prioritization of an 
organization over ‘its' publics. The emphasis on strategic PR (Grunig 2001, p. 13; 
Grunig & Grunig, 2000) indicates a bias toward organizational ends. Part of the dilemma 
here is the failure to adequately engage the disparate enactment of power between an 
organization and ‘its’ publics. This criticism has been noted by a variety of critical 
scholars; Grunig himself (2001) cites Dozier and Lauzen (1998), Kersten (1994), and 
L’Etang (1996) as critics on this point (pp.16-18). Key here is the reality that 
organizations and ‘their’ publics have differential access to resources, communicative 
and otherwise. Working from a similar assumption, German (1995) goes so far as to 
argue that corporate communication with publics can only be monological (p. 293; in 
McKie, 2001, p. 77). The contention here is that PR is a communication phenomenon in 
which organizations use persuasion to gain their own advantage at the expense of their 
publics, so to dub it ‘symmetrical’ serves a hegemonic end. 
Although the two-way symmetrical model does not inherently disallow power, it 
obscures it. At best, it is hastily mentioned as a hindrance to collaboration or as a reason 
for sketching a normative theory of activist PR (Grunig, 2001, p. 14; Grunig & Grunig, 
1992, p. 319). At worst, it is portrayed as off-set by the countervailing power available to 
activist publics through media advocacy, litigation, legislation, and regulation (Grunig, 
2001, p. 18). Stating that “many public relations practitioners believe their organizations 
have lost control to activist groups,” Grunig implies that the power disparity may 
actually hang in favor of organized publics (2001, p. 18). In situations such as the clergy 
sexual abuse crisis, such an assumption is dangerous where it risks faulting victims 
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while portraying perpetrators as victims. Were one to analyze the clergy sex abuse crisis 
through the lens of the two-way model, the only communication which would be audible 
would be those instances which the Roman Catholic Church (as the ‘source’ 
organization) strategically engages or acknowledges. In this way, it would silence 
unacknowledged discourse being produced by salient publics and discourse being 
produced in alternative arenas. 
Second, the two-way symmetric model plays into the idealism of PR. After 
carefully distinguishing between a positive model (i.e., descriptive) and a normative 
model (i.e., prescriptive), Grunig categorizes his model as normative. Interestingly, 
Grunig rebuts criticisms that this (ideal) model is idealistic (Grunig, 2001, pp. 16-20). 
Even if some of Grunig’s critics have oversimplified his model (Grunig, 2001), it is 
intended to function as a recommended best practice. Reasoning backwards from 
Grunig’s recommendation that public relations ought to be symmetrical, one can infer 
that enacted PR is not necessarily symmetrical. Reasoning backwards from the 
assumption that ‘excellent’ organizations practice symmetrical PR, one can infer that not 
all organizations practice symmetrical PR. Even advocates of Grunig’s model admit it is 
bounded by the source organization (PR agency versus corporation), the culture (USA 
versus China), the history and technological savvy of an organization, and the reality of 
mixed motives (self versus other) (Hon, 2007, pp. 13-15). 
Inasmuch as it fails to challenge the managerial-egalitarian paradox in PR 
scholarship, the two-way symmetrical model is insufficient for understanding the 
nuances of a case like the clergy sex abuse crisis. At the most basic level, it would 
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obscure the power disparity among stakeholder organizations. By restricting its attention 
to stakeholders deemed strategic by the source organization, it may overlook key 
stakeholders. This, in turn, would obscure how stakeholders respond to an organization’s 
determination of their strategic worth (i.e., whether they are worth engaging or not). It 
would also paint over the tactics stakeholders use to challenge the source organization’s 
crisis management. This model also fails to distinguish between authentic attempts to 
create communicative symmetry and attempts to create the appearance of symmetrical 
PR (i.e., image management). 
Thus, while Grunig’s model has advanced and challenged PR research, it fails to 
engage the communicative complexities of enacted public relations discourse. In 
continuing to challenge the functionalist presumptions of PR, researchers must attend to 
marginalized voices and alternative truths in crisis communication (Tyler, 2005, p. 567). 
They must also recognize the power embedded in treating managers as innocent victims, 
in the organizational goal of quick closure, in foregrounding a single organizational 
voice, and in seeking situational control; the function of polyvocality and dissent and the 
ethical implications of particular responses to suffering have yet to be addressed (Tyler, 
2005, p. 567).  
Limitations in Public Relations Scholarship 
More generally, in constructing more nuanced understandings of PR, it may be 
helpful to consider three challenges facing PR scholarship. First, as PR has become 
institutionalized and professionalized, it has uncritically privileged the source 
organization. From the early days of publicity to the pursuit of scientific principles to the 
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recommendation of two-way symmetry, the source organization has not been challenged 
as the primary focus or agent of public relations. When publics are considered, they are 
considered in relation to, and from the perspective of, the source organization (Botan, 
1997, p. 196; Botan & Taylor, 2004, p. 651; Leichty & Warner, 2001, p. 61; Leitch & 
Neilson, 2001, p. 127). They are, in essence, made Other, and viewed from the 
standpoint of the source organization. The assumption that public relations discourse 
flows from an organization to ‘its’ publics obscures the reality that multiple 
organizations discursively contribute to many PR situations. The result is that “public 
relations theory has been unable to come to terms with the power relationships between 
discourse participants or with ethical issues relating to power differentials” (Leitch & 
Neilson, 2001, p. 127). 
For example, Martin and Boynton’s (2005) study of NASA’s crisis 
communication following the Challenger and Columbia tragedies looks for evidence of 
NASA’s communication with its stakeholders. However, stakeholder voices are absent 
from the research, as is any critical assessment of NASA’s crisis management goals. In 
his (2004) assessment of West Pharmaceutical’s facility explosion, Coombs offers “a set 
of guidelines for crisis managers looking to protect their reputational assets” (p. 467) 
without problematizing the goal of organizational self-protection or exploring competing 
goals. Sellnow, Ulmer, and Snider’s (1998) review of the 1994 salmonella outbreak at 
Schwan explores the link between taking corrective action and restoring an 
organization’s image without addressing the response of victims to corrective action or 
the ethical implications of engaging corrective action for the purpose of image 
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restoration. Even in Wise’s (2004) assessment of Chicago’s response to a deadly 
nightclub stampede, the only contrary voice comes from media. It is fascinating that 
stakeholders are marginalized in a discussion of the strategic use of attribution versus 
compassion. Although there has been some treatment of PR from critical perspectives 
(see Toth & Heath 1992; Trujillo & Toth, 1987), a fundamental reconceptualization of 
PR as a contested practice has yet to take hold. One response to this challenge is 
decentering the (notion of the) source organization. 
Second, much PR research fails to offer a sufficiently complex understanding of 
communicative interactivity. The important distinction between one- and two-way 
communication notwithstanding, PR research frequently obscures the nuances of 
communication. Early models discounted interaction entirely, relying on “an overly 
narrow view of communication as a one-way and primarily downward conduit” (Trujillo 
& Toth, 1987, p. 204). Later, two-way models are better, addressing “communication as 
a two-way process involving various channels (upward, downward, and horizontal) and 
various media” (Trujillo & Toth, 1987, p. 204). Even these models, however offer a 
simplistically linear view of communication, often implicating bi-directional one-way 
communication. As Cheney and Christensen (2001) note, strategic organizational 
communication “narrows down the notions of dialogue, symmetry, and responsiveness 
to specifically circumscribed and manageable encounters between the organization and 
select publics” (p. 181). Oversimplifying PR communication obscures how multiple 
organizations collaboratively and conflictually co-construct PR. According to Kent and 
Taylor (1998), fully understanding symmetrical communication requires an 
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understanding of dialogic communication (p. 323), which they conceptualize as a 
negotiated intersubjectivity (p. 325). Key to managing this challenge is analyzing public 
relations discourse in a polyvocal context. 
Third, the extant literature on PR fails to address the gap between the ideal of 
symmetry and the reality of asymmetry (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 180). Offering 
a ‘symmetrical’ relationship between an organization and those it deems key public(s) 
may in fact obscure how power disparities between an organization and ‘its’ publics are 
managed. As Leitch and Neilson (2001) note, discourse symmetry requires more than a 
“willingness to listen to publics and to adapt one’s behavior as a consequence of this 
interaction” (p. 129). Where there is an unequal access to resources, there is asymmetry 
(Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 180). According to McKie (2001), PR needs to look 
beyond simplistic notions of two-way symmetry to consider “complex force fields of 
multiple competing powers in the real world” (p. 84). Although critics deem it 
hegemonically asymmetrical (i.e., an organization unilaterally using its power to pursue 
its goals) and proponents tout it as idealistically symmetrical (i.e., organizations inviting 
stakeholders into mutually beneficial relationships), PR hangs somewhere in the balance. 
As the discussion of Grunig’s two-way symmetrical model shows, a normative theory of 
PR serves to compound rather than elucidate the problem. The problems that come from 
either overstating or under-specifying symmetry are compounded “by the complete 
absence of the concept of power in mainstream public relations theory” (Leitch & 
Neilson, 2001, p. 128; see also Coombs, 1993). One way to ensure a balanced 
perspective is employing a descriptive analysis of PR. 
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Although there are a myriad of challenges to be managed in any area of research, 
these three are key for any communication-based analysis of PR. By analyzing how PR 
communication functions, it is possible to articulate a model of PR which describes how 
multiple organizations construct a PR situation across power divides. The model 
presented here decenters the source organization by attending to the polyvocality and 
power dynamics of public relations discourse. In particular, this dissertation advances a 
more complex understanding of how PR functions by addressing how a variety of 
stakeholder organizations interactively co-construct a crisis. In so doing, it extends the 
line of research begun by numerous researchers working from interpretive and critical 
frameworks. In particular, it follows on the heels of Botan (1997), Botan and Hazelton 
(1989), Botan and Taylor (2004), Kent and Taylor (1998 & 2002), Pearson (1989), and 
others addressing the potential of a dialogic theory of PR. 
Given the goal of further articulating the dialogic theory of PR, it is essential to 
understand how theory functions in PR scholarship. This is the subject of the next 
section. 
Public Relations’ Theoretical Framework 
While there is a fairly robust literature to guide public relations practitioners, its 
theoretic foundation is less than robust. According to Cheney and Christensen (2001), 
PR “grew out of a highly practical context and subsequently developed a theoretical 
apparatus to support the analysis and legitimation of its professional activity” (p. 167). 
Leitch and Neilson (2001) agree, noting, “The needs of the public relations profession 
have, to a large extent, driven the development of public relations as an academic 
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discipline” (p. 127). Given this developmental sequence, it is important that PR’s 
theoretical agenda should not simply follow social-political trends (Cheney & 
Christensen, 2001, p. 167) or be restricted by a focus on current exigencies (Leitch & 
Neilson, 2001, p. 127). Instead, theory development ought to be as evocative and 
enlightening as it is responsive to professional and social trends (Cheney & Christensen, 
2001, pp. 167-168). 
A survey of the literature, however, indicates that PR is remiss in theory 
development. Although PR scholars have allocated numerous social science theories, 
“there is no public relations theory” (Leeper, 2001, p. 93; see also Grunig, 1989). This 
challenge constrains research in both the US and in Europe (Moss, Verčič, & Warnaby, 
2000, p. 2). Taking a rather diplomatic stance, Botan and Taylor (2004) argue that theory 
is present, yet underdeveloped in PR research (p. 659). Cropp and Pincus (2001) 
describe PR theory as fragmented, noting that “scholars have generated an assortment of 
theories and models that, when taken together, show public relations as a field comprised 
of a constellation of separate and linked subfields, perspectives, roles, and purposes” (p. 
193). Whether describing PR theory as absent, fragmented, or underdeveloped, these 
researchers each problematize extant PR theory. 
Theoretic Bases 
In order to contextualize the need for continued development of PR theory, it is 
important to review some ways in which public relations scholars have applied theory to 
date. Despite (or perhaps because of) the shortage of original PR theories and the lack of 
a covering PR theory, PR scholars frequently allocate theories from other disciplines. 
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Just a few of the theories (generated or borrowed) include: apologia theory, image 
restoration theory, communitarianism, stakeholder theory, game theory, chaos theory, 
‘new science,’ complexity theory, role theory, situational theory, and a variety of 
feminist theories. At a time when PR was dominated by functionalist understandings, 
Trujillo and Toth (1987) drew on organizational theory to argue that PR research and 
practice should be informed by functionalist, interpretive and critical perspectives (p. 
204). Then, in 1992, Ehling, White, and Grunig cited four major conceptual systems 
undergirding PR scholarship: inter-organizational theory, management and decision 
theory, communication theory, and conflict resolution theory (in Moss, Verčič, & 
Warnaby, 2000, p. 3). 
At the same time, Toth (1992) explored how systems, rhetorical, and critical 
perspectives reveal complementary conceptualizations of public relations. Systems 
perspectives have been predominant in recent decades, since they undergird Grunig’s 
paradigmatic theory (Botan & Taylor, 2004, p. 659; Toth, 1992, p. 3; Trujillo & Toth, 
1987, p. 207). From a systems perspective, PR is a subsystem of the organization 
(Trujillo & Toth, 1987, p. 207), and attention to the environment is paramount (Toth, 
1992, p. 8). Interviews and surveys are common research tools in this perspective (Toth, 
1992, p. 10). From this theoretical perspective, PR serves to “coordinate and integrate 
the various subsystems that constitute the organization and, more important, to reduce 
uncertainty about the environment in order to help the organization adapt to (and grow 
in) that environment” (Trujillo & Toth, 1987, p. 208). What is missing in much of this 
scholarship is a rigorous treatment of communication (Toth, 1992, pp. 3, 9). 
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Offsetting this deficit is the substantive work on rhetorical perspectives of PR 
(e.g., Heath 1992; Heath 2001a; Toth, 2000). A 1978 Supreme Court ruling brought this 
line of theorizing to bear by reconceptualizating corporations as rhetors (Toth, 2000, p. 
130). Rhetorical analyses of PR frequently focus on values, issues, identities, and images 
(Toth, 2000, p. 130), assess mass media accounts and public records, and draw on the 
work of Burke (Toth, 1992, pp. 5-6). According to Toth (1992), the goal of rhetorical 
approaches to PR is “to evaluate or criticize the effectiveness of organizational messages 
as successfully advocating organizational stances” (p. 6). 
An emphasis on evaluation is central to critical perspectives on PR. In this 
theoretical approach, scholars seek to “disrupt our beliefs about organizations” (Toth, 
1992, p. 7) and explore how PR is a vehicle for power and social influence (Trujillo & 
Toth, 1987, p. 218). Work from this theoretic tradition explores whose interest is served 
by public relations communication, and frequently uses written messages or values as 
units of analysis (Toth, 1992, p. 7). Key here are explorations of how PR practitioners 
use the tools of their trade to influence social bodies (Cutlip, 1980, in Trujillo & Toth, 
1987, p. 218) or systematically distort communication (Deetz, 1982, in Trujillo & Toth, 
1987, p. 219). Important to this theoretic perspective is a critical examination of 
ideologies driving PR practice (Olasky, 1985, in Trujillo & Toth, 1987, p. 220). 
According to Botan and Taylor (2004), the field has seen an increasing use of 
‘cocreational’ theories (e.g., the symmetrical/excellence theory, coorientation theory, 
accommodation theory, and dialogue theory) in the past decade. The use of these 
theories marks a key shift in how scholars conceptualize PR communication, from a 
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functional to a cocreational activity (p. 652). It remains to be seen which cocreationist 
model will emerge “as the most useful, the most theoretically valuable, and perhaps, the 
one that situates public relations theory as a foundational member of the field of 
communication” (Botan & Taylor, 2004, p. 659). To date, communication centered 
theories allocated by PR scholars have been drawn from interpersonal, organizational, 
mass media, group, and cultural/critical communication research. 
In addition to addressing the theoretic perspectives of PR research, it may be 
helpful to note that PR scholars address theory at multiple levels. Boton and Hazleton 
(1989) categorize public relations theory on three levels: metatheoretic, theoretic, and 
applied (in Botan & Taylor, 2004, p. 649).  This may be compared to Littlejohn’s (1992) 
three levels of theory: metatheoretic, hypothetical, and descriptive. Leeper (2001) 
describes Littlejohn’s metatheoretic level as addressing basic assumptions, his 
hypothetical level as constructing pictures of reality or frameworks for knowledge, and 
his descriptive level as centering on operations and findings (p. 93). According to Botan 
and Hazelton (1989), researchers must recognize the metatheoretic assumptions of their 
projects before engaging theoretic alternatives (p. 7; in Leeper, 2001, p. 93). Grunig 
(1989) concurs, arguing that metatheoretical considerations precede development in the 
practice (p. 17; in Leeper, 2001, p. 96). Botan and Taylor (2004) augment the focus on 
driving theoretical assumptions with a focus on the contexts and methodological lenses 
that affect the adoption of a particular theory or theoretical perspective (p. 651). This 
paves the way for the current study, which uses a case study (i.e., applied level) to map 
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and test a particular dialogical epistemology (i.e., metatheoretical level) for 
understanding crisis communication. 
The following brief review of two approaches to PR theory further illustrates the 
interconnection among the levels of theory. 
Theoretic Case Analyses 
Although scholars distinguish between theoretic and applied levels, PR research 
often folds those into one frame. This coincides with Barge and Craig’s (in press) 
contention that theory may be used to conceptualize practice. The plethora of case 
studies in public relations reveals this to be a popular choice. Although it may be more 
typical to apply one theory to a case, an interesting alternative to theoretic case analyses 
is offered by Sellnow and Seeger (2001), who advocate using multiple theoretical 
models in one study. In this approach, researchers explore the explanatory power of 
various theories in one analytical frame. By applying several theories to one case, 
researchers can approach public relations cases on a more complex, nuanced level than 
they might otherwise. According to Sellnow and Seeger (2001), “multiple methods are 
necessary for building a complete understanding of … broad-based, complex, and 
dynamic events” (p. 164). In particular, they say it takes the dynamic interplay of various 
theoretical perspectives to foreground “the important interactive features of crisis” (p. 
165). They argue that more simplistic, unitary analyses fail to challenge the status quo, 
and fail to “account for the multifaceted role of communication in crisis planning and 
recovery” which, in turn, denies “both victims and potential victims the understandings 
necessary to deal more successfully with these powerful events” (p. 166). 
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In an exemplar study for this approach, Sellnow and Seeger (2001) draw on 
chaos theory, retrospective sensemaking, crisis communication logistics, and apologia to 
study the Red River Valley Flood crisis. Their analysis illustrates the flexible, 
sophisticated understanding of crisis events that can emerge when multiple theoretic 
perspectives are used in concert. Although Sellnow and Seeger stop short of 
reconnecting the findings to a more complex and nuanced theoretical framework of 
crisis communication, their approach opens the door for combating the theoretic 
fragmentation of public relations. In order to move beyond a case study approach (no 
matter how rich), it is essential that researchers tease out more fundamental 
metatheoretical implications of their findings. This role of theory is discussed next. 
Metatheoretic Analyses 
Rather than using multiple particular theories to illuminate practice, some 
researchers assess how a variety of metatheoretical approaches illuminate public 
relations scholarship. By moving beyond individual case studies, metatheoretic analyses 
explore processes basic to public relations, thus potentially expanding conceptualizations 
of the domain. Rather than advocating the creation of new models or frameworks, 
researchers working from this perspective argue that the next step for theorizing PR is to 
set extant perspectives in conversation with one another, exploring where they contrast 
and where they augment one another. As opposed to theoretic case analyses which can 
be accomplished in one study, this approach requires a secondary (or meta) level 
analysis. That is, it requires the application of a diversity of theoretical models in 
individual studies. Sets of such studies are then assessed for essential complementarity 
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across theoretical perspectives. This illustrates the interplay between theory and 
metatheory, with theoretic analyses being sifted against one another to tease out 
metatheoretic orientations of the discipline. 
As mentioned, a good example of this approach to theory development is Toth’s 
(1992) exploration of how systems, rhetorical, and critical perspectives reveal 
complementary conceptualizations of public relations. Although Toth delineates the 
distinctions among the three perspectives, she argues that they are increasingly able to 
offer complementary rather than competing insights into public relations. By sifting the 
three perspectives against one another, Toth determines that rhetorical and critical 
researchers need to clarify the theoretic underpinnings of their research in order to be 
salient to the field (p. 12). She also determines that rhetorical and critical scholars stand 
poised to add a much richer conceptualization of communication to the field than 
systems scholars have articulated (p. 12). 
An interesting assumption of Toth’s approach is the sufficiency of existing 
theoretical models for PR. Toth asserts that what is lacking is simply an exploration of 
how extant theories interact. Researchers pointing towards a new paradigm in PR 
scholarship (e.g., Boton & Taylor, 2004; Kent & Taylor, 2002; Leeper, 2001) seem to 
challenge this presumption. Although cross-paradigmatic meta-analyses such as Toth’s 
are an important way to illuminate commonalities in the field, they should not be taken 
as a substitute for theory development. Be that as it may, clearly both theoretic case 
analyses and metatheoretic analyses are important tools as researchers continue to 
theorize PR practice. 
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Engaging a Potential Paradigm for PR Theory 
According to McKie (2001), PR theory has been slow to develop for three major 
reasons: “outmoded ideas of science (especially reductionism) … an associated 
quantitative methodology, and … scientific management” (p. 80). Moss, Verčič, and 
Warnaby (2000) cite the “multi-disciplinary roots and boundaries of modern public 
relations theory and practice” as a confounding factor in attempts to demarcate a 
“distinctive body of knowledge in public relations” (p. 2). Regardless of the reason, 
there is clearly much room yet to theorize public relations practice. Leeper (2001) notes 
that the general desire for a PR theory continues to fuel “an ongoing discussion among 
scholars as to which possible paradigm would be most valuable as a unifying theory” (p. 
93). At the same time, it is possible to question the need for a unifying theory. 
This dissertation enters the ongoing discussion by exploring the potential of a 
particular dialogic perspective on crisis communication. A dialogic perspective threads 
(although in a contested form) through the reigning paradigm of PR (i.e., Grunig’s 
excellence theory), and has been offered as a potential new paradigm for the field (Boton 
& Taylor, 2004, p. 659; Kent & Taylor, 2002, p. 33). According to Kent and Taylor 
(2002), although a dialogic theory of PR is the “next stage of public relations theory 
development,” additional theoretical issues in dialogue have yet to be articulated (p. 33). 
In response, this dissertation crafts a dialogic model for analyzing actual PR discourse. 
As will be explained in Chapter V, this study theorizes practice by taking a 
grounded practical theory approach to public relations discourse. This speaks to the 
ongoing need to theorize practice by exploring how a dialogical epistemology might 
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illuminate the discursive construction of a crisis. In offering a particular dialogic model 
of crisis communication, this study does not offer a recommended practice. It offers a 
mechanism for tracing the specific communicative strategies used by an organization 
and its stakeholders in a crisis situation. That is, the model presented here is descriptive 
rather than strategic, offering a mechanism for teasing out ways in which discourses 
interact to alternately extend, challenge, shape, alter, control, or steer an unfolding crisis. 
This offers a mechanism for illuminating the communicative practices of organizations 
which are not practicing ideal (or ‘excellent’) communication, since this is where most 
learning takes place. 
In order to contextualize the analysis, however, it is necessary to narrow the 
focus to the particular type of public relations practice most salient to the clergy abuse 




CRISES AND CRISIS COMMUNICATION 
The preceding review of PR’s history and theoretical basis sets the stage for an 
assessment of the type of PR most salient to the clergy abuse case: crisis communication. 
Whereas researchers position public relations as a general process of adjusting an 
organization to its environment, crisis communication is described as an organization’s 
(internal and external) response to an unexpected and damaging event. As such, crisis 
communication is a subset of public relations. In order to understand the nuances of 
crisis communication, one must first understand the nature of an organizational crisis. 
Conceptualizing Organizational Crises 
In general, given the word’s etymology, a crisis might be defined as a turning 
point or a point of decision (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 7). A fairly 
representative conceptualization is offered by Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (1998) who 
describe an organizational crisis as “a specific, unexpected and non-routine 
organizationally based event or series of events which creates high levels of uncertainty 
and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals” (p. 233; in Seeger, 
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 7). A more general perspective is offered by Carroll (1991), 
who sees crises as emotionally driven incidents that may engender turning points (p. 
492; in Marcus & Goodman, 1991, p. 284). According to Fink (1986), a crisis is marked 
by public scrutiny, high intensity, image-threats, and/or financial threats (in Penrose, 
2000, p. 157). According to Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003), a crisis “evokes a sense 
of threat, urgency, and destruction” (p. 4). Further, crises have ambiguous meanings and 
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outcomes (Penrose, 2000, p. 157; Sellnow & Seeger, 2001, p. 155, Ulmer & Sellnow, 
1997, p. 216). 
More specifically, Marcus and Goodman (1991) describe crises according to 
their causes and their effect on victims (p. 284). Using these two factors, the authors 
articulate three types of crises: accidents, scandals, and product safety incidents (p. 281). 
In this view, accidents have concrete victims and high levels of deniability; scandals 
have diffuse victims and low levels of deniability; and product safety and health 
incidents have moderately identifiable victims and moderate deniability (p. 265). Further 




Typology of Crises (Source: Marcus & Goodman, 1991) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 Accident Product Safety/Health Incidents Scandal 
Deniability High deniability Moderate deniability Low deniability 
Victims Clear victim pool Disputed victim pool Diffuse victim pool 
Event Discrete event Repeated events Not a discrete event 
Cause Due to system properties Due to faulty or dangerous product Due to human or  





Although this typology is helpful in understanding some basic characteristics of 
crises, it is limited. It obscures organizational type (i.e., sector, industry), the enactment 
and contestation of power, the evolution of crises across time, potential distinctions 
among victims, and the contested emergence of stakeholders. The limitations in this 
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typology highlight the boundaries of early crisis definitions, and point to ways in which 
current understandings of crisis communication need to be expanded.   
Traditionally, crises have been viewed as specific, time-bound events which 
threaten an organization, thus requiring a rapid response to reassert organizational 
control (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001, p. 156). In this fairly narrow view, the 
responsibility of public relations practitioners is the speedy dissemination of information 
and the restoration of the organization’s image (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001, p. 
156). Newer research portrays crises as an inevitable and increasingly prevalent part of 
organizational life (Fink, 1986, pp. 1, 8; Sellnow & Seeger, 2001, p. 153, Seeger, 
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 3). This is apropos, given the growing reliance on 
technology and complex organizational systems. In this more holistic view, crises are a 
natural part of the organizational lifecycle (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998; Seeger, 
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001, p. 156) and may create the potential for growth and positive 
outcomes (Penrose, 2000; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002). This shift in conceptualizations adds 
environmental scanning, risk assessment, and crisis planning to the PR professional’s 
job. 
Conceptualizing Crises Further 
Recent shifts in the literature notwithstanding, there are several areas of 
confusion that need to be clarified in order to articulate a rigorous understanding of 
organizational crises. First, it is important to distinguish between triggering events and 
the crisis process. Extant literature argues that crises are brought about by a cosmology 
episode (i.e., a traumatic event which unhinges one’s sense-making ability) (Weick, 
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1985; Weick 1993) or a trigger event (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 4). For 
Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003), trigger events “signal radical breaks with previous 
states of existence” (p. 4). In this view, a crisis is a life-changing, archetypal event for 
individuals, organizations, and communities (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 6). 
Drawing on Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, and Miglani (1998), Olaniran and Williams 
(2001) describe triggering events as “specific events identifiable according to place, 
time, and agents” (p. 492). Thus, a triggering event (e.g., an oil spill, a failed product, a 
moral failure) is what sets a crisis in motion. Unfortunately, by delimiting a crisis as an 
event (see Fearn-Banks, 2001, p. 480; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998, p. 233; Seeger 
& Ulmer, 2002, p. 126), many traditional definitions obscure the diachronic complexity 
of crises. Triggering events are part of a crisis, but they must not be confused with the 
crisis in its entirety. 
In an early allusion to the crisis process, Fink (1986) describes a crisis as a 
“fluid, unstable, dynamic situation … things are in a state of constant flux” (p. 20; 
emphasis added). This is underscored in newer definitions that portray crises as an 
inevitable, and perhaps necessary, element of the organizational lifecycle (Olaniran & 
Williams, 2001, p. 487; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002, p. 137). Although still failing to address 
the contested enactment of crises, these models do move beyond linear 
conceptualizations of crisis management (such as Littlejohn’s (1983) Six-Step Crisis 
Model) to emphasize the cyclical nature of crises. One cyclical model reviewed by 
Fearn-Banks (2001) describes the crisis process as originating with detection (watching 
for warning signs), then moving through preparation and prevention (heeding warning 
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signs), containment (limiting the duration/damage), and recovery (efforts to return to 
normalcy), en route to learning (evaluation of losses/lessons) (p. 480). This last stage 
serves to turn the crisis into a prodrome, or warning sign, for future crises, thus 
beginning the cycle again (Fearn-Banks, 2001, p. 480). 
Viewing crises as cyclic means they extend beyond one-time events to dynamic 
situations. This must be taken one step further to highlight their recursivity across time. 
Rather than an event, a linear process, or a controlled cycle, crises are co-constructed 
across space and time by a variety of elements. They are comprised of strategic planning 
and unforeseeable contingencies (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001, p. 158), emerge 
through the interaction of humans and technology (Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, & 
Miglani, 1998, in Penrose, 2000, p. 157), and play out in both internal and external 
contexts (Coombs, 1995; D’Aveni & MacMillan, 1990; Fink, 1986; Heath, 1990; 
Penrose, 2000). 
Further, although the source organization may attempt to control a crisis situation 
rhetorically and materially, such attempts do not go uncontested. Alternative accounts 
may emerge from the media, varying agendas may be offered by stakeholders, critical 
opinion may come from the public, particular responses may be mandated by legal and 
law enforcement entities, and confounding information may come to light through 
organizational members. Unfortunately, traditional approaches fail to take into account 
the complex body of communication generated in response to a triggering event. What is 
necessary is a model which illuminates how a source organization and ‘its’ stakeholders 
co-construct a crisis through communication that may be alternately conflictual and 
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collaborative, (dis)allowed, and may (not) effect change. In response to this need, the 
current study crafts and applies a dialogical model of crisis communication which draws 
the crisis-focused communication of a variety of stakeholders into a single framework. 
Second, it is important to distinguish between crisis resolution and crisis 
management. Although the term crisis management permeates the literature, it is 
consistently paired with an emphasis on the quick and efficient resolution of crises. The 
assumption that crises are natural and inevitable has yet to shift researchers’ focus from 
resolution to management; the two are misnamed and conflated throughout the literature. 
For example, one research team describes the goal of crisis management as moving 
“beyond the crisis as quickly and thoroughly as possible while maintaining economic 
viability and social legitimacy” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001, p. 162). Further, 
Seeger and Ulmer (2002) argue that most strategies in crisis communication typologies 
“focus largely on moving beyond the crisis, principally by obscuring, disputing, 
suppressing, diffusing, or discounting responsibility for the event and/or associated 
harm” (p. 128). Even in phase models, there is an emphasis on prevention, containment, 
and recovery (see Fearn-Banks, 2001, p. 480). The preoccupation with crisis resolution 
indicates that the chief intent of organizations in crisis is control and stability. To return 
to status quo, managers seek to resolve the crisis. Throughout the literature, there is an 
emphasis on speed and closure, which speak to resolution more than to management, 
despite the consistent use of the term crisis management. 
In an early article, Fink (1986) describes crisis management as “managing a fluid 
situation by a process of vigilant decision making” (p. 11). Although his emphasis on 
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contingency planning and conditional thinking (p. 55) opens the door for a management 
focus, Fink functionally equates crisis management with decision-making (p. 133) and 
thus resolution. He also assumes that crisis managers are involved in the organization’s 
strategic planning process, although this is frequently not the case. In a more recent 
article, Fearn-Banks (2001) defines crisis management as “strategic planning to prevent 
and respond during a crisis or negative occurrence, a process that removes some of the 
risk and uncertainty and allows the organization to be in greater control of its destiny” 
(p. 480). Here, there is an emphasis on either preventing a triggering event or controlling 
the crisis situation it may engender, both aspects of resolution. 
What is necessary at this point of confusion is to disentangle the concepts of 
resolution and management. Since most of what is described as crisis management in the 
literature is driven by the goal of resolution, crisis management has yet to be specified 
and examined. A clear focus on crisis management would allow researchers to examine 
how goals of resolution interact with goals of ongoing management. Conceptualizing the 
goals of crisis PR on a continuum between resolution (emphasizing speed, control, and 
closure) and management (emphasizing an ongoing, complex, contested process) would 
be a start. The current study addresses this lack by tracing how a variety of stakeholder 
organizations use PR to contest the construction of the clergy sex abuse crisis. Rather 
than focusing on the source organization’s attempts to resolve the crisis, this study 
focuses on how stakeholders alternately seek to extend or close out the crisis. 
Third, it is important to take a more complex view of proactive versus reactive 
crisis management. Historically PR was construed as the public defense of 
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organizational actions (Cheney & Vibbert, 1987, p. 167). This defensive orientation has 
been underscored by the extensive application of apologia in enacting and analyzing 
crisis management. Since the 1980s, rhetorical analyses of crisis discourse have 
permeated the literature (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 172). Although researchers 
argue that rhetoric is not inherently unidirectional (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 173), 
rhetorical analyses of crisis discourse predominantly focus on apologia, which is, by 
definition, a discourse of defense (Hearit, 1994). 
Set against this backdrop, researchers have begun to explore the implications of 
proactive crisis management. At the heart of this trend is the previously noted 
reconceptualization of crises as a phase in the organizational lifecycle. One of the 
outcomes of this shift is an increasing scholarly attention to crisis planning and proactive 
crisis strategies (Olaniran & Williams, 2001, p. 488). In this school of thought, situation 
analyses, decision-making, prevention, and uncertainty-reduction are key (Olaniran & 
Williams, 2001, pp. 490-492). According to Udwadia and Mitroff (1991), preparation 
for a crisis requires an awareness of self and one’s vulnerability to crisis; it also requires 
the creation of crisis plan (in Olaniran & Williams, 2001, p. 500). This links back to 
Fink’s early work (1986) in which there is an assumption of conscious, strategic, rational 
planning. 
This emphasis on proactive planning, although an important counter to the 
reactive/defensive tactics predominant in the early literature, is simplistic. Marra (1998) 
problematizes the uncritical assumption that crisis plans lead to the ‘successful’ 
management of a crisis. Although plans are important, he argues that they must be 
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augmented by an awareness of how organizational culture, the amount of decision-
making autonomy the PR team has, and the PR team’s alignment with senior leadership 
affect the outcome of crisis management. Marra suggests shifting the focus from tactics 
and techniques to organizational strategies (1998, p. 473). 
One such strategy is that of ‘stealing thunder.’ This is a self-disclosure strategy 
used in jury trials, politics, and organizational crises in which an individual releases 
potentially negative information about him or herself before anyone else can (Arpan & 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005, pp. 425-426). Crisis managers who ‘steal thunder’ may earn 
increased credibility in the public arena, but run the risk of escalating public attention to 
their crisis (Arpan & Pompper, 2003, p. 301). Stealing thunder extends the emphasis on 
proactive crisis communication to preemptive crisis communication, an unnamed 
possibility in the literature. 
Another strategy that indicates the simplistic dualism between reactive and 
proactive crisis management is that of kategoria-based apologia (Hearit, 1996). This 
counter-attack strategy may take three forms: levying new charges against an attacker, 
challenging the validity of charges by reframing them; or challenging the ethics of the 
accuser (Hearit, 1996, pp. 235-236). In effect, this is a rhetorical strategy for turning one 
stakeholder organization in a crisis from a defensive posture to an offensive posture. 
This strategy allows a less powerful organization to leverage the force of a more 
powerful organization’s attack against it, much as a smaller wrestler may leverage a 
larger opponent’s weight against him/her. Although, as Hearit indicates, this strategy 
shifts an organization from the defensive to the offensive (p. 236), it is a responsive 
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strategy. As such, kategoria-based apologia is a reactive-offensive strategy, something 
not named in the literature. 
Whether crisis communication is proactive, preemptive, or reactively-offensive, 
the cyclical notion of crises (and the need to address crisis management rather than crisis 
resolution) makes a clear differentiation between proactivity and reactivity difficult. As 
Cheney and Christensen (2001) argue, the notion of proactive crisis management 
predicates research into “how proactivity potentially enacts and precipitates the very 
situations that organizations seek to escape” (p. 171). It also predicates research into how 
stakeholders contest the definition of and control over a crisis (p. 171), the focus of this 
dissertation. What is necessary is a model which allows for a more complex 
understanding of the ways in which organizations may orient to crisis communication. 
By taking a dialogical view of crisis communication, it is possible to trace the 
interactivity in crisis communication. This, in turn, illuminates a variety of discursive 
mechanisms (which may be more or less intentional and conscious) organizations use in 
constructing a crisis. (See Table 5 for some possible orientations to crisis 




Possible Orientations to Crisis Communication 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  Reactive Proactive 
Defensive Traditional apologia Stealing thunder 
Offensive Kategoria-based apologia Crisis planning 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Thus, although the literature conceptualizes crises in a fairly consistent way, a 
more rigorous conceptualization must distinguish between triggering events and the 
communicative construction of a crisis. Further, it must be clear about the competing 
goals and differing processes of resolution and management. In addition, it is crucial to 
allow for a more complex understanding of the strategic orientation organizations take to 
crises. If, contrary to extant conceptualizations, crises are comprised of one or more 
trigger events embedded in a recursive cycle of planning and management, and if each 
communicative act in this cycle may take a variety of strategic orientations, it is essential 
to find a model capable of engaging the communicative complexity of crises. The 
dialogic model of crisis communication proposed in this dissertation is one mechanism 
for illuminating the ongoing, complex, interactive nature of organizational crises. The 
dialogical model constructed in this study offers one way to speak to each of these 
limitations by foregrounding a variety of ways in which stakeholders communicatively 
manage an unfolding crisis situation. Foundational to this approach is the concept of 
crisis communication. 
Although some scholars treat crisis communication as one of several crisis 
management tools (Fink, 1986, in Marcus & Goodman, 1991, p. 284), this exhibits a 
severely limited conceptualization of communication. A richer understanding emerges 
when one explores the ways in which communication is constitutive of crises. This is 
especially important since crisis management is essentially communicative and crises are 
constructed discursively among stakeholder organizations. 
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According to Sellnow and Seeger (2001), communication has several roles in 
crisis literature, and the understanding of communication’s role in crises has evolved 
across time. This section reviews two key orientations to crisis communication and 
prepares the way for a third. First, in the PR-based literature, crisis communication is 
treated as a strategic set of practices. Second, in the organizational rhetoric literature, it 
is treated as the strategic management of meaning. A third potential, developed in this 
study, addresses a dialogic understanding of crisis communication. 
Crisis Communication as Strategy 
 Generally, public relations scholars present crisis communication as a strategic 
tool. During crises, effective communication (i.e., the fast delivery of accurate, relevant 
information) is recommended as an organization’s top priority (Penrose, 2000, p. 158). It 
is described as one of the main elements of crisis plans (Penrose, 2000, p. 157), a 
mechanism for avoiding crises (Fink, 1986, p. 14), and a way to minimize reputational 
damage (Fearn-Banks, 2001, p. 480). As such, it is the strategic management of 
information flow used to protect an organization’s image (Coombs, 1995, p. 449; Marra, 
1998, p. 462; Penrose, 2000, p. 158). 
 In this view, communication is described as transmissional, with an emphasis on 
the dissemination, solicitation, and monitoring of information (Seeger, Sellnow, & 
Ulmer, 2001, p. 162). Seeger and Ulmer (2002) concur, describing crisis communication 
as “practitioner-based strategies for the management of a crisis including crisis planning, 
decision-making, and media relations” (p. 128). 
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 Key to this strategic, transmissional communication is speed (Arpan & Pompper, 
2003, pp. 291-3; Marra, 1998, p. 462; Penrose, 2000, p. 158; Williams & Olaniran, 
1994, in Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001, p. 162). However, the practitioner mantra of 
‘tell it all and tell it fast’ is complicated by issues of risk, timing, and control (Arpan & 
Pompper, 2003, pp. 291-293). Risk emerges as practitioners manage the tension between 
stonewalling to mitigate legal ramifications and disclosing to mitigate image 
ramifications. Timing becomes an issue as media and the source organization grapple 
over the nature and flow of information. Control is another mitigating issue. When the 
source organization proactively discloses information, it gains control; however, it risks 
losing control if this disclosure escalates the import of the crisis (Arpan & Pompper, 
2003, pp. 291-293). Quick, full disclosure, then, is not a straightforward process. Be this 
as it may, good crisis communication is repeatedly described as fast, efficient, and 
vigilant (Williams & Olaniran, 1994, in Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001, p. 162). 
Although the research on strategic uses of crisis communication is revealing, its 
preoccupation with strategic outcomes obscures the sense-making and persuasive 
functions of crisis communication. Rhetorical analyses, coming as they do out of the rich 
tradition of communication scholarship, are more illuminating on this point. 
Crisis Communication as Rhetoric 
Rhetoric, which addresses “the ways in which discourse functions in various 
social contexts” has been applied to the field of public relations since the early 1980s 
(Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 172). Rhetorical analyses of crises foreground “the 
processes whereby organizations create and exchange meanings among stakeholders 
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regarding the risk of crisis, cause, blame, responsibility, precautionary norms, and crisis-
induced changes in the organization and its relationship to stakeholders” (Seeger & 
Ulmer, 2002, p. 128). Crisis rhetoric helps stakeholders make sense of the crisis situation 
and frame the future (Weick, 1988, in Seeger & Ulmer, 2002, p. 127). It also serves as a 
means through which an organization can influence and/or control emerging 
interpretations of the crisis. 
Although based on the long tradition of individual rhetoric, scholars argue that 
corporate rhetoric is unique. Organizational rhetors face greater audience diversity, have 
access to more creative resources, and may be required to create an image of univocality 
from polyvocality (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 173; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 
2001, p. 160). Another interesting notion is that management is both the source and 
audience of its own rhetoric (Heath, 1990, p. 153). When organizational rhetoric 
becomes internalized as organizational culture, it serves to constrain the perceptions, 
judgments, and actions of organizational members, management included (Heath, 1990, 
p. 153). Thus, just as management exerts unobtrusive control over employees through 
the rhetoric it uses, it may be controlled by the very same rhetoric (p. 153). When 
organizational rhetoric is oriented toward presentation (precluding discussion or 
analysis), an organization runs greater risks of crises; when it is oriented toward 
examination (promoting discussion and analysis), the organization may be better able to 
mitigate potential crises (Heath, 1990, p. 157). Thus, organizational rhetoric is unique 
from individual rhetoric in its access to resources, attempts to veil organizational 
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polyvocality in an image of univocality, and its effect on organizational culture. It is also 
a key mechanism for the enactment of control and power in and by an organization. 
The tradition of organizational rhetoric has been brought to bear on crisis 
communication from at least four approaches: apologia theory, kategoria-based apologia, 
image restoration theory, and discourses of renewal. Each of these schools of thought 
builds on the others. The most developed and closest to the roots of classical rhetoric is 
that of apologia. Hearit (1994) describes apologia as a ‘discourse of defense’ in which 
one reframes organizational actions in a more compelling light (pp. 114-115). Although 
apologia is inherently responsive to some accusation, researchers fail to address the 
interchange or interactivity among organizational rhetors. Apologia is largely used as an 
analytical lens for understanding the source organization’s crisis communication. 
Hearit (1994) sees apologia as serving three goals for a source organization. 
First, persuasive accounts “reassert terminological control over the interpretation of the 
act with a counter-interpretation of events” (p. 115). Redefinition through persuasive 
accounts may deny intent and thus responsibility. Second, statements of regret allow 
organizations to express sorrow while downplaying responsibility. This is important, 
since admitting concern for victims may negatively affects stock prices and denying 
responsibility may steady stock prices (p. 117). Third, dissociation allows the 
organization to distance itself from the situation, thus appearing in a more favorable light 
(p. 121). 
Three forms of dissociations are available to organizational rhetors. They may 
use opinion/knowledge dissociations when the facts are debatable; in this case, the 
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organization argues that the accusations are opinions and offers ‘facts’ to counter them. 
This functions to deny responsibility or guilt. They may use individual/group 
dissociations when the facts of the case are not in question; in this case, the organization 
argues that the responsible party is or acted outside of the organization’s realm of 
authority. This functions to shift blame to another party. Finally, organizational rhetors 
may use act/essence dissociations when the organization must admit some guilt; in this 
case, the organization argues that the act was wrong, but is not representative of the 
character of the organization. This functions to deny intent. 
Huxman and Bruce (1995) shift the focus from apologia strategies to apologia 
analyses. Based on Campbell and Jamieson’s (1978) argument that rhetorical genres 
share substantive, stylistic, and situational character traits, Huxman and Bruce (1995) 
propose a ‘dynamic generic framework for apologia’ (p. 57). In order to understand 
apologia as a genre, one must assess its situational characteristics (accusatory), its 
substantive characteristics (motivational), and its stylistic characteristics 
(argumentative). This requires asking three key questions:  ‘What exigency caused this 
situation?’ ‘What is the apologist’s motive?’ and ‘How does the apologist advance the 
argument?’ (pp. 58-59). Assessing the answers to these questions paves the way for a 
generic analysis of apologia. However, note that it still fails to address the way in which 
crisis communication is constructed by a variety of organizations. It is a single-
organization analysis. 
On the heels of his (1994) terminological approach to apologia, Hearit (1996) 
proposes the notion of kategoria-based apologia (as mentioned earlier). Since apologia is 
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inherently defensive, Hearit proposes that organizations may respond to an attack with a 
counter attack. This essentially shifts an accused organization from the defensive (the 
situation of traditional apologia) to the offensive (p. 236). As already mentioned, there 
are three forms of kategoria (pp. 235-236). First, an organization may levy new charges, 
although this risks compounding its image of guilt by looking like a dodge. Second, an 
organization may challenge the validity of charges by reframing them (c.f., 
opinion/knowledge dissociations). Third, an organization may challenge the ethics of the 
accuser by labeling the charge as false or labeling the accuser as ethically suspect. 
Although Hearit makes an important contribution to the literature by focusing on 
the shift of power between organizational rhetors, kategoria-based apologia is a risky 
option for practitioners. Given the inherent power differentials among stakeholders in an 
organizational crisis, an organization can only use this strategy on an opponent of equal 
or larger power. Otherwise it will appear to be bullying its accuser (p. 244). 
Additionally, the shift involved in kategoria may appear as an attempt to distract 
stakeholders from key issue(s) (p. 245). This strategy is best used when “the apologists 
can arguably claim the moral high ground, or at least claim that their opponents have 
taken the low road” (p. 245). This is an important contribution to the literature, since it 
requires at least a basic awareness of the communicative interplay among stakeholder 
organizations. 
Benoit’s (1995, 1997) typology of image restoration strategies is the next 
development in crisis rhetoric. According to Benoit (1997), his focus on message options 
builds on, and is more exhaustive than, apologia theory (p. 178). Essentially, he offers a 
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typology of strategies organizations may use to restore their image (p. 178). 
Organizations may deny the act with a simple denial or a shifting of blame. They may 
evade responsibility by claiming that they were provoked, alternative actions were not 
feasible, the situation was an accident, or they acted out of good intentions. 
Organizations in crisis may also work to reduce the offensiveness of the act by 
bolstering their image, minimizing the act, differentiating the act from more negative 
acts, pointing to some transcendent aspect of the context or outcome, attacking the 
accuser, or offering compensation to victims. Finally, they may take corrective action or 
offer an apology.  
Although this approach clearly draws on Hearit’s earlier strategies of apologia, it 
reverts back to a single-rhetor view. Seeger and Ulmer (2002) critique image restoration 
theory as focusing on “linear rhetorical strategies designed to symbolically position the 
organization more favorably” (p. 129). Further, it frames the concerns of stakeholders as 
“obstacles or costs to be quickly resolved, minimized and overcome…. The overriding 
goal is to return to a pre-crisis state as quickly and with as little damage to the 
organization’s image and reputation, cost and disruption as possible” (p. 129). This 
critique, emerging directly from the typology of strategies points to a consistent 
obscuring or devaluing of stakeholders and their concerns in the literature. 
Although not speaking to this organizational bias, Seeger and Ulmer’s (2002) 
discourse of renewal is positioned as an alternative to both apologia and image 
restoration strategies. (Note that this approach, although not strictly rhetorical, situates 
the ‘discourse of renewal’ as an alternative to ‘discourses of apologia,’ connecting it to 
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the current discussion.) Noting that “crisis-related discourse is most often about harm, 
responsibility, fault, culpability, blame, guilt, liability, compensation, and victimage” 
and generally framed as apologia, the authors propose an “optimistic discourse of 
rebuilding and renewal” (pp. 126-127). They site the expanding research on the positive 
consequences of crises as a rationale and context for this alternative conceptualization of 
crisis communication (p. 129). Rather than focusing on strategy, Seeger and Ulmer 
explore how post-crisis discourse might frame crisis events as “more dynamic, natural, 
and potentially positive processes in organizing” (p. 129). This focus on discourse 
moves beyond traditional conceptualizations of rhetoric to focus on the “organic and 
interactive process of reformation and renewal” central to sense-making and planning (p. 
130). 
 Importantly, this focuses a leader’s discourse on the future through use of 
‘prospective sensemaking,’ thus freeing up “organizational resources that may have been 
constrained by a more myopic, retrospective focus” (p. 137). Although this echoes the 
standard goal of crisis communication to focus on (an unproblematic) future, it does so 
by relinquishing issues of blame and causality rather than by resolving them (p. 137). In 
this approach, crises are viewed as opportunities for transformation and natural 
components in the organizational lifecycle rather than as interruptions (p. 137). This 
echoes the shift, noted earlier, to a processual understanding of crises. 
 In contrast to responses based on apologia or image restoration, renewal 
responses are provisional rather than strategic (p. 138). That is, leaders using a discourse 
of renewal draw on their instinctive reaction to a crisis rather than a pre-planned 
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response (p. 138). One important implication of this research is the specification of how 
(leaders’) discourse can frame the construction (or enactment) of a crisis (Weick, 1979, 
1988, 1995; in Seeger & Ulmer, 2002, p. 138). A second key implication is the shift 
from a generic (i.e., typology-driven) to an organic (i.e., exigency-driven) view of crisis 
communication (Burns & Bruner, 2000, in Seeger & Ulmer, 2002, p. 139). This unusual 
shift from standardized to emergent crisis management may privilege crisis management 
rather than crisis resolution. 
As Seeger and Ulmer (2002) note, the crisis communication literature is biased 
toward generic, strategic approaches to crisis communication. Although PR scholar-
practitioners’ emphasis on “intention-based, strategy-centered” rhetoric has obscured 
issues of power, there has been a recent shift in research from linear analyses of 
particular cases to a “deep appreciation of the interactions of various institutional forces 
in contemporary (post)industrial society” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, pp. 172-3). 
There is some debate in the literature as to the capacity of rhetorical analyses to address 
this interactivity. While some scholars contend that rhetoric is not “necessarily 
unidirectional, strategic, and unrelated to truth” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 173), 
Grunig uses the concept of rhetoric as a foil for his concept of two-way symmetrical PR. 
Although Seeger & Ulmer’s discourse of renewal is better suited for 
foregrounding the emergent, organic aspect of crisis communication than traditional 
rhetorical approaches, it fails to engage any discourse other than the leaders’, thus 
missing polyvocality and interactivity entirely. Amazingly, the entire literature seems to 
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by-pass the dilemma of a transmission model of communication. As such, it promotes a 
source-organization bias and obscures the communicative construction of crises. 
Thus, the literature reveals that rhetorical (and ‘discourse’) analyses, while 
augmenting basic assessments of crisis communication strategies with a focus on sense-
making and enactment, largely fail to decenter the source organization. This makes them 
blind to the polyvocality and interactivity of crisis communication. The notion of 
kategoria-based apologia may stand as the single offering organizational rhetoric 
scholars make in exploring the interactive nature of crisis communication. What 
rhetorical (and discourse) analyses add to crisis research is an understanding of how 
source organizations use communication in a crisis. What they fail to add is an 
understanding of how communication is used to co-construct a crisis. 
To understand how the communication strategies and crisis rhetoric of multiple 
stakeholder organizations interact, a polyvocal, interactive understanding of crisis 
communication that decenters the source organization is essential. This study argues that 
adopting a dialogical perspective on crisis communication offers a way to meet these 
objectives. To that end, the next chapter reviews the complex literature on dialogue. This 
paves the way for crafting a dialogic model of crisis communication that will extend 




One of the challenges in understanding dialogue is managing the complexity of the 
literature, coming as it does from a diversity of disciplines and theoretical orientations. 
While it is possible to survey the literature by metatheoretical ‘camps,’ it is not the 
approach taken by this chapter. Following the tradition of many dialogue scholars, this 
chapter treats dialogue dialogically. That is, it brings “dialogic thinkers into dialogue 
with one another … by asking how dialogic theories mutually form and inform one 
another and the process of communication” (Wood, 2004, p. xv). This chapter, as 
dialogue itself, is marked by a tensional holism (Stewart, Zediker, & Black, 2004). That 
is, it focuses on the dialectical tensions within the research on dialogue, highlighting the 
oppositional forces within that scholarly body. This echoes the essential nature of 
dialogue, which draws difference into a unified frame. After tracing some essential 
metatheoretical distinctions among approaches to dialogue, the chapter teases out 
elements core to a variety of conceptualizations. The understanding that emerges from 
this chapter extends the conceptualization offered by Kent and Taylor (2002), setting the 
stage for the dialogic analysis of crisis communication to follow. 
The initial research for this chapter led to the generation of a list of key 
questions, paradoxes, and characteristics that emerge from the literature on dialogue. It 
also indicated that an understanding of any complexity must address the concept, 
process, and context of dialogue. A review of the metatheoretical assumptions driving 
dialogue scholarship paves the way for a discussion of each of these elements. 
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Theorizing Dialogue 
In order to understand what dialogue is (conceptualizations), how it functions 
(processes), and how it is situated (contextualization), it is essential to identify the 
theoretical underpinnings of dialogue research. Although Linell (1998) argues that 
dialogue is undertheorized due to the difficulty of specifying a multi-functional process 
(p. xvi) and Isaacs (2001) notes the difficulty of articulating any systemic concept of 
dialogue since such conceptualizations “make claims about something that is in motion 
where timing, feedback, relationship and context have enormous influence on outcomes 
and experience” (pp. 715-716), theory plays a central role in the literature on dialogue. 
Note Isaacs’ (2001) Action Theory of Dialogue, Linell’s (1998) treatise on dialogism, 
the application of coordinated management of meaning to moral conflicts (Littlejohn, 
2006), and the substantive works of Buber, Bakhtin, Bohm, Freire, Gadamer, Levinas, 
and Habermas among others. (See also Cissna and Anderson’s (1998) review of dialogue 
which cites 117 sources on the topic.) 
In order to contextualize the theoretic tensions across the literature, several 
approaches to categorizing dialogue research are presented. According to Linder (2001), 
dialogue draws on two historical models: Socratic and Athenian. In the former, dialogue 
is a mode of inquiry. It emphasizes argumentation between parties, with the goal of 
discovering truth. This model may be seen to inform Gadamer, Bohm, and Lacan 
(Linder, 2001). In the Athenian model, dialogue is a mechanism for forming the 
individual will. It emphasizes generating a common purpose for the sake of collective 
action. This model may be seen to inform Habermas and Dewey (Linder, 2001). 
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Linder further groups conceptualizations of dialogue along a continuum (pp. 641-
2; in Roberts, 2001). On the normative end of the continuum is the formalist model, 
typified by Habermas, which focuses on reconstructing everyday language and 
foregrounds assumptions about the ‘best’ dialogue. In the middle of the continuum is the 
hermeneutic model, exemplified by Gadamer and Bohm, in which dialogue is used for 
social inquiry. This draws on Socratic methods to elicit meaning and order. On the 
empirical end of the continuum is the pragmatic model, best represented by Dewey, 
which focuses on problem-solving and productive social action. It addresses the 
emergence of collective intelligence and the production of citizens and communities. 
Another categorization system is offered by Stewart and Zediker (2000) and 
reviewed by Stewart, Zediker, & Black (2004). Stewart and Zediker classify notions of 
dialogue as either prescriptive or descriptive. Prescriptive approaches to dialogue (e.g., 
Buber and Bohm) see all human interactions as relational, but use ‘dialogue’ to refer to a 
particular quality or type of relating (Stewart, Zediker, & Black, p. 21). Descriptive 
approaches, on the other hand, use the term dialogue to name “the irreducibly social, 
relational, or interactional character of all human meaning-making” (Stewart, Zediker, & 
Black, p. 21). In such approaches (e.g., Bakhtin and Gergen), all human life is seen as 
dialogic. According to Stewart, Zediker, and Black, categorizing approaches as 
prescriptive or descriptive “prompts reflection about the role of epistemological and 
ethical considerations in dialogic theory and practice” (p. 22). Here, the authors indicate 
that typologies, although helpful, fail to illuminate the driving assumptions of any given 
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approach to dialogue. In fact, it is essential to reflect on the metatheoretical orientation 
of any approach, regardless of how it may be classified. 
Throughout the literature, researchers construct arguments about the ontology, 
epistemology, and/or axiology of dialogue. According to Stewart (1994), Buber 
conceptualizes dialogue as constitutive, seeing it as an “ontological nexus between 
persons” (pp. xiii-xv). In contrast, others argue that dialogism is an epistemology which 
is conceptually distinct from dialogue as a type of discourse (Linell, 1998, pp. 8, 10; 
Marková & Foppa, 1990, pp. 3-4). In this “dialogistic epistemology,” structure and use 
are intertwined (Linell, 1998, p. 36) and language emerges from contextualized social 
interaction (Marková & Foppa, 1990, pp. 3-4). 
Further, according to Maranhão (1990), although the “result of the dialogical 
operation may reinforce epistemology… it may also reflect accommodations having 
little to do with categories of knowledge regarded as true and right” (p. 1). From this 
perspective, dialogue is the “antipode” of epistemology, or an “antiepistemology” that 
draws its ontological basis from logos (Maranhão, 1990, pp. 1, 10). Tyler (1990) takes 
this a step further, arguing that Renaissance conceptualizations positioned dialogue as an 
ethos rather than an ontology or epistemology (p. 298). Similarly, Crowell (1990) argues 
that the basis for dialogue is ethical rather than ontological or epistemological (p. 356). 
Returning to their broad categorizations, Stewart, Zediker, and Black (2004), see 
prescriptive approaches as emphasizing axiology, and descriptive approaches as 
emphasizing epistemology (p. 22). 
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To map the lineage of dialogue research, one might establish a link from the 
Athenian model of dialogue to formalist and pragmatic (i.e., prescriptive) approaches, 
which emphasize the axiological component of dialogue. Another link might be 
established between the Socratic model of dialogue and hermeneutic (i.e., prescriptive) 
approaches, with an emphasis on axiology and, to some extent, ontology. Standing 
perhaps less connected with the Greek traditions and Linder’s continuum are the 
descriptive approaches, with their emphasis on epistemology. This branch of dialogue 
scholarship guides the model presented in this study. 
Further, by using the work of Linell (among others) to describe the enactment of 
crisis discourse, this study emphasizes a dialogistic epistemology. For Linell (1998), 
dialogicality is an epistemological orientation which must not be conflated with a 
particular type of discourse. In this view, any communication marked by utterances that 
are “mutually other oriented” has a dialogistic orientation (Linell, 1998, p. 35). In fact, 
either a monologue or a dialogue may have a dialogistic orientation (Linell, 1998, p. 35). 
This is essential to the current study, which views press releases through a lens of 
dialogism. Based on Bakhtin, Linell (1998) argues that dialogicality can be evaluated at 
three recursive levels: local/utterance, meso/episode, and global/speech event (p. 180). 
In order to apply a dialogical frame to crisis communication, the analysis that follows 
maps how discourse functions at multiple interactive levels. 
Although researchers tend to emphasize one metatheoretical element over the 
others, it is important to acknowledge that assumptions about ontology, epistemology, 
and axiology interplay in any approach to dialogue. In the current study, the primary 
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focus is on applying a dialogistic epistemology to crisis communication; a secondary 
focus is on exploring the axiological issues related to the clergy sex abuse crisis. The 
particular orientation to dialogue that this study adopts will emerge over the course of 
the next several chapters. For now, it is important to return to a more general review of 
the concept, process, and context of dialogue. 
Conceptualizing Dialogue 
To conceptualize dialogue, scholars offer definitions, typologies, and models. 
They compare and contrast it with what might be termed parallel concepts (e.g., 
collective inquiry, public communication, conversation, monologism, active listening, 
social interaction, cooperation). They offer metaphors for dialogue (e.g., a game of 
instances of understanding, jazz, an information processing system, a container), map 
out its possible characteristics (e.g., (a)symmetrical, egalitarian, mutual, harmonious, 
open, consensual, other-oriented, unstructured, transformative, (de)generative) and 
highlight paradoxes in its enactment (e.g., cooperation vs. competition; individuality vs. 
collectivity; coherence vs. fragmentation). They also discuss ways to evaluate it (e.g., 
contextualized efficacy, discursive efficacy; evaluation at interactive level). Although it 
is informative to review extant conceptualizations of dialogue, it almost does more to 
muddy one’s understanding than to clarify it. One way to engage this conceptual breadth 
is to engage a cross section of definitions holistically. Table 6 (next page) lists a 
selection of definitions of dialogue. 
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Table 6 
Selected Definitions of Dialogue 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
• a “fundamental process-quality of understanding and immediacy” (Anderson, Cissna, & Arnett, 1994) 
• a “mutuality of discourse” (Gergen, McNamee, & Barrett, 2001) 
• “discursive coordination in the service of social ends,”  “the process of relational coordination” 
(Gergen, Gergen, & Barrett, 2004) 
• “communication between simultaneous differences” (Clark and Holquist, 1984, in Hazen, 1993) 
• “a discipline of collective thinking and inquiry, a process for transforming the quality of conversation 
and, in particular, the thinking that lies beneath it” (Isaacs, 1993) 
• “a sustained collective inquiry into the processes, assumptions, and certainties that compose everyday 
experience” (Isaacs, 1993) 
• “reflective learning process” (Isaacs, 1993) 
• a phenomenological orientation “that stresses the constitution of a shared world, a shared 
understanding, a coming together” (Crapanzano, 1990) 
• “a speech across, between, through two people. It is a passing through and a going apart” 
(Crapanzano, 1990) 
• both logos and “concrete, embodied intersubjectivity” (Luckmann, 1990) 
• “sign-bound face-to-face communication which involves that high degree of immediacy and 
reciprocity which occurs when the streams of consciousness of the participants in social 
communication are fully synchronized” (Luckmann, 1990) 
• a “togetherness of talking,” a “mutuality of exchanging ideas” (Graumann, 1990) 
• “sustained collective deliberations that create a ‘field’ for inquiry: a setting where people can become 
more aware of the context around their experience, and of the processes of thought and feeling that 
created that experience’” (Isaacs; in Roberts, 2001) 
• “public talk about common concerns” (Linder; in Roberts, 2001) 




Although the definitions emerge from contrasting theoretical perspectives (i.e., 
dialogue as particular type of discourse versus dialogue as a generic quality of 
discourse), it is possible to map a broad conceptualization of dialogue. Across 
perspectives, dialogue is conceptualized as interactive and relational. Although it is 
collaborative and to some degree coordinated, it is not necessarily cooperative or 
symmetrical. It generally serves the goals of inquiry and understanding. It creates the 
possibility for transformation or second-order change. It is a symbol-based mechanism 
for meaning-making. It is created in the tension between individuality and collectivity, 
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and is characterized by immediacy to a given context. Each of these elements is key to 
the conceptualization of dialogue presented at the end of this chapter. 
The Process of Dialogue 
Another area in which it is important to trace tensions and overlap across the 
literature is the process (or functions) of dialogue. Among issues such as dialogue’s 
outcome or utility (e.g., meaning-making; personal, situational, or organizational 
change; transcendence; productivity; synchrony; community-building; group action), its 
goals (e.g., cooperation or competition), and the agents involved (e.g., the public; a 
facilitator; primary/secondary participants, actual/virtual participants, present/remote 
addressee, reader/listener, self/other), three elements stand out: prerequisites to dialogue, 
impediments to dialogue, and the ‘process components’ of dialogue. Each is addressed 
in turn. 
Prerequisites 
Researchers working from hermeneutic and/or prescriptive notions of dialogue 
argue that participants must exhibit a capacity for self-transcendence (Grudin, 1996, p. 
112) and metacommunication (Mecke, 1990, p. 198); they must also possess a 
willingness to release their assumptions (Swearingen, 1990, p. 52). More generally, 
dialogue requires an atmosphere of trust (Anderson, Cissna, & Arnett, 1994, p. 4) and 
vulnerability (Cissna & Anderson, 1994, p. 10). Dialogue participants need to be 
connected (Cissna & Anderson, 1994, p. 10) and cooriented (Stewart, 1994, p. xvi). 
They also need a ‘common center,’ or a text available to all participants (Arnett, 1994, p. 
231). 
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According to Maranhão (1990), there should be a “symmetry of participation and 
goodwill” among participants (p. 8). Note that the former is an equality of involvement, 
not of power, and that the latter is more about the willingness to listen than about 
charity. Dialogue requires that those in positions of authority shift from leaders to 
facilitators (Helling & Thomas, 2001, pp. 764-765). All participants must relinquish 
‘anarchic autonomy’ (Crowell, 1990, p. 19) and respect one another as autonomous 
subjects rather than objects (Rahim, 1994, p. 131). 
From these relatively traditional interventionist perspectives then, dialogue is 
predicated on individuals who possess a capacity for self-transcendence and 
metacommunication, who share a common “text,” who are mutually, although not 
necessarily equally, involved in the process, and who are willing to relinquish 
preexisting roles and total autonomy. Although the current study presents a dialogical 
analysis of public relations texts rather than a review of highly structured face-to-face 
dialogue, the prerequisites for participants is still important to acknowledge. In this 
study, they inform the concluding assessment of the crisis as a speech event which is co-
constructed by key stakeholders in the case. 
Having introduced some prerequisites of dialogue, it is important to discuss what 
might stymie it. 
Impediments 
 Across the literature, two types of impediments to dialogue emerge: discursive 
impediments and social-psychological impediments. Discursive impediments to dialogue 
include attempts at persuasion, explanation, deep-structural translation (Crowell, 1990, 
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p. 345), advocacy, information control, spin, and compromise (Spano, 2001, p. 29). It is 
also hindered by confrontational, adversarial, and war-like orientations (Spano, 2001, p. 
30). Dialogue may be hindered by competing goals (Helling & Thomas, 2001, p. 758), a 
lack of acknowledgement, and mutual face saving (Schein, 1993). 
 Although a common textual center is important, a shared language may hamper 
dialogue by priming participants to overlook subcultural differences (Schein, 1993, p. 
49). Time pressures may also undermine the requisite relationship-building and lead to 
defensiveness (Schein, 1993). This, in turn, may preclude the development of trust. 
Negation, an utterance (or absence thereof) which “essentially destroys the meaning-
making potential of a preceding utterance” and individual blame are two other 
communicative impediments to dialogue (Gergen, Gergen, & Barrett, 2004, p. 50). 
Although these discursive impediments are difficult to synthesize, it is clear that 
dialogue can be obstructed by specific communication tactics (e.g., negation and blame) 
and by general communication orientations (e.g., defensiveness and an emphasis on time 
constraints). Such impediments are salient to both prescriptive and descriptive notions of 
dialogue. 
 Social-psychological impediments to dialogue stem from cultural and 
philosophical phenomena. According to Dewey’s pragmatic notion of dialogue, 
technology and corporate life derail dialogue by severing the processes of speaking and 
listening across time and space, increasing one-way communication, increasing the 
passivity of individuals, and reducing individual agency (Evans, 2001, pp. 644-645). 
Where humans are socialized to think categorically and withhold information that would 
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challenge the social order, dialogue may be hampered (Schein, 1993, p. 41). For these 
authors, any social phenomena disconnecting people and/or reducing mutuality hampers 
dialogue. In the clergy sex abuse crisis, categorical thinking and a reticence to challenge 
the social order are greater barriers to dialogue than is technology. In fact, technology is 
used by key stakeholders to overcome communicative barriers erected by the hierarchy. 
 According to Roberts (2001), Linder attributes a modern skepticism about 
dialogue to preferences for specialized expertise, hierarchical direction, and to 
substantive talk (pp. 641-642). Although the conflict between substantive talk and 
dialogue may seem counter-intuitive, it is based on conflations of dialogue with 
sensitivity training (Schein, 1993, p. 40) and bargaining (Linder, 2001, p. 661, cited in 
Roberts, 2001, p. 641-642). When people define dialogue as a managerial fad or as a 
mechanism for agenda-setting or self-promotion, it is unlikely to be valued or 
implemented. This is compounded when dialogue is discussed as a transformative 
mechanism of communication, but experienced as a stylized practice. The dissonance 
between appearance and experience may lead to a general reticence to implement 
dialogue (Linder, 2001, p. 660, cited in Roberts, 2001, pp. 641-642). This clearly 
emerges in the present case, in which participants criticize politicized uses of the term 
dialogue and its correlates. 
 According to Linder (2001), the modern philosophical assertion of a ‘pre-social 
individual’ (i.e., the belief that individuals create society rather than the reverse) has led 
to a monologic, private rationality (p. 656-657, cited in Roberts, 2001, pp. 641-642). 
This shift to a monologic rationality has been compounded by social and economic shifts 
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that sever individuals from the communities and common cultures that contextualized 
dialogue. In an era of differentiation, fragmentation, specialization, and pluralism, public 
communication becomes indirect and impersonalized (Linder, 2001, pp. 657-659, cited 
in Roberts, 2001, pp. 641-642). Although Linder views fragmentation as a roadblock to 
dialogue, this study shows how a dialogic epistemology can be applied to what might be 
considered fragmented crisis discourse. 
 Although the discursive limitations on dialogue are better illuminated by a micro-
level analysis and the social-psychological limitations on dialogue by a macro-level 
analysis, it is essential to remember that dialogue unfolds at multiple, recursive levels. 
Thus, discursive limitations and social-psychological limitations may be recursive. 
Process Components 
 The micro-macro distinction is especially evident as researchers address the 
processes of dialogue. On one hand are researchers who use discourse analyses to 
describe dialogue on a micro level; on the other hand are researchers who draw on 
notions of civic participation to prescribe public dialogues. In the following paragraphs, 
Linell’s (1998) description of the discursive moves of dialogue is used to illuminate 
micro-level analyses of dialogue. The work of Spano (2001), Isaacs (1993), and a variety 
of dialogue practitioners are used to introduce some processes prescribed for large-scale 
public dialogues. Literature from both arenas is briefly reviewed below. 
 Linell (1998) offers a detailed model for describing the linguistic and 
communicative patterns in dialogue. In Linell’s (1998) view, dialogue is governed by 
four principles: sequentiality, joint construction, act-activity interdependence (i.e., the 
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meaning of an utterance being derived from its embeddedness in a specific activity), and 
superordinance (i.e., the reflexivity between discourse and context) (Linell, 1998, p. 87). 
More particularly, an analysis of dialogue should compare: 
• Initiatives to responses 
• Soliciting/obliging (i.e., demand direct response) to non-soliciting/non-
obliging initiatives (i.e., invite continuation) 
• Verbal to silent/nonverbal responses 
• Local (i.e., tied to immediately preceding remark) to non-local responses 
• Focal (i.e., tied to main content) to non-focal responses 
• Tied (i.e., in line with preceding context) to untied utterances 
• Self-tied (i.e., tied to own contribution) to other-tied responses (Linell, 1998, 
pp. 169-71) 
The model used for this dissertation highlights two of Linell’s principles: joint 
construction and superordinance. It foregrounds how the discourse of three key 
stakeholder organizations co-constructs the crisis (joint construction), and the role of 
context in constructing the clergy sex abuse crisis (superordinance). It also adapts 
Linell’s focus on initiatives/responses, (non)soliciting/(non)obliging, and (non)focal 
responses. 
Further, utterances function on three levels: content/meaning, relationship/power 
alignment, and interaction/process (Linell, 1998, p. 177). These levels yield possible 
levels for dialogic analysis. Other possible units for analysis include the topic and the 
episode. According to Linell, topicality is “the property of ‘aboutness’ in discourse” (p. 
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181), and topics are sustained matters (p. 182). Topics are created by junctures in 
interactional flow, and participants create intersubjectivity through topical coherence 
(Linell, 1998, pp. 181-182).  An episode is “a bounded sequence, a discourse event with 
a beginning and an end surrounding a spate of talk, which is usually focused on the 
treatment of some ‘problem,’ ‘issue’ or ‘topic’” (Linell, 1998, p. 183). Episodes may be 
either homogeneous/monotopical or heterogenious/polythematic. Heterogenious 
episodes may be ‘messy’ (i.e., having multiple topics open simultaneously) or ‘clean’, 
using ‘topic glides’ to transition sequence of topics (Linell, 1998, p. 189).  
Going beyond intradialogic components, Linell addresses the interactive 
components of dialogue. To assess non-local aspects of dialogue, Linell focuses on the 
following elements of social-interaction: mutual attention (i.e., attention to one another’s 
actions, beliefs), common focus (i.e., the establishment of a common point of 
discussion), and contribution ties (i.e., mechanisms which carry topics over sequences of 
interaction) (p. 179). Here, the focus is on how participants interactively manage the 
discourse of a dialogue. These are of particular interest to the case at hand. 
 Linell frankly admits a bias toward dialogic coherence. To address dialogue as a 
struggle to achieve intersubjectivity or discursive power, he recommends emphasizing 
the multi-functionality of utterances and contributions; polyvocality; discrepant 
relevances and competing communicative projects; dominance and power; asymmetries 
of knowledge and participation; and complementarity of dialogue roles (1998, p. 89). 
This shift is important for the current study, given its focus on how three organizations 
co-construct the clergy sex abuse crisis. Although not an analysis of face-to-face 
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interaction, this study adapts Linell’s discourse-analytic approach to explore the 
interactive nuances of public relations communication. The model in this study replaces 
Linell’s focus on utterances with one on press releases/statements and explores (among 
other things) how topics are negotiated across time in PR discourse. 
 In contrast to this micro-analytic perspective, other researchers address dialogue 
as a macro-social phenomenon (Isaacs, 1993; Murphy, 1995; Spano, 2001). Spano 
(2001) sees public dialogue as emphasizing exploration, deliberation, discussion, and 
collaboration (p. 29). It involves an equal emphasis on listening and speaking, the open 
expression and consideration of viewpoints, the prioritization of coordination over 
competition, staying in tension between holding one’s ground and being open to 
another’s, communicating trust, and marking understanding (p. 30). Spano goes on to list 
a variety of communication skills necessary for engaging a public dialogue, including 
taking a neutral, not-knowing position; dialogic listening; eliciting experiences and 
stories; appreciative inquiry; systemic questioning; and reflecting (pp. 38-43). 
 Isaacs (1993) offers another set of guidelines for public dialogue. According to 
this author, participants must suspend assumptions, observe, listen, slow down the 
process of inquiry, be aware of thought, and ‘befriend’ polarization (p. 33). In her (1995) 
work on workplace dialogues, Murphy offers a series of recommendations for 
stimulating dialogical understanding. From her perspective, such dialogues must offer 
participants opportunities to: disclose personal feelings about relevant issues, dialogue 
within and across relevant groups, identify and speak to driving assumptions about self 
and other, learn about one another in a non-threatening way, make requests of one 
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another (pp. 81-84). Note that Spano and Isaacs emphasize the receptive, reflective, 
neutral orientation required of participants, while Murphy emphasizes a more 
expressive, investigative orientation. The goal of public dialogue is an increased mutual 
understanding. In some instances, it is used as a preliminary step for decision-making 
and action-focused discussions. In other instances, it is a tool for conflict management or 
dispute resolution. 
 Any review of dialogue at the macro-social level must include the grounded 
work coming from seminal projects such as the National Issues Forums, the Public 
Conversations Project, and the Public Dialogue Consortium (Pearce and Littlejohn, 
1997). Additional (types of) dialogical projects include A Search for Common Ground, 
The Listening Project, study circles, policy juries, and some types of encounter groups 
(Dukes, 1996, pp. 71-75). Each of these projects derives its essence from the Socratic 
traditions of inquiry and draw on hermeneutic models of dialogue, since they promote 
meaning-making through social inquiry. They are clearly prescriptive approaches to 
dialogue. 
 On the general level, Dukes (1996) describes the dialogical sensibility guiding 
each of these approaches to public discourse as an exploratory process that seeks to 
educate stakeholders, illuminate stakes, raise awareness of an issue, highlight points of 
discussion, deter violent confrontation, and cultivate support for impending decisions 
(pp. 63-64). Dialogic principles may be present at any single stage of a public conflict, 
or it may undergird the entire process, as it would in policy dialogue (Dukes, 1996, p. 
54).  
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 Pearce and Littlejohn’s (1997) review of three programs reveals more 
particularly how such large scale dialogues function. The National Issues Forum (NIF) 
annually sponsors civic deliberations on current socio-political issues. This forum 
focuses equally on speaking and listening, with a goal of understanding. This is based on 
the assumption that “Actors make choices by deliberative dialogue to come to public 
judgment and thereby establish a public voice through common ground and 
complementary action” (Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997, p. 173). The process unfolds in 
issue-based community forums or study circles. Participants have the opportunity to do 
some pre-reading on the selected issue and a set of prescribed choices that may stem 
from it. During the event, participants go from sharing perspectives on the issue to 
considering each possible choice in turn. Next, participants address the deep 
commonalities or differences undergirding each choice. The outcome is a deeper 
consideration of the assumptions at work in the issue and perhaps some 
recommendations for helping policymakers frame their treatment of the issue (pp. 175-
176). According to Pearce and Littlejohn, the public judgment that emerges from these 
deliberations “is an outcome in which people continue to hold different views but with a 
fuller, more complete understanding of the powers and limits of each view” (p. 173). 
 In the Public Conversations Project (PCP), opponents are positioned as 
uncontentious listeners; destructive differences and blame are disallowed; and narrative 
revelation and self-reflexivity are emphasized (Gergen, Gergen, & Barrett, 2004, pp. 53-
54). Key to PCP sessions is a focus on the complexity of what are traditionally viewed as 
polarized issues. Facilitators serve four goals: preparing participants to enter a new type 
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of experience, creating a safe context, discouraging standard patterns of interaction, and 
stimulating the co-construction of a new interaction (Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997, p. 182). 
PCP facilitators conceptualize dialogue as an interaction that combines spontaneous 
sharing and listening and foregrounds ambiguities rather than certainties (Pearce & 
Littlejohn, 1997, p. 183). Here, questions are motivated by an authentic desire to 
understand the Other. 
 The Public Dialogue Consortium (PDC) emerged from the Kaleidoscope Project 
and draws on the work of the NIF and PCP among others and takes a systems approach 
to communication. The goal of this type of public discourse is to stimulate ‘transcendent 
communication’ in situations of moral conflict (Littlejohn, 2006). Transcendent 
communication ‘creates new frames that transcend differences…transforms 
relationships… [and] creates opportunities to explore the powers and limits of multiple 
worldviews” (Littlejohn, 2006, pp. 407-408). To achieve the goal of transcendent 
communication, PDC projects work from four assumptions: communication is a 
patterned social construct, every communication pattern has its own guiding ‘grammar,’ 
communication recursively constructs its context, and social realities are enacted (Pearce 
& Littlejohn, 1997, pp. 199-200). Practitioners use systemic questioning to elicit and 
stimulate critique participants’ ‘grammar.’ They also use appreciative inquiry to shift the 
group from a negative to positive direction. Another tool is reflecting, a “type of shared 
hypothesizing in which an interviewer reflects possible connections, contexts, and 
futures based on answers to systemic and appreciative questions” (p. 203). The process 
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that emerges is a highly structured attempt to redefine a moral conflict (Littlejohn, 2006, 
p. 408). 
 The prescriptive, interventionist orientations to public dialogue represented by 
these researcher-practitioners are no less salient to specifying the process components of 
dialogue than are descriptive, language-based orientations. Unfortunately, there is an 
artificial (or perhaps practical) fault line between the two orientations. The difficulty is 
bringing the rich analytical potential of discourse analysis to bear on an emergent large-
scale social situation. Although risky, this dissertation draws from the substantive micro-
analytic traditions of discourse analysis to explore how multiple organizations 
discursively construct of a large-scale crisis. More will be said about this later. 
Contextualizing Dialogue 
A survey of the literature reveals a shared focus on the concept and process of 
dialogue. It also reveals a focus on the context of dialogue. The centrality of context is 
clear in Linell’s (1998) argument that dialogism is contextualized (inter)actions (p. 7). 
Both prescriptive and descriptive researchers address two levels of context: external and 
internal. Externally, dialogue is situated within a specific socio-historical context. 
Internally, dialogue creates a container (or context) within which a particular type of 
interaction occurs (Isaacs, 2001; Swearingen, 1990). Linell (1998) notes a tension 
between the co-construction of a dialogue (i.e., its internal context) and the socio-
historical dimension (i.e., its external context). Thus, one might say that dialogue has 
and is a context, and that those two levels of context are held in tension. Others address 
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the temporal, spatial, ideological, and discursive contexts of a dialogue, as the following 
paragraphs show. 
According to Swearingen (1990), dialogues are atemporal internally. They serve 
to slow down or even stop time (Isaacs, 2001). Externally, however, they emerge from 
the historical past and affect the emergent future. There may be a tension between the 
permanence of textual dialogues and the fleeting nature of oral dialogues. Attention to 
time is required to mark the interactivity, coherence, sense-making, and intersubjectivity 
of a dialogue. The notion that dialogues suspend time, resist closure, and extend the 
present stands in direct contrast to crisis communication’s typical goal of closure. In 
order to manage the tension between dialogic and PR notions of time, the model used in 
this study traces the discursive presence of stakeholders across time. This is an essential 
step to understanding the temporal context of a crisis. 
Traditional models of dialogue presume that dialogues occur within a particular 
spatial context. This may refer to both the local physical setting of the dialogue and the 
global abstract conditions surrounding its emergence (Linell, 1998). Unfortunately, the 
literature does not offer a substantive treatment of the spatial context of a dialogue. This 
may in part be due to the prescriptive notion that dialogues are face-to-face interchanges. 
By exploring the dialogical aspects of crisis communication posted on the internet (the 
data for this study), the current study challenges extant notions of spatial context. Further 
study is needed to explore the implications of an asynchronous context on a dialogue. 
Every dialogue is also embedded within an ideological context or framework. 
Linell (1998) argues that each utterance in a dialogue is “framed by expectations, 
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entitlements and obligations with respect to possible meaning attributions and actions” 
(p. 83). That is, the meanings generated through a dialogue are dependent on the 
ideologies within which they are framed. In the current study, the ideological context 
influences how participants treat the notion of dialogue itself (i.e., politicized uses of 
dialogue and its correlates). It also emerges in how participants frame the institution of 
the Roman Catholic Church and participation therein (i.e., a democratic right or 
dangerous dissent). 
Additionally, dialogues are situated within particular discursive contexts. The 
discursive context refers to salient communication genres. It also refers to the coherence 
of a dialogue, in which each utterance is linked to the utterances surrounding it (Linell, 
1998). This study operates within the generic context of public relations discourse. It 
explores ‘coherence’ within this genre by tracing the (non)responsiveness of 
stakeholders to one another’s discourse. 
Context can function to either focus or expand a dialogue, as this study will 
show. When it serves as a source of referents, constrains sense-making, or directs 
attention, context bounds an emerging dialogue (or the dialogicality of disparate texts). 
When it is contested, demarcates change, spans time, and/or connects internal and 
external audiences, context serves a broadening function. In the current case, it appears 
that dissent and advocacy organizations use context to broaden the crisis, while the 
source organization uses it to constrain the crisis. 
A holistic reading of the literature, then, shows that dialogues have multiple 
emergent, contested contexts. Context serves as both the subject and object of dialogue 
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and as both precedent and antecedent to dialogue. Since context both constrains and 
enables dialogue, it may be described as recursive with dialogue. To a large degree, the 
current study focuses on the internal context of the crisis. In particular, it traces the 
temporal, ideological, and discursive contexts of the crisis as constructed by the 
stakeholder organizations. Attention to the spatial context is left for another study. 
Specifying Dialogue for This Study 
As noted, the research on dialogue is amorphous, which makes a review of the 
literature unwieldy. In addressing the theoretical underpinnings of dialogue, the concept 
of dialogue, the process of dialogue, and the site or context of dialogue, the goal of this 
chapter has been to mark the outlines of a tensional-holistic understanding of dialogue. 
This breadth sets the stage for articulating a more particular conceptualization of 
dialogue, a prerequisite for constructing a dialogic model of crisis communication. 
Overall, researchers agree that dialogue is both praxis and theory, a type of 
discourse and an ideal, form and content. It requires some amount of coordination since 
it balances individuality and collectivity (Gergen, Gergen, & Barrett, 2004; Maranhão, 
1990). Schein (1993) describes dialogue as a group process that requires individual 
willingness to participate. An extant tension among participants is prerequisite to 
dialogue (Clark and Holquistt, 1984, in Hazen, 1993; Crapanzano, 1990). This leads to 
the assumption that dialogue is a mechanism to map or gain perspective on 
fragmentation (Isaacs, 1993, p. 30; Nichol, p. vii, in Bohm, 1996). 
Dialogue is agreed to be a generative (Crapanzano, 1990; Linder, 2001), 
symbolic (Linell, 1998; Luckmann, 1990; Marková, 1990) mechanism used to create 
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meaning (Medvedev and Bakhtin, 1978, in Hazen, 1993; Roberts, 2001), understanding 
(Anderson, Cissna, & Arnett, 1994; Crapanzano, 1990), and transformation 
(Crapanzano, 1990; Grant, Hardy, Oswick, & Putnam, 2004; Grudin, 1996; Isaacs, 
2001) through inquiry (Evans, in Roberts, 2001; Isaccs, 2001; Linder, 2001). 
In their comparative assessment of five key dialogue philosophers (i.e., Buber, 
Bakhtin, Bohm, Freire, and Gadamer), Stewart, Zediker, and Black (2004) argue for two 
common approaches to dialogue: holism and tensionality. Holism, in this context, is the 
tendency to frame a topic as a totality. Although ‘holism’ may be summative or 
synergistic, Stewart, Zediker, and Black argue that the five key writers on dialogue use a 
tensional holism. By tensionality they allude to the “sense that the whole…is centrally 
marked by both a complementary and contradictory quality that renders it inherently 
fluid and dynamic” (p. 27). This defines dialogue ‘dynamically and dialectically rather 
than as a static construct’ (p. 23). The emphasis on the dialectical tensions within a 
coherent (social, textual, etc.) body may be compared to Plato’s metaxy (the “between”), 
Montgomery and Baxter’s (1998) both/andness (in which multiple views interplay 
without losing their essence), and Clark and Holquist’s (1984) “communication between 
simultaneous differences” (Stewart, Zediker, & Black, 2004, pp. 27-8, 37). 
Despite agreement on these elements, researchers disagree on other essentials. 
Some, like Gadamer, argue that symmetry is essential (Crowell, 1990); others argue that 
it is neither inherently cooperative nor symmetrical (Linell, 1998). They disagree on the 
locality of dialogue, some arguing that it is nonlocalized (Bradley, 2001), others arguing 
that it requires physical co-presence (Linell, 1998). There is a tension between normative 
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and descriptive definitions, and between historic traditions and modern 
conceptualizations. 
Based on the extant literature, amorphous and diverse as it is, this study 
conceptualizes dialogue as a sustained, symbol-based, contextualized, collaborative-
agonistic process of interactive social inquiry which creates meaning and a potential for 
change. Since each aspect of this definition is intentional and meaningful, it is important 
to unpack the definition briefly. As an essentially communicative process, dialogue is 
enacted through the use of symbols and serves a meaning-making function. It is used to 
make inquiry into some (social) phenomena, and this inquiry is engaged on a collective 
(i.e., dyadic, group, organizational, or cultural) level. Etymologically, dialogue indicates 
“a speech across, between, through … people” (Crapanzano, 1990). Although essentially 
interactive, dialogue does not require symmetry or cooperation (Linell, 1998, p. 13). 
This interaction unfolds in what might be described as a tense collaboration (Clark & 
Holquist, 1984, in Hazen, 1993; Crapanzano, 1990; Linell, 1998, pp. 13, 214). Much like 
a rubber band, dialogue uses opposing forces to draw things together. 
To understand dialogue, one must acknowledge the context within which it 
unfolds. More than a location in time and space, the context of a dialogue is a nexus of 
ideological assumptions and particular socio-cultural exigencies. This context emerges 
from extant patterns of thought and affects how the dialogue is framed. A key element of 
dialogue that is underrepresented in the literature is its protracted nature. As a dynamic 
social process, dialogue is not the work of an instant. Rather, it unfolds across time, and 
is thus described as a sustained inquiry (Isaacs, 2001). One of the key outcomes of 
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dialogue is the potential for change, be that generative, degenerative, or transformational 
(Crapanzano, 1990; Grant, Hardy, Oswick, & Putnam, 2004; Grudin, 1996; Hazen, 
1993; Isaacs, 2001; Linder, 2001). Although dialogue does not lead to inevitable change, 
it inevitably challenges stasis. This is indicated in Swearington’s (1990) description of 
dialogue as a liminal mode of discourse (p. 64). Again, dialogue is a sustained, symbol-
based, contextualized, collaborative-agonistic process of interactive social inquiry 




In 1989, Pearson offered what is considered the first rigorous application of dialogue to 
PR. Although his premature death cut short the development of his research on a 
dialogical ethic for PR, his work opened an important area of research for the field. In 
fact, dialogical principals thread through the discipline’s reigning paradigm (i.e., 
Grunig’s symmetrical model), although with an imprecise conceptualization and 
problematic application. Further, dialogue has been named as a possible new paradigm 
for the field (Boton & Taylor, 2004, p. 659; Kent & Taylor, 2002, p. 33). Despite its 
seeming prominence in the literature, its potential has yet to be engaged fully by 
scholars. In a 1992 article, Kent and Taylor made a preliminary exploration of the 
essence of dialogue and ways in it may be salient to PR practice. They concluded that 
more work is necessary on the theoretical issues of such a perspective (Kent & Taylor, 
2002, p. 33). One way to continue developing a dialogic theory of PR (and thus 
theorizing PR) is to craft a dialogic model for PR discourse. The current study uses 
grounded practical theory (GPT) to craft a dialogical model for the analysis of PR 
discourse and applies it to press releases produced in the clergy sex abuse crisis.  
The GPT approach to research originated with Craig in 1983, and adapts the 
basic elements of Glaser & Strauss’s (1967) grounded theory in order to build practical 
theory (Barge & Craig, in press). According to Barge and Craig, practical theory seeks to 
address practical problems and generate new possibilities for action. Drawing on Glaser 
and Strauss’s constant comparison, GPT generates “an evolving normative model or 
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‘rational reconstruction’ that conceptualizes values and principles (or ‘situated ideals’) 
already partly implicit in practice” (Barge & Craig, in press).  
By sifting actual press releases together in light of a particular dialogical 
epistemology, this study maps a new model for understanding crisis communication. 
Mapping uses theory to chart the “communicative territory of people’s experience and 
identify the important landmarks and pathways that distinguish that landscape” (Barge & 
Craig, in press). More particularly, this study uses ‘an interpretive approach to mapping’ 
to identify the communicative strategies stakeholder organizations use to manage the 
clergy sex abuse crisis and the consequences of using those strategies (Barge & Craig, in 
press). Teasing out (the consequences of) each stakeholder’s strategies in light of the 
crisis as a chaotically bounded situation offers the potential to inform and/or challenge 
future crisis communication practices. 
Since the research process and analysis are recursively constructed in grounded 
practical theory research, recounting how the research process emerged is essential to 
understanding the analysis. What follows is a description of how the stakeholder 
organizations and data were selected. 
Selecting the Stakeholder Organizations 
In order to decenter the source organization and foreground the polyvocal co-
construction of the clergy abuse crisis, it is essential to account for the crisis 
communication generated by a variety of stakeholder organizations. Before addressing 
the three key stakeholder organizations selected for this study, a brief review of the 
stakeholder concept is in order. 
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The Stakeholder Concept 
While PR literature refers interchangeably to publics, audiences, and 
stakeholders, this study uses stakeholder organization in response to Cheney and 
Christensen’s (2001) use of the term (p. 176). This term is selected based on the 
assumption that an organization’s primary interactions are with other organizations 
rather than with individuals (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 176). This may build on 
the assumption that public discourse is generally inter-organizational, with 
organizational-individual discourse tending to be privatized. Further, as Leitch and 
Neilson (2001) note, PR theories generally name organizations as potential publics (p. 
130). Additionally, given the goal of addressing the overlap between organizational 
communication and PR, this is an important terminological choice. In order to identify 
what organizations are salient to a crisis, one must understand what constitutes a 
stakeholder. 
Although not a PR researcher, Clarkson (1995) argues that stakeholders are 
entities that “‘bear risk as a result of a firm’s activities’” (in Vidaver-Cohen, 1999, p. 
39). They may affect the organization or be affected by the organization, and they may be 
voluntary (able to remove themselves from risk) or involuntary (unable to remove 
themselves from risk) stakeholders (Vidaver-Cohen, 1999, p. 40). Stakeholders co-
construct conflicts/crises through their communication. For example, they may deny, 
downplay, and exclude one another through denials of outcome severity, of stakeholder 
inclusion, or of self-involvement, all of which culminate in an exclusion of some type 
(Opotow & Weiss, 2000, pp. 479, 481). The recognition that stakeholders have some 
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ability to affect a crisis (and one another) is central to the goals of tracing the interactive 
polyvocality of the clergy sex abuse crisis. 
Writing from a PR perspective, Fearn-Banks (2001) agrees with this view of 
stakeholders, although focusing on individuals rather than organizations. She describes 
stakeholders as “people who have an interest in the organization and are affected by 
decisions made by it” (p. 482). That Watson (1991) defines stakeholders as claimants 
points to an interdependence between organizations and their stakeholders that is central 
to inter-organizational crisis management (in Daugherty, 2001, p. 395). Defining 
stakeholders as those able to affect or to be affected (by the organization or by other 
stakeholders) or by relationship (with the organization or with other stakeholders) 
foregrounds the interactive, contested nature of crisis communication, and decenters the 
source organization – again central to this study. 
According to Estes (1996), stakeholders include “’employees, customers, 
stockholders, suppliers, lenders, neighboring communities, and society at large’” (p. 29, 
in Stark & Kruckeberg, 2001, p. 56). Similar lists are given by Daugherty (2001) and 
Heath (1988). PR standards expect an organization to know, rank, and cultivate 
relationships with its stakeholders (Fearn-Banks, 2001, p. 482). According to 
stakeholder theory, organizational success depends on the ability to manage the 
conflicting demands of stakeholders (Coombs, 2001, pp. 111-112). Key here is 
stakeholder segmentation. This is especially important given the “many complex, and 
sometimes conflicting, roles played by the growing number of stakeholders in today’s 
society” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 171). Although these perspectives fail to 
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challenge the organization-centered view of PR, they do indicate the broad array of 
stakeholders which may require an organization’s attention. 
Emerging from a more relational (although still organization-centered) 
orientation comes research on stakeholder ethics, management, and interests. In one 
view, stakeholder ethics “emphasizes an organization’s obligations to both internal and 
external publics, with the realization that these interests often will conflict” (Curtin & 
Boynton, 2001, p. 417). More particularly, management may orient to stakeholders in 
four ways: immoral (i.e., management exploits stakeholders), ethical misconduct (i.e., 
management misleads, cheats, or disregards stakeholders), amoral (i.e., managers focus 
on profit making, downplay morality), and moral (i.e., management views itself as 
interdependent and equal with stakeholders) (Daugherty, 2001, pp. 396-7; see also 
Carroll, 1991). The arguable premise of many dialogue researchers is that dialogic 
communication is inherently ethical. 
Although Makower (1994) argues that organizations operate best when they 
align their interests with those of stakeholders (in Daugherty, 2001, p. 390), Leitch and 
Neilson (2001) point out that organizations may find no advantage in aligning 
themselves with publics (p. 129). Unfortunately, much of the research on managing 
stakeholder relationships (ethically) fails to address the complex interdependence among 
organizations and stakeholders. One reason may be that research tends to privilege 
managerial interests, thus ignoring all but the most powerful stakeholder organizations. 
This bias also obscures interaction among stakeholder organizations. 
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Narrowing the focus to crisis communication, Mitroff and Pearson (1993) 
recommend that organizations advance their relationships with intervening stakeholder 
groups and stimulate collaboration among stakeholders (p. 114; in Fearn-Banks, 2001, p. 
481). Note the agency/power attributed to the organization here. Despite the expectation 
that organizations communicate forthrightly with a heterogeneous group of stakeholders 
in a crisis situation (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001, p. 162), crisis communication is 
necessarily constrained by the potential of litigation. Acknowledging stakeholder action, 
Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2001) say that stakeholders stake “freedom of information-
based right to know” claims about the potential risks of a plethora of organizational 
phenomena (p. 157). Further, stakeholders face both legitimate risks and media-, rumor-, 
or ignorance-induced concerns (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001, p. 157). Although this 
opens the door to understanding crisis situations from the perspective of stakeholders, it 
barely scratches the surface. Even from this brief review, the stakeholder concept seems 
constrained by an idealized and organization-primary view. 
The Stakeholder Organizations 
There are many entities that voluntarily or involuntarily affect or are affected by 
the Roman Catholic clergy abuse crisis. Some of these stakeholders are individuals (e.g., 
victim/survivors, judges, journalists), some are groups (e.g., plaintiffs in class action law 
suits, audit boards, journalistic teams), and some are organizations (e.g., USCCB, SNAP, 
VOTF). This study focuses exclusively on stakeholder organizations in order to decenter 
the source organization and challenge the managerial-egalitarian paradox in PR. 
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Further narrowing the study, this dissertation focuses on those organizations most 
central to the case. Through a broad, detailed reading of media accounts of the crisis, 
three key organizations stand out: The United States Council of Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB), Voice of the Faithful (VOTF), and the Survivors Network of those Abused by 
Priests (SNAP). There are several reasons these three organizations emerge as central to 
the case. First, each is named frequently in the media. Second, to a greater or lesser 
degree, they refer to one another in their verbal and nonverbal communication. Third, 
each has produced and cachéd a large amount of crisis-specific communication. Fourth, 
each plays a key role in the crisis (i.e., source organization, internal dissent organization, 
and external activist organization). Fifth, (returning to the most basic definition of a 
stakeholder) each has affected and been affected by the crisis. Although some would 
criticize demarcating the source organization as a stakeholder, that is essential to 
decentering the source organization’s subject position. Until the source organization is 
viewed within the same framework as stakeholder organizations, it will retain a 
privileged position in PR research. 
Returning to the organizations, it is evident that each has a particular salience to 
the case. As the primary governing body of the U.S. Roman Catholic Church, the 
USCCB may be seen as the Church’s organizational representative in this crisis. Its 
goals include engaging and coordinating Catholic activities in the U.S. 
(http://www.usccb.org/whoweare.shtml). Its decision-making power is evident 
throughout the crisis, namely in the creation of the Charter for the Protection of Children 
and Young People and the establishment of the National Review Board. The USCCB 
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has clearly served as the voice of the American arm of the institutional Catholic Church, 
and has had high visibility in managing the crisis. It has power to represent and manage 
the larger Catholic Church in the United States. 
Both VOTF and SNAP were formed by (ex)Catholics in direct response to the 
phenomena of clergy abuse. VOTF’s mission is to provide a voice through which the 
laity can share in church governance. The organization’s goals include supporting 
victims, survivors, and priests of integrity and shaping structural change within the 
church (http://www.voiceofthefaithful.org/Who_We_Are/mission.html). Although it 
situates itself as a mechanism for bridging the laity and the hierarchy, church officials 
contest VOTF’s position as a Catholic organization. 
SNAP is a “volunteer self-help organization of survivors of clergy sexual abuse 
and their supporters” which works to educate its members and their communities in 
order to prevent clergy abuse (http://www.snapnetwork.org/). Their goals are healing 
and justice (http://www.snapnetwork.org/). Although members of SNAP may be (or 
have been) Catholic, the organization does not identify itself as Catholic. 
Selecting the Data 
Having selected the key stakeholder organizations to study, the next decision was 
identifying and delimiting a data set from their extensive crisis communication. The 
complexity of this case in particular and of crisis communication in general made this 
decision challenging. Crisis communication may be generated for external audiences 
(e.g., press releases, public statements, posting flyers) or internal audiences (e.g., 
organizational bulletins, memos, emails, newsletters; letters to investors; meetings with 
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lawyers). It draws on a multitude of media (e.g., face-to-face, electronic, written, visual). 
It may change across time in response to developments in the crisis and ongoing 
processes of sense-making. It is likely to be adapted to a variety of audiences. It 
implicates power and resistance. It may or may not represent a consistent organizational 
voice. It may or may not be cachéd or available in its entirety. Its production and 
dissemination may be constrained by legal action, the presence of a vulnerable 
population, or a lack of information. It may differ in salience and credibility. In short, 
crisis communication is complex. 
Several factors influenced the dataset selected for this analysis. First, in keeping 
with the presumption that crisis communication is an organizational phenomenon, the 
data needed to be a form of organizational discourse. Second, given the sensitive nature 
of the case (the alleged sexual exploitation of minors which was being pursued in 
ongoing legal actions and media coverage), it seemed advisable to focus on texts that 
were publicly accessible. 
Third, given the diversity of communication media being used in the case (e.g., 
member newsletters, press conferences, sermons, letters to the editor, community 
events), it was important to find a medium that was used consistently across stakeholder 
organizations throughout the crisis. Fourth, in order to remove the effect that 
intermediary stakeholders (e.g., the media) have on crisis communication, it was 
important to study the use of controlled media, or at least discourse that had yet to be 
adapted and re-released by intermediary stakeholders. Fifth, to tap into the conflictual, 
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polyvocal construction of the crisis, it was necessary to identify a mode of crisis 
communication that was accessible to each of the key stakeholder organizations. 
Given these constraints, an obvious choice was to focus on the press releases 
generated by key stakeholder organizations. Not only was this format of discourse used 
consistently by each of the key stakeholder organizations, but it was cachéd on each 
organization’s website. In this format, the press releases were both publicly available 
and untouched by any intermediary organizations (e.g., media outlets). Further, the press 
releases were ordered chronologically, which meant they could be compared in time. 
Orienting to the Data 
Since the crisis continues to unfold, it was necessary to delimit the dataset. The 
analysis presented here focuses on press releases from January 2002 (when the case 
broke to the public through The Boston Globe’s exposé) through June 2005 (when data 
collection occurred, and at which time each organization was poised to discuss the crisis 
at its own national conference). The data is comprised of all relevant press releases 
posted on each organization’s website for the delimited three-and-a-half year time 
period. Since both VOTF and SNAP emerged in direct response to clergy abuse and 
focus primarily on that issue, all of their press releases were relevant, addressing some 
aspect of the crisis. 
Since the USCCB has a history that precedes and a purpose that supersedes 
clergy abuse, the process was slightly more complex for this organization. Clergy abuse 
was only one of a multitude of topics addressed by USCCB press releases, so it was 
necessary to determine salience on a document-by-document basis. Although some press 
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releases were obviously irrelevant to the case (e.g., those addressing stem cell research, 
interfaith dialogues, or assisted suicide) others were less clear. This was often the case in 
press releases announcing the resignation, (rea)ppointment, and/or retirement of priests 
and bishops. Although many of these job changes occurred as a result of allegations of 
sex abuse allegations or abuse-related diocesan mismanagement, this was not stated in 
the press releases. It took additional research (generally media searches for further 
information on the career of the named priest/bishop) to identify which of these press 
releases were salient to the clergy abuse case and which were not. Of 886 press releases 
posted by the USCCB during the specified time frame, only 10% were case-specific. 
For each organization, press releases were copied directly from the website, 
ordered chronologically, and saved in a single-spaced Word document. Relevant 
USCCB press releases (from January 2002 – June 2005) comprised a 140-page 
document. Relevant VOTF press releases (from July 2002 – June 2005) comprised a 
234-page document. Relevant SNAP press releases (from June 2002 - June 2005) 
comprised a 229-page document. In addition, during the same window of time, SNAP 
posted enough “press statements” (a category of discourse not used by USCCB or 
VOTF) to fill a 172-page document. This data collection process yielded a familiarity 
with the texts, but no formal analysis was conducted at this stage. 
Once the data was collected into four documents (one for USCCB, one for 
VOTF, and two for SNAP), it became necessary to return to research the concept and 
practice of dialogue. The reading at this phase produced hundreds of pages of notes and 
abstracts, which were later summarized in Chapter IV. This reading phase set the stage 
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for the next phase of data analysis. The hundreds of pages of dialogue notes generated at 
this stage were, as per grounded theory practices, left to percolate, while the data took 
center stage once again. 
The data analysis that followed consisted of a minute reading of the 603 pages of 
publicly available press releases from USCCB, VOTF, and SNAP. In order to orient to 
the data, a preliminary tracking of each stakeholder organizations’ issue management 
was conducted. Understanding the construction of issues is a logical starting point, since 
issue management is a type of PR central to conflict or crisis situations. The framing of 
issues hinges on four actions by stakeholders: naming, blaming, claiming, and 
explaining. A frame analysis reveals what issues are named, and how stakeholders 
demarcate culpability, process blame and accusation, and explicate the issues (Putnam & 
Kolb, 2000, pp. 91-2). Such an analysis can be revealing on both the organizational level 
and the inter-organizational level, revealing both the coherence of crisis frames at the 
organizational level and the contested crisis frames at the inter-organizational level. In 
this capacity, it served as an orienting method for understanding the points of consensus 
and dissensus among key stakeholder organizations. However, the a priori nature of this 
coding scheme stifled the grounded theory goals of the study. Additionally, it offered an 
insufficient capacity to foreground the interactivity among organizations, offering 
instead a mechanism for static cross-comparison. 
Thus, driven by the goal of taking a dialogical view of the data, the analysis 
shifted from an issue management approach to an exploration of emergent discursive 
elements. Among other things, this included tracking emotionality (i.e., the evidence and 
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treatment of emotions), temporality (i.e., orientations to time), context (e.g., historical 
and social), voice and silencing, grammatical forms (e.g., invitations vs. imperatives, 
associational vs. dissociational language), and metacommunication (e.g., explicit 
references to the use of PR or of dialogue). Note was also taken of where crisis 
communication was overtly being used dialogically (e.g., where a form of PR was used 
by one organization to engage other stakeholder groups) versus instances of overt 
monologism (e.g., where a form of PR was used to make declarations). Although sifting 
through over 600 pages of data looking for emergent communicative strategies became 
increasingly cumbersome and unwieldy, it was revealing. 
What resulted from this stage of the analysis was a broad understanding of how 
the stakeholder organizations were using crisis communication. In retrospect, the 
assessment may be understood as a three level analysis which tracked: 1) what each 
organization chose to communicate (content), 2) how each organization chose to 
communicate (process), and 3) if/how the organizations interacted with one another 
(interactivity). The result was the equivalent of 116 (single-spaced) pages of 
commentary on the data (22 for UCCB, 44 for VOTF, and 50 for SNAP). 
 The learning from this stage of the analysis affirmed the potential for an 
expanded dialogic understanding of crisis communication. There were clear indications 
of dialogicality in each stakeholder organization’s PR. The following lists some of the 
communicative strategies illuminated by a dialogical perspective. According to the 




o Demarcate space in which to keep key questions open and to defer closure. 
o Note events in which stakeholder groups could dialogue. 
o Record their attempts to engage dialogue with one another. 
o Point out media used for dialogue (e.g., webcasts, Ad Hoc committees). 
o Promise future opportunities for dialogue. 
o Delimit communicative interactivity; bound dialogue 
o Mark the direction(s) that dialogue and power are flowing. 
o Mark who is in control of potential dialogue. 
o Mark the (un)typical nature of dialogue. 
• Interact 
o Trace turn taking across time and various media. 
o Respond to one another’s assertions and interpret one another’s actions. 
o Trace ‘who talked with whom about what.’ 
o Channel their communication through various intermediary audiences. 
o Recap and expand on one another’s statements. 
o Set themselves up as communication equals, despite power differentials. 
• Invite 
o Invite one another into dialogue, overtly or implicitly. 
o Attempt to bring new players into discursive interaction. 
o Request that one stakeholder address another stakeholder. 
o Act as, name, or note the need for a dialogue facilitator. 
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o Request involvement in dialogue. 
o Wish for or recoil from dialogue. 
• Metacommunicate 
o Debate the possibility of dialogue. 
o Comment on a stakeholder’s reaction to attempts at discursive interactivity. 
o Mark nonresponsiveness, silence, listening, and interruptions in 
communication. 
o Report on side-bar conversations. 
Each of the functions in this categorization is either overtly or implicitly dialogic. 
Just as salient were the strategies stakeholders used to restrict or refuse dialogue (e.g., 
refusals to disclose information, cancellation of meetings, the exclusion of particular 
voices, the containment of interaction in time/space, announcements, 
demands/imperatives). That each of the stakeholder organizations used a variety of 
strategies to engage or limit dialogicality affirmed the salience of the current project. 
Next, the literature on dialogue was reviewed in order to frame the emergent model. 
Construction and Application of Model 
One of the difficulties of carving out a dialogical framework to apply to this 
dataset was the division in the dialogue literature between micro- and macro-approaches. 
In light of the numerous communicative strategies unearthed by the preliminary analysis, 
it seemed essential to craft a model capable of engaging the data at both levels. 
Ultimately, what emerged was an analytical model guided primarily by Cheney and 
Christensen’s (2001) call for a critical assessment of public relations and by Linell’s 
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(1998) discourse-analytic approach to dialogicality. The emergent framework was 
comprised of six elements which were roughly grouped into an assessment of discursive 
context (discursive presence across time, general orientations to dialogic terms, and 
stakeholder contextualizations of the crisis) and an assessment of discursive interactivity 
(a comparison of initiative/response patterns to offensive/defensive orientations, 
(non)topicality, and enabling/constraining responses). The first analysis mapped the 
temporal, ideological, and sense-making context of the crisis, and the second analysis 
traced particular discursive strategies in the practice of crisis communication. 
The next two chapters review the findings from this two-pronged analysis. 
Conclusions and implications for an expanded dialogic approach to crisis 
communication follow that. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS I: CONTEXT 
As noted, the goal of this study is to craft a dialogical model for understanding the 
communicative construction (and contestation) of a crisis. With Linell (1998), this study 
views dialogicality as an epistemological orientation which should not be conflated with 
dialogue as a type of discourse. Key here is exploring the degree to which PR texts 
posted on the websites of three of the most vocal organizations in the clergy sex abuse 
crisis are “mutually other oriented” (Linell, 1998, p. 35). 
Recognizing that dialogicality can be evaluated at multiple recursive levels, this 
study draws on Linell’s (1998) definition of dialogicality as contextualized interactivity 
(p. 7) to build a two-pronged analysis. This chapter contains a macro analysis which 
maps the context of the crisis; the next chapter contains a micro analysis which maps the 
(attempted) discursive interactivity of the crisis. Note, however, that attention to the 
specifics of language and the breadth of context interweave throughout the analyses, 
given their recursive natures. 
This chapter offers three approaches to tracking the clergy abuse crisis at a 
broader level. First, it charts each organization’s discursive presence in the case across 
time, contextualizing how this presence ebbs and flows in the content addressed by each 
organization. Second, it foregrounds each organization’s ideological orientation to 
dialogue by tracing political uses of terms associated with dialogic practices. Third, it 
traces the way in which each organization contextualizes the crisis. When taken together, 
these analyses serve as a backdrop against which a more particular assessment of the 
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discursive interactivity of the organizations can be traced. The next chapter offers three 
mechanisms for tracking (attempts at) interactivity in the dataset. 
Mapping Discursive Presence 
One way to assess the communicative context of a crisis is to track who is 
producing crisis-related discourse at any given time. In order to track what might be 
called discursive presence, it is necessary is to note how many press releases/statements 
each stakeholder organization produces across a given span of time. Of interest here is 
how each organization’s discursive presence shifts with the lifecycle of the crisis. Bar 
graphs based on a simple tabulation of each organization’s press releases/statements 
across the crisis (delimited for this study as January 2002 through June 2005) depict the 
ebb and flow of each group’s discursive presence. This, in turn, is contextualized in light 
of the content each stakeholder organization addresses. This offers a mechanism for 
visually (and comparatively) mapping changes in the discursive presence of stakeholder 
organizations across time, an important part of assessing the dialogicality of the crisis. It 
is important to acknowledge that the use of publicly accessible discourse (i.e., press 
releases/statements) has an equalizing power here, allowing the researcher to work from 
a type of PR generated by and equally accessible to the three stakeholder organizations. 
Creating comparative charts for the stakeholder organizations’ press 
releases/statements across the duration of the time studied raises interesting questions 
about how organizations make their discursive presence felt across the lifecycle of a 
crisis. It may also indicate which points in time are comparatively more salient to a 
given organization than they are to other organizations. It also reveals ways in which 
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discursive dominance shifts across time and points at which various stakeholder 
organizations ‘enter’ and ‘leave’ the larger crisis context. This may indicate points at 
which an organization deems a crisis worthy of public engagement (perhaps deeming it 
to have moved from a ‘latent’ to ‘manifest’ phase), and points at which it deems the 
crisis to be ‘resolved’ (or to have returned to a ‘latent’ or ‘status quo’ phase). Thus, 
although a broad brush stroke analysis, this is a key step in understanding how multiple 
stakeholder organizations co-construct a crisis. 
Figures 1-4 trace the respective number of press releases/statements for each 



















 In the chart for 2002 (Figure 1), several things stand out. The USCCB is virtually 
the only ‘speaker’ from January through June. This makes sense, given its position as the 
‘source’ organization and VOTF and SNAP’s positions as ‘responder’ organizations. 
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During the six-month period in which the USCCB predominates, it engages in typical 
apologia and image restoration discourse in response to allegations of systemic 
complicity with abuse. The USCCB addresses a rather generic Catholic audience (i.e., 
the U.S. laity) in its press releases, and portrays itself as actively involved in remediating 
the problem of clergy sexual abuse. At this time, VOTF is still emerging, and SNAP 
(still relatively small, but several years old at this point) is inexplicably silent. 
In July, there is a shift in which VOTF becomes increasingly vocal, producing 
more press releases than the USCCB for several months. VOTF has three main foci 
during this time. Having started as a Boston-based group, it offers a running commentary 
on how the crisis is unfolding in Boston (the epicenter of the crisis). Also, being an 
emergent group banned by the hierarchy, much of its PR defends its position and 
credibility within the Church. On the national level, VOTF’s press releases focus on the 
creation of the USCCB’s Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People 
(a.k.a. the Charter). Across these foci, VOTF’s PR has a diverse audience, including the 
hierarchy, the victim/survivor community, the laity, and the general public. The USCCB, 
again seeming to address a generic lay audience, is equally focused on the creation of the 
Charter during the second half of 2002. This preoccupation is understandable, given the 
USCCB’s assertion that the Charter is its ‘definitive response’ to the crisis. 
Throughout this first year, SNAP is virtually silent, posting no more than two or 
three press releases/statements in any given month. What it does post traces the 
organization’s meetings with the USCCB and with officials from the New Jersey 
Attorney General’s office, and its exclusion from the USCCB’s National Review Board. 
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By marking these meetings, SNAP traces its access to and exclusion from key sites of 
discussion. Like VOTF, SNAP responds to the USCCB’s crisis management at this 
point, levying for certain actions and attempting to set standards for the USCCB’s 
actions. 
Clearly the three organizations offer differing discursive presence in the crisis at 
this stage. Where the USCCB brings a strong presence to bear through its apologia, 
VOTF brings an emerging presence to bear through its pursuit of organizational 




















In 2003 (see Figure 2), a clear shift happens. Whereas the USCCB predominated 
early in 2002, here it pulls back to a steady, low level of participation. The hierarchy’s 
focus at this point shifts to practical, seemingly proactive crisis management steps: the 
establishment of policies, training and audit programs, and shifts in leadership. The only 
defensive posting responds to a media fire storm over a recently unearthed 1962 Vatican 
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document. This document was being cited as evidence of a long-standing policy 
forbidding church leaders from reporting clergy sex crimes to civil authorities. The 
USCCB strongly defends the document, thereby defending the global hierarchy’s 
historical management of clergy sexual abuse (CSA). 
In 2003, VOTF shows a relatively steady presence in the crisis, continuing to 
comment primarily on events in Boston, with an expanding focus to New England and 
new affiliates across the United States. The organization divides its focus between 
responding to actions of the hierarchy (banning VOTF chapters from meeting on church 
property, USCCB meetings, changes in church leadership, the creation of policies, 
settling with victims, etc.) and initiating their own actions (funneling lay donations away 
from hierarchical control, holding meetings and conferences, joining with external 
coalitions, surveying members and Boston priests, etc.). 
SNAP begins this year relatively quiet, much as it did 2002. However, by July, 
SNAP has overtaken both the other organizations in establishing discursive presence in 
this genre of PR (press releases/statements posted on the web). Interestingly, SNAP is 
the only organization of the three to post both press releases and press statements. 
Whether this is the reason or not, SNAP clearly creates more PR output than the other 
two organizations in 2003. 
From this broad perspective, it becomes evident that there is a shift in the 
composite discursive presence mid-2003, with the USCCB receding, VOTF staying 
relatively consistent, and SNAP increasing. Interestingly, SNAP’s discourse exhibits a 
consistent bifurcation from this point forward. Its predominant theme focuses on how the 
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crisis is enacted in the United States court system. SNAP proactively engages entities in 
the legal arena, the public, and the Church, consistently positioning the crisis within a 
legal context. A strong sub-theme in SNAP’s PR is a running commentary on the 
hierarchy’s (mis)management of the crisis. More often than it comments on the 
USCCB’s official policies, SNAP comments on the transfer of abusive priests, the 
stonewalling of diocesan audits, the promotion of complicit bishops, the lack of follow-





















 Again in 2004 (see Figure 3), the USCCB maintains a low discursive presence in 
this venue. Its postings continue to emphasize the implementation of policies, audits, 
meetings, and reports, and to downplay any de-escalation in its crisis response. The 
relaxation of the USCCB’s focus on the crisis only becomes apparent in the discourse of 
the other organizations and in a mapping of its discursive presence in the situation. For 
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its part, the USCCB continues to emphasize its crisis management (e.g., noting that 700 
priests and deacons were removed since 2002 in response to the Charter). 
VOTF’s discursive presence in 2004 is fairly consistent with its presence in 
2003. However, its tone begins to be more sharply critical of the hierarchy, paralleling 
SNAP’s critical voice in 2003. VOTF names and criticizes numerous actions taken by 
the hierarchy, often calling for particular responses. VOTF also introduces a new theme, 
focusing several postings on financial issues, addressing the hierarchy’s lack of financial 
openness in conjunction with bankruptcy filings in several dioceses. At this point, VOTF 
has expanded beyond Boston and response to official Church rhetoric to take a more 
critical, nation-wide stance. 
In 2004, a distinction emerges between SNAP’s press releases and its press 
statements. The former frequently levy particular requests for action to a variety of 
entities; there is a distinct request for interactivity in this discourse. The latter are more 
consistent with the other organization’s press releases, and offer a critical running 
commentary on the crisis. In both categories of PR, SNAP continues to focus on the 
hierarchy’s actions and on the legal arena. However, at this point, SNAP expands its 
focus, offering a barrage of salient details and cases and instances and issues across the 
U.S. (and some around the world). SNAP is clearly the most specific, broadly aware, and 






















 By the last year of analysis (see Figure 4), the USCCB has virtually removed 
itself from the arena. Although it is difficult to determine the exact turning point, the 
USCCB has clearly returned to normal operations. Everything about its discursive 
presence in 2005 positions the crisis in the past; the USCCB clearly marks the crisis as 
having moved to a low level maintenance issue. It presents data from its internal audits, 
tracks changes in leadership salient to the crisis, notes the status of policies created in 
response to the crisis, and previews an upcoming meeting of the hierarchy. Overall, the 
way the USCCB addresses the crisis in 2005 marks the hierarchy marks as having 
returned to business-as-usual. 
For VOTF, 2005 marks a reduction in its discursive presence as well. During this 
six-month period, VOTF’s discourse continues to expand its focus. The organization 
responds to a USCCB request for feedback on improving the Charter, comments on 
SNAP’s criticism of a Ford Motor Company ad exploiting the crisis, calls the USCCB to 
open up about Charter revisions, and comments on a relevant trial. It also comments on 
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Pope John Paul’s death, surveys VOTF members on the new pope, and criticizes the 
Vatican for allowing Cardinal Law (resigned archbishop of Boston) to participate in the 
Pope’s funeral services. 
SNAP continues to produce a high amount of discourse in 2005, naming a wide 
array of issues on the national and global level. It comments on many of the same issues 
as VOTF, while continuing to track numerous legal developments around the country 
(and world). It continues to orient to the crisis both as critical commentator and as 
participant, making specific requests for interactivity, especially of representatives of the 
hierarchy. It is interesting to note that in June, when the USCCB has its General 
Meeting, SNAP and VOTF are equally present in this discursive venue, but the USCCB 
is nearly absent. 
Although general, the preceding discussion provides an important overview of 
the communicative terrain of the clergy sex abuse crisis by charting the discursive 
presence of three stakeholder organizations from January 2002 through June 2005. The 
picture that emerges is what might be expected in any crisis. The source organization is 
strongly present in the beginning, engaging in traditional apologia. Then, having 
presented what it deems to be sufficient PR and policy responses, it subtly decreases its 
presence in the crisis, shifting to informative updates and progress reports, thus marking 
its intent to return to status quo. At this point, the source organization positions itself as 
having returned to normal, the crisis well in hand if not resolved, and its presence no 
longer necessary in any on-going discussion of the crisis. For the USCCB, image 
management seems to be primary. 
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Not surprisingly, as an emergent grassroots organization, VOTF’s discursive 
presence in the crisis seems to follow a bell curve. It is not present in the beginning, 
peaks in the middle as it finds its voice as an organization, then settles back into a lower 
discursive presence as its focus (at least in this venue) seems to dissipate to some degree. 
As an organization that emerged in response to the crisis, it is not formed enough to be 
discursively present until mid-2002. At that point, its focus is primarily on its 
organizational identity, a prerequisite to establishing any substantive discursive presence 
in the crisis. Once its identity is somewhat established, VOTF briefly dominates this 
discursive arena. However, it quickly settles back down into a lesser, albeit steady, 
presence. VOTF’s major focus throughout is on establishing its identity and challenging 
the identity of the Church. 
SNAP is an interesting study. Although its existence is directly responsive to the 
crisis of clergy sexual abuse and predates the 2002 Boston Globe exposé, it is a late entry 
into this discursive arena. It is not until mid-2003 that SNAP makes its presence 
substantively felt. However, at this point, SNAP becomes a powerhouse, expanding the 
scope of the crisis without losing focus on the key issues, and maintaining a strong 
national/global awareness. SNAP’s presence consistently increases across time, and its 
primary focus seems to be on managing the issue of clergy sexual abuse. 
Mapping Ideological Orientations to Dialogue 
A second way to trace the communicative context of the clergy sex abuse crisis is 
to assess each stakeholder organization’s ideological orientation to dialogue. By 
comparing each organization’s espoused value for dialogic communication with the 
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dialogicality of its enacted communication, it is possible to trace each organization’s 
ideological orientation to dialogue. Cheney and Christensen (2001) argue that 
distinguishing between ‘political’ uses of dialogical terminology and a dialogical 
orientation to discourse is a crucial step in distinguishing between attempts to evoke a 
dialogical image and attempts to dialogue. Given the currency that dialogue has as a 
concept in the organizational world, it is likely that most managers will speak well of 
dialogue. However, it is essential to discern (by an assessment of their actual discourse) 
whether this is a cooptation of the term, or an indicator of a truly dialogical orientation. 
Interestingly, the current dataset is permeated with references to dialogue and its 
correlates (e.g., collaboration, community, teamwork, and discussion). It is only by 
tracing the dialogicality in each organization’s actual communication practices that it is 
possible to determine where these references underscore a dialogical orientation to crisis 
communication and where they serve strategic or ‘political’ purposes in the crisis. There 
may be a greater or lesser correspondence between an organization’s talk about dialogue 
and its enactment of dialogic forms of communication. For example, an organization 
may describe itself as inclusive of all points of view, yet strictly guard access to 
decision-making. Alternately, an organization might support its rhetoric of ‘team-based 
communication’ with a decentralized structure. Key here is comparing what an 
organization says about dialogue (and its forms) with the ways in which it actually 





In the clergy abuse case, each organization uses the term dialogue differently. 
For the USCCB, dialogue is seldom referred to directly. This absence in and of itself 
may be revealing, given the USCCB’s position of power and its focus on crisis 
resolution. More common terms are those indicating decision-making processes (e.g., 
meeting) or religious connections (e.g., communion, church, body).Where these words or 
the term dialogue appear, they are used in several ways.  
Dialogue as Image Management 
First, it is important to assess the ways in which the USCCB uses dialogic terms 
(e.g., cooperation and meeting) to craft a particular image of the Catholic Church in 
general or the USCCB in particular. This is seems to be the most common use of 
dialogical terms by the USCCB. In the next two quotes, the emphasis is on the hierarchy 
meeting with victims/survivors to hear them. The emphasis on pastoral listening clearly 
indicates a positive image of the hierarchy. The picture that emerges here is of a 
leadership (here equated with the Church) actively co-present and listening to 
victims/survivors. 
As a Church, we have met with those who are victims of sexual abuse by priests. 
We have heard their sorrow, confusion, anger, and fear. We have tried to reach 
out pastorally and sensitively not only to victims of this outrageous behavior, but 
to their families and the communities devastated by this crime. (Bishop Gregory 
statement; USCCB, 2002, February 19) 
 
[The Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse] sponsored meetings with victims and 
victims' organizations, and its representatives attended their national meetings. 
(USCCB, 2002, September 5) 
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In a similar vein, the next two quotes position relationship, commitment, and 
cooperation as mechanisms for potential renewal in the Church. What emerges is a 
glowing image of the Church (i.e., the hierarchy) interfacing with “its people” (note the 
possessive language) in a healing, restorative manner. 
"It is clear that the Church is facing an opportunity to renew its relationship with 
its people, to restore trust and to strengthen its commitment to the faithful," 
Archbishop Flynn wrote. "We are confronting a wonderful opportunity for 
ultimate healing…" (USCCB, 2002, April 19) 
 
"The USCCB's Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People adopted 
by the Church in the United States last spring was a welcome milestone in our 
continuing effort to cooperate with our priests and with our church members to 
ensure that all our children are protected from harm.… We will have the 
certainty that we can move forward in justice and compassion as a real 
community of clergy and laity." (Bishop Gregory; USCCB, 2002, November 13) 
 
Additionally, the USCCB paints an image of itself as collaborating on a grander social 
scale. Here, the USCCB is portrayed as working with other social institutions to address 
child abuse in society. Again, collaboration is treated as a tool for addressing the 
problem of clergy sexual abuse. 
The draft Charter also contains a proposal that the USCCB "cooperate with other 
churches, institutions of learning, and other interested organizations in 
conducting a major research study" about sexual abuse of children and young 
people in our society. (USCCB, 2002, June 4) 
 
"… participants agreed to seek ways in the future to cooperate together in order 
to take even more dramatic steps on the specific issue of abuse of children and 
young people in church and society.” (USCCB, 2002, June 7) 
 
…The AHCSA [Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse] originated formal 
consultations with other bishops’ conferences of English-speaking countries and 
participated in other international church consultations on the problem. (USCCB, 
2002, September 19) 
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Clearly, the hierarchy is positioning itself as a cooperative, solution-oriented participant 
in both the religious world and society at large. 
Another image created by dialogic terminology is that of Catholic unity. Here, 
the primary emphasis is on U.S. alignment with Rome. In the quote below, note that the 
National Review Board (NRB), the USCCB, priests, the laity, indeed, “the entire 
Church” (here, the Vatican and the USCCB) are described as positioned to collaborate 
on enacting the Charter. 
The National Review Board is comforted by the overall support given by the 
Vatican to the efforts of the American bishops to end this ugly chapter of clerical 
sexual abuse. Clearly the entire Church is united …. We stand ready to assist in 
any way as the Dallas Charter is further refined in accord with Rome's direction. 
Once that work is completed next month, there will be an urgent need for all 
American Catholics - bishops, priests, and laity alike - to give life to the charter 
with strong action and resolve. We members of the review board rededicate 
ourselves to fulfilling our part of that promise. (NRB statement; USCCB 2002, 
October 18) 
 
This image of Catholic unity is underscored by an emphasis on bonds of communion. 
This paints an image of the Catholic Church as truly catholic (i.e., united globally). 
The genuine ecclesial communion between the Episcopal Conference and the 
Apostolic See, demonstrated once again in these painful circumstances, prompts 
us all to pray earnestly to God that from the present crisis might emerge, as the 
Holy Father has stated: "a holier priesthood, a holier episcopate, and a holier 
Church" …. In this way, the bonds of communion which unite the bishops with 
their priest and deacons, and the faithful with their pastors, will be further 
strengthened. (Cardinal Re; USCCB, 2002, December 8) 
 
However, note the subtle variations in unity here. The USCCB is united to the Vatican, 
the bishops, priests, and deacons are united, and the laity is united with its pastors. These 
subtle demarcations in the hierarchy’s view of catholic unity are important, and will be 
addressed in the concluding chapter. 
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Despite subtle gradations in its conceptualization of the Church, the USCCB’s 
PR uses dialogic terms to craft an image of a globally unified Church that is being 
renewed internally and collaborating externally. The USCCB clearly uses dialogic terms 
to craft a positive image. 
Dialogue as Decision-Making and Directives 
The USCC also applies dialogic terms to describe the bishops’ decision-making. 
Here, they denote pragmatic aspects of crisis management. These references position 
dialogue as an internal communication function of the hierarchy, as the following quotes 
indicate. 
"The full body will be asked to consider how these principles can be further 
developed and whether additional principles should be formulated as the 
foundation for future action." (USCCB, 2002, March 14) 
 
…144 (or 74 percent of all dioceses) reported having been in dialogue with the 
Major Superiors of Religious regarding the status of members in religious life. 
(USCCB, 2002, September 19) 
 
The Holy See requested further reflection and revision by a "mixed commission" 
made up of four representatives of the Holy See and four representatives of the 
USCCB. The Mixed Commission met in Rome … and the results of its work 
were discussed and approved by the full body of U.S. bishops. (USCCB, 2002, 
December 16) 
 
Dialogue, in these examples, is positioned as a mechanism for managerial decision-
making, and is frequently conflated with a discussion or meeting. 
The USCCB also uses dialogic terms in an implicitly commanding way when 
directed to the laity. Consonant with its position of power in the crisis, the USCCB 
periodically impels Catholics to serve the hierarchy’s goals. In these instances, the 
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USCCB uses dialogue and associated terms to set the standard for expected behavior by 
members of the church, as the following examples indicate. 
This is a time for Catholic people bishops, clergy, religious, and laity to resolve 
to work together to assure the safety of our children. (USCCB, 2002, February 
19) 
 
As we pursue this common work for the safety of our children and for the good 
of society and the Church we love, let us continue to remember one another 
before the Lord in prayer and in charity. (Bishop Gregory statement; USCCB, 
2002, February 19) 
 
All Christians must work together in seeking to find ways to offer healing to 
those who have been so wounded and to restore the faithful to the faith that has 
been taken from them by these actions (USCCB, 2002, June 7) 
 
Note that in each of the quotes above, there is an implicit command for Catholics, and 
that several of them require the collaborative work of the laity and the hierarchy. Here, 
collaboration is commanded and it is portrayed as essential for crisis resolution. 
A different picture emerges as the USCCB addresses SNAP, the stakeholder 
organization self-identified as external to the Catholic Church. Note the following quote. 
[Bishop Gregory] said today that he would consider the participation of the 
Survivors' Network for those Abused by Priests (SNAP) in a dialogue to take 
place between victims and the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse 
and a delegation of Cardinals. … Now that SNAP has announced that it is 
withdrawing its participation in the lawsuit, the USCCB and the organization will 
be in contact about re-framing the planned discussion. (USCCB, 2002, June 10) 
 
Here, dialogue is a resource that the USCCB controls and can portion out at will. Note 
that the USCCB considers SNAP for inclusion in the dialogue only upon withdrawing 
from a lawsuit against the Church. Clearly, the USCCB directs other stakeholders 
through either mandating or controlling access to dialogue. (The next chapter addresses 
the issue of power more fully.) 
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Although not addressed with great frequency, the USCCB does name dialogue 
and associated terms in its discourse. The idealized image of a dialogic Church that 
emerges stands in rather stark opposition to the use of dialogic terms to either mandate 
catholic collaboration or demarcate decisions as accessible only to the hierarchy. In the 
USCCB’s press releases, there is a chasm between image-enhancing uses of dialogic 
terms and the use of dialogic processes as a mechanism of control. Interestingly, dialogic 
terms do not appear in later USCCB press releases, perhaps indicating the USCCB’s 
primary application of dialogical terms as a strategy for image management early in the 
crisis. 
VOTF 
The term dialogue appears more frequently in VOTF’s discourse than in that of 
the USCCB, and appears throughout the period studied. As does the USCCB, VOTF 
uses dialogic terminology to promote a particular image of itself. Here, the image is of a 
willing participant in the crisis management process. VOTF also promotes the problem-
solving capacity of dialogue, often positioning dialogue as both the ultimate goal and the 
means to attain that goal. As with the USCCB, dialogue is equated with discussions and 
meetings; it is portrayed as an ongoing process that requires mutual respect and 
listening. VOTF notes “sidebar” discussions it has with other organizations (stakeholder 
or otherwise), just as the USCCB does. At times, VOTF speaks out against the 
hierarchy’s restricting access to dialogue (e.g., in their frustration over bannings). At 
other times, VOTF accepts the hierarchy’s management of dialogue, simply expressing 
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gratitude for any dialogic opportunities that are extended and availability for additional 
dialogic meetings. 
Dialogue as Image Management 
As noted, dialogic terminology is used in VOTF’s press releases to portray the 
organization as a willing participant in crisis management. Where the USCCB comments 
on dialogue as an abstract ideal or reports on past dialogues (thus making them 
inaccessible to other stakeholders), VOTF repeatedly asks, hints, or demands to be 
invited to the table. VOTF’s discourse makes it clear the organization is functioning 
from a lower power position; by looking to the hierarchy for access to the dialogue, 
VOTF indicates the USCCB’s control of the discursive situation. Note the image of 
VOTF that emerges in the following quotes.  
…we wish to contribute positively through ongoing dialogue and insistence that 
the Church is all the people of God - pope, bishops, clergy, religious and lay - 
working together for our common good, for justice, reconciliation, healing, and a 
stronger Church. (VOTF, 2002, November 13) 
 
… Voice of the Faithful stands ready to meet with Bishop Lennon in response to 
his desire to further discussions that have occurred over the past seven months. 
(Post; VOTF, 2002, December 18) 
 
We need a blueprint to heal the Catholic Church. Voice of the Faithful stands 
ready to begin that work today. (Post; VOTF, 2002, December 13) 
 
This is an opportunity to involve the laity in answering “why?” and in creating 
plans to solve these problems. A shared responsibility to find the answers would 
strengthen the faith of all participants while fortifying the whole community. We 
are ready and able to be a part of finding those answers, in examining the 
problems with a clear and reasoned voice, and to find solutions in the spirit of 
collaboration inside the universal Church. (VOTF, 2004, November 18) 
 
The image of VOTF that emerges here is of a willing, helpful, stubbornly committed, 
participative part of the Church. The image of the Church that emerges from VOTF’s PR 
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is that of a democratic organization in which all members (ought to) have a say. As a 
result, VOTF offers itself as part of the dialogical solution to clergy sexual abuse (and 
related dilemmas). 
Dialogue as Collaborative yet Constrained 
In contrast to the USCCB, VOTF frequently uses the term dialogue, positioning 
it as essential to crisis resolution. For VOTF, dialogue is both the means and the end 
goal, as is evident in the following quotes. 
"We love our Church dearly, and all we have sought from the beginning was 
open and honest dialogue with our bishops” (Vellante; VOTF, 2002, September 
30) 
 
"VOTF is committed to open dialogue, especially with those who disagree with 
us. We are providing a forum for healthy exchange which we would like to see in 
the Catholic Church. We believe that we grow in faith when we listen to each 
other." (Zouvelenkis; VOTF, 2003, February 11) 
 
Not only is dialogue positioned as essential to crisis resolution and as VOTF’s 
ultimate goal, but it is also described as collaborative. Although this seems obvious, it is 
important to address, since it foregrounds VOTF’s dependence on at least four groups 
(hierarchy, laity, clergy, and victim/survivors) to achieve its goal. According to VOTF: 
Solutions need the “sunlight” of truth and reconciliation in order to bring about 
healing. Solutions must involve collaboration among the laity, priests, religious, 
and hierarchy … Healing requires listening to one another, to survivors and their 
families, to priests, religious, and to the laity – women and men of good will who 
share a responsibility for the well-being of the Church. We must listen to one 
another; we must have real and honest dialogue; we must cooperate in shaping 
solutions. (Post; VOTF, 2002, December 13) 
 
“…U.S. bishops as pastoral leaders need to provide strong leadership in order to 
bring all sides together — bishops, priests, survivors and laity — in an open and 
honest dialogue. This collaboration will serve to bring a swift conclusion to this 
Catholic sexual abuse crisis." (Post; VOTF, 2002, October 18) 
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As noted, where VOTF looks to the hierarchy to engender dialogue, it acknowledges the 
power differential between the hierarchy and itself. Thus, VOTF finds itself in a double-
bind, since what it deems essential is not under its control. At best, VOTF can construct 
an image of itself as a willing participant in crisis management and invite the hierarchy 
into dialogue. (Again, more will be said about the discursive enactment of this power 
differential in the next chapter.) 
VOTF also responds through a running commentary on the hierarchy’s control of 
dialogue. Early in the crisis, this commentary centers on archbishops banning VOTF 
from meeting on church property throughout New England. In response to the bannings, 
VOTF leverages Pope John Paul’s statements about the importance of meaningful lay 
participation and dialogue in church life, as the following quote shows. 
"We hold that banishment of persons who in no way have been found guilty of 
any deviation from faith or discipline is destructive to the internal life of the 
Catholic community and is in flagrant contradiction to the spirit of dialogue that 
Pope John Paul II continuously advocates and demands."  (Post letter; VOTF, 
n.d., “Voice of the Faithful Names”) 
 
Here, VOTF calls out the disparity between Pope John Paul’s image of a dialogic 
Church and its control of resources. VOTF sees this disparity as extending beyond the 
(former) Pope’s vision of a dialogic Church to a general understanding of a dialogic 
Church: 
… Steve Krueger called this tactic [bannings], "a subtle form of 
excommunication that delegitimizes ecumenical dialogue and hurts all 
Catholics." (VOTF, 2002, November 10) 
 
…the bannings represent the hierarchy's manipulation of the faithful in their 
diocese, not their openness to listen to them. …. the bannings contradict the 
requirements for a collaborative church by stifling dialogue. (Krueger; VOTF, 
2003, January 6) 
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At times, VOTF’s PR goes into great detail tracing the discrepancy between this 
stonewalling and the hierarchy’s politically correct use of dialogue. 
…your letter states that “at the present time, the Archbishop, Cardinal Law, is in 
dialogue with the leaders of VOTF through his Vicar General, Bishop Edyvean.” 
This is not true. There is no dialogue at the present time. In fact, there have been 
no meetings between Bishop Edyvean and leaders of Voice of the Faithful since 
June 28, 2002. Since then we have attempted to schedule meetings with Bishop 
Edyvean without success. Bishop Edyvean was invited to speak at our 
convention on July 20, 2002; he declined. Moreover, he or Cardinal Law 
instructed members of the Chancery staff not to meet with Voice of the Faithful 
officials. By any reasonable definition, this pattern of behavior does not qualify 
as a “dialogue.” … 
 
To my knowledge, you have not contacted anyone from Voice of the Faithful to 
inquire as to the truthfulness of the accusations lodged against us, nor to provide 
us any opportunity to respond. The logic of your action might reasonably be 
summarized as follows: “While these issues remain unresolved in this dialogue” 
one partner in the “dialogue” finds the other partner guilty for causing “scandal” 
and punishes the partner through a “banning” order. (Post letter to Bishop Allue; 
VOTF, 2002, October 3) 
 
Stepping away from the hierarchy’s image of a dialogic Church, VOTF offers its 
own frank response to the bannings, as represented by the following quote: 
"In the midst of the worst crisis facing the Catholic Church in its entire 500-year 
history in North America, it is astonishing that some bishops and Catholic 
educators think the best solution is to ban Catholics from gathering on church 
property to talk about the Church's problems. … Catholic leaders need to stop 
preventing open and honest dialogue. They should join with Voice of the Faithful 
and thousands of Catholic laity across the country, to promote and foster 
effective healing via community discussions." (Post; VOTF, 2003, January 16) 
 
Even where VOTF is invited into some type of ‘dialogue’ with an arm of the 
hierarchy, indications of the hierarchy’s politicized orientation to dialogue emerge, as 
the following quotes show. The first two comments were made after a ‘landmark’ 
meeting between National Review Board chair Governor Keating and representatives of 
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the survivor community, VOTF, and SNAP; the third comment was made after VOTF’s 
first meeting with Boston Archbishop O’Malley. 
“Bishops need to listen to survivors and grassroots organizations. I don’t see 
what’s wrong with open dialogue – we can’t talk too much.” (Gov. Keating; 
VOTF, 2002, October 4) 
 
“The governor heard and seemed to agree that victims need to be listened to by 
the bishops, in the same way we have been listened to by Voice of the Faithful.” 
(Webb, SNAP member; VOTF, 2002, October 4) 
 
“Previously closed doors were opened, with dialogue towards mutual 
collaboration on several fronts.” (Krueger; VOTF, 2003, November 19) 
 
In the first two quotes, VOTF strategically amplifies representatives from the hierarchy 
and from SNAP to mark the bishops’ hesitancy to dialogue. The implication is that the 
bishops are not engaging in dialogic behaviors, but ought to be. Even in celebrating a 
move to dialogue (in the third quote), VOTF marks dialogue as an atypical experience 
with the hierarchy. 
What is interesting in the way in which VOTF uses dialogic terminology is the 
organization’s mix of naïve idealism and rugged pragmatism. Although it is generally 
precluded from interactions with the hierarchy, even to the extent of being banned from 
meeting on church properties, VOTF never questions dialogue’s power to heal. For 
VOTF, the problem and the solution are equally obvious: (getting to) dialogue. The 
organization is as vocal about the ideal of dialogue as it is about the constraints it faces 
accessing dialogue. 
SNAP 
SNAP, like the USCCB, makes few direct references to dialogue. Instead, it 
frequently calls for disclosures (by the USCCB) and describes meetings or discussions 
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that have already taken place. SNAP does not present an idealized, messianic notion of 
dialogue, as do the USCCB and VOTF. Perhaps due to its nature as a support group-
based organization, dialogue is a specific type of discourse for SNAP. It is an intimate, 
face-to-face encounter based on openness, disclosure, and listening. Like VOTF, SNAP 
chafes against the control the hierarchy exerts over dialogue, emphasizing the futility of 
dialogue without openness. 
Dialogue as Image Management 
It is important to note that SNAP operates in both the legal arena and the 
victim/survivor support arena. Although SNAP does not use dialogic terms for image 
management nearly as much as the USCCB does, it does draw on dialogic terms to 
reinforce its image as a victim/survivor support group. The following quotes extend the 
image of a group engaged in therapeutic dialogue to interactions between SNAP and the 
hierarchy. 
"We believe that our best chance of reaching the Cardinals' hearts is in an 
intimate setting like this. We hope to have a very frank dialogue." (Blaine; 
SNAP, 2002, June 6) 
 
…Survivors are expected to provide brief personal introductions, discuss the 
impact that childhood sexual abuse has had on their lives, and offer suggestions 
on how the Church can help victims to heal and prevent future abuse. (SNAP, 
2002, June 6) 
 
We're asking each member of [the National Review Board] to spend just two 
hours sometime in the next two months sitting in one of our support group 
meetings. It's a simple request, but a crucial one. Because without this 
experience, without directly listening to the pain and the experiences victims are 
going through right now, all this can easily become a dispassionate intellectual 
endeavor, a discussion of policies and procedures and canon law and 
psychological theories. . . One of our ground rules is "No one has to speak. 
Listening is a gift too." We don't want board members to come and give a 
speech. We just want them to hear us. (Blaine; SNAP, 2003, July 29) 
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SNAP believes victims of female clergy abuse may be more apt to come forward 
if the topic of female abusers is thoroughly discussed and victims allowed the 
chance to use their voice. (SNAP, 2004, July 13) 
 
There is an interesting dance going on here, as support group meets power. In the third 
quote, note how National Review Board members are silenced in order to listen to 
victim/survivors. Here, SNAP takes the position of dialogue facilitator, coaching the 
hierarchy on how to participate in this type of dialogue. This simultaneously indicates 
and trumps the power differential between the hierarchy and SNAP, which leads to the 
next use of dialogic terminology. 
Dialogue as Controlled by the Hierarchy 
As does VOTF, SNAP offers some amount of commentary on how the hierarchy 
manages dialogue. Interestingly, several of their references are commendations of 
particular leaders who engage dialogue with the victim/survivor community. Although 
VOTF officially celebrates ‘Priests of Integrity,’ it is SNAP that lauds leaders who 
dialogue. The following quotes, although celebrating rare examples, indicate leaders 
whose actions affirm the image of a dialogical Church. 
[SNAP cites] Bishop Frank Rodimer … who held the first open listening session 
with survivors….  Archbishop Timothy Dolan …who held two "listening 
sessions," for abuse victims, their families and parishioners, which were planned 
with SNAP members and community leaders, including the district attorney…. 
Bishop Mulvee …and his staff, who listened to several dozen survivors one-on-
one, face-to-face during settlement talks. (SNAP, 2002, November 12) 
 
“Bishop Bootkoski has agreed to an ongoing dialogue where SNAP 
representatives can offer input and criticism on the Diocese of Metuchen in its 
efforts to comply with the new church policy on child sexual abuse by church 
personnel.” (Kelly; SNAP, 2003, February 6) 
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“… Though there is more work to be done in his diocese, we have the 
opportunity for an ongoing dialogue with this bishop and a seat at his table for 
further improvements.” (Serrano; SNAP, 2003, June 20) 
 
Just as SNAP affirms how particular leaders manage dialogue, it calls out those 
who preclude dialogue. Some present one-sided statements, others prevent access to 
open forums, as the following quotes show. 
"Wuerl has proven he is capable of spending lots of money in the court of public 
opinion to discuss the clergy abuse crisis. As shepherd of the Pittsburgh flock, he 
sent a terrible message last night that clergy-abuse survivors are unworthy of 
being heard…. Such one-sided 'spin-control' commercials run counter to the 
message and teaching of Jesus." (Clohessy; SNAP, 2004, March 5) 
 
“… One thing needs to [be] made clear: this dreadful decision…was made by the 
Albany Diocesan Sexual Misconduct Review Board without even bothering to 
meet and discuss the incident with the victim. … Bishop Hubbard …refuses to 
provide clergy abuse victims an open forum to discuss their own abuse.” 
(Furnish; SNAP, 2004, March 7) 
 
Comments such as these corroborate VOTF’s criticism of the Church’s control of 
dialogue. Interestingly, although positioning itself as external to the Church, SNAP 
defers to the hierarchy’s control of the discourse by asking for permission to enter 
certain discussions. In this way, SNAP seems to acknowledge a similar position to 
VOTF: dependent on the hierarchy for access to the table. This is emphasized in the 
following example, in which SNAP and VOTF speak together: 
The Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests (SNAP) and Voice of the 
Faithful (VOTF) are calling on the U.S. Catholic bishops to open up their 
discussions of sexual abuse in June to public scrutiny and participation. (SNAP, 
2004, May 31) 
 
The organization’s dependence on the hierarchy for access to dialogue is also evident 
when SNAP speaks on its own: 
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In a separate letter sent today to Monsignor Ford, SNAP leaders ask for an 
opportunity to meet with St. Mary's parishioners to discuss the controversy. 
(SNAP, 2004, August 19) 
 
… Please help see that it [the diocesan audit process] is at least re-examined in a 
full, careful public discussion, if not fully reversed. (Blaine & Clohessey letter to 
Bishop Skylstad; SNAP, 2004, November 24) 
 
… we respectfully urge you to delay any such decision and spend the next few 
weeks in genuine dialogue with Spokane Catholics about the needs of all parties 
involved. (Harding letter to Bishop Skylstad; SNAP, 2004, December 1) 
 
Thus, despite being external to the Church, SNAP largely defers to the hierarchy’s 
power over dialogue. Although SNAP seems to chafe at this control, it does not directly 
problematize it. Instead, the organization asks the hierarchy to manage dialogue in a 
more open, supportive, listening-centric (i.e., therapeutic) way. 
The preceding discussion sets the stage for how each stakeholder orients to the 
notion and practice of dialogue. Each uses dialogic terminology for political or image-
building purposes. Each also traces the (USCCB’s) enactment or control of what it 
deems to be dialogue in the case. What emerges from this section is an idea of the 
ideological context within which the crisis unfolds. In concert, the discourse of the three 
organizations about dialogue is mutually revealing. The USCCB boasts of being 
dialogic, yet is outed by VOTF’s story of stonewalling. VOTF trumpets an inclusive 
dialogue as messianic, yet finds itself excluded by the USCCB. SNAP tries to barter its 
submission to the USCCB’s control of dialogic opportunities for the USCCB’s 
submission to SNAP’s therapeutic model of dialogue. Each is undeniably reliant on the 
others in this genre of communication. 
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Mapping Communicatively Constructed Contexts 
A third way to map the context of a crisis is to compare how each stakeholder 
organization contextualizes the crisis. At the micro level, Linell (1998) analyzes whether 
an utterance is in line with the preceding context. Given the asynchronous nature of 
mediated crisis communication, this is a bit difficult in the current case. However, by 
identifying the primary context(s) created or referenced by each stakeholder 
organization, it is possible to discover key frames used to make sense of the crisis. It is 
also possible to discover ways in which the stakeholders share or contest a given context. 
This, in turn, will indicate some ways in which the communicatively constructed context 
serves to constrain and/or enable crisis management. By mapping the various contexts 
referenced by each stakeholder, it is possible to stake out the broadest contested 
boundary within which stakeholders strive to make sense of the crisis. 
In the clergy abuse case, each organization evidences a primary context, each of 
which affects how that organization names, manages, and seeks to resolve the crisis. Key 
contexts for each stakeholder organization are presented below, with implications for 
how they might work together to bound the crisis. 
USCCB 
The USCCB consistently contextualizes the clergy abuse crisis in their policy 
history. By addressing the problem as one of which they have been aware for some time, 
they are able to frame it as under their control They do this by emphasizing their 
managerial response to the crisis, as the following examples indicate. 
A description of two decades of efforts by the nation's Catholic bishops to 
address the problem of sex abuse in the Church and to assist those who have been 
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affected by it is now available. …"to provide a comprehensive and readily 
accessible resource on this topic to those who are interested in knowing what has 
transpired," said Msgr. Francis Maniscalco…. "There has been a dramatic 
improvement in the handling of these cases…" he said. (USCCB, 2002, February 
15) 
 
“Over the past two decades, the bishops of the United States have worked 
diligently to learn all we can about sexual abuse. Our Conference has encouraged 
the development of policies in every diocese to address this issue. Bishops have 
developed procedures whereby priests moving from one diocese to another must 
have certification of their good standing. Bishops have also revised seminary 
screening and have mandated in-service programs for priests, teachers, parish 
ministers and volunteers to emphasize their responsibility to protect the innocent 
and vulnerable from such abuse. Dioceses have implemented programs to ensure 
safe environments in parishes and schools. While we have made some tragic 
mistakes, we have attempted to be as honest and open about these cases as we 
can, especially in following the law on these matters and cooperating with civil 
authorities. We remain committed to seeing these initiatives implemented 
fully….” (Bishop Gregory; USCCB, 2002, February 19) 
 
Consistently, the bishops address the crisis as a topic of which they are well 
aware and on which they have a history of proactive (if regrettably imperfect) 
management. Although this positions the crisis within the bishops’ control, it does so at 
the risk of implicating them. Indeed, one of the key issues of this chapter in the Church’s 
history with sexual abuse it the systemic complicity of its leaders. Although the bishops 
contest hierarchical complicity in their PR, they implicitly affirm this accusation by 
contextualizing the crisis as an ongoing, well-known issue. 
Perhaps in order to redeem the evident admission of complicity, the USCCB also 
contextualizes sexual abuse as an inevitable social ill. Note how the bishops broaden the 
scope of the crisis by contextualizing it as international, inevitable, and social. 
"This is a large step forward from what we did during the last decade," 
Archbishop Flynn said. "We established good principles then, but we didn't 
provide for a way to be accountable to our people and to one another nationally 
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for what is so clearly a national -- even international – problem." (USCCB, 2002, 
June 6) 
 
“Sadly, we are faced with the fact that evil does harm the innocent, something 
which human life has faced since the beginning of time. This is a reality against 
which we must be ceaselessly on guard.” (Bishop Gregory; USCCB, 2002, 
February 19) 
 
…The draft Charter also contains a proposal that the USCCB "cooperate with 
other churches, institutions of learning, and other interested organizations in 
conducting a major research study" about sexual abuse of children and young 
people in our society. (USCCB, 2002, June 4) 
 
"It was clear from the meeting that the Roman Catholic Church and its bishops 
do not stand alone in the painful experience of dealing with sexual misconduct 
among clergy and lay leaders in the church. The Catholic Church shares with the 
wider ecumenical community deep concern for the victims of sexual abuse, 
especially children and young people. …participants agreed to seek ways in the 
future to cooperate together in order to take even more dramatic steps on the 
specific issue of abuse of children and young people in church and society.” 
(USCCB, 2002, June 7) 
 
In this paradoxical way, the USCCB retains the image of being in control of the crisis 
while dissociating from it. The bishops contextualize clergy sexual abuse as well-under 
their control while redirecting attention from clergy sexual abuse in the U.S. Roman 
Catholic Church to clergy sexual abuse in the ecumenical community or to sexual abuse 
in society. When contextualized this way, the USCCB appears in control of, yet not 
entirely responsible for the crisis. 
VOTF 
Two primary contexts are constructed in VOTF’s PR discourse. The first is that 
of Catholicism. Here, VOTF emphasizes its submission to the hierarchy and the 
teachings of the Church. Typically, this is based on references to Vatican II or particular 
comments by Pope John Paul, as the following quotes illustrate. 
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“The intent of Voice of the Faithful has been from the beginning to work for a 
greater participation of the laity in the operations of the Church. This work is 
inspired by Catholic traditions, animated by Catholic doctrines, and always 
within the framework of the Church's constitutional structures. We are convinced 
that such fidelity is the best way to safeguard the unity of the Faithful while 
honoring the great diversity of God's gifts among his people. We see our 
movement as an expression of the widely spread aspiration in the Catholic 
Church to see the insights and desires of Vatican Council II implemented in a 
practical way.” (Post; VOTF, n.d., “Voice of the Faithful Names”) 
 
We agree with Pope John Paul II’s statement, “There is no place in the 
priesthood or religious life for those who would harm the young.” … Pope John 
Paul II has called sexual abuse by clergy a “crime” - and it is. (VOTF, 2003, 
August 31) 
 
In these quotes, VOTF contextualizes both its role in the crisis and the crisis itself. Both 
are situated within the global Catholic Church, albeit a version of that Church 
demarcated by Vatican II and Pope John Paul. 
An interesting twist on this context emerges in VOTF’s merging of U.S. 
democratic ideals with Catholicism. Where relying on a Catholic context positions 
VOTF as deferential to the hierarchy, levying a democratic context positions VOTF as 
empowered. Note the shift in the following quote. 
American Catholics are the beneficiaries of two powerful sets of ideas. From our 
national democratic tradition, we have learned that freedom is important; that 
accountability is essential; and that free speech and the right of assembly are 
fundamental rights. From our Catholic faith, we have learned that morality 
matters, that individual conscience is critical, and that we have baptismal 
responsibility to work for the good of our Church.  
 
This is the DNA that we share as American Catholics in 2002. Like the double 
helix, these ideas are entwined in our belief system and in our lives. We believe 
in these ideas. And because we believe in these ideas -and the values the 
represent — we are responsible to see they become values in practice. (Post; 
VOTF, 2002, October 29) 
 
The context here is a hybrid of American democracy and Roman Catholicism. 
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Although the context of American Catholicism may lead to inspiring rhetoric, as 
indicated by VOTF President Jim Post’s speech (above), it leads VOTF into a 
paradoxical position. By contextualizing the clergy abuse crisis and its management in a 
democratic ideal of Catholicism, VOTF essentially promotes a protestant understanding 
which clashes fundamentally with the basic identity and organizing principles of 
Catholicism. In fact, it is VOTF’s emphasis on democratizing Catholic structures that 
leads the hierarchy to debate VOTF’s identity as a Catholic organization. Thus, in the 
eyes of the hierarchy, contextualizing the crisis in democratic traditions trumps any 
reference to a Catholic context. 
SNAP 
For SNAP, the context for the crisis is comprised of support groups (i.e., SNAP), 
law enforcement, and the court system. SNAP portrays these contexts as feeding into 
one another. Victim/survivors come forward to support groups, and in so doing gain the 
confidence to report their abuse to those in law enforcement and the legal arena, as the 
following quotes illustrate. 
Leaders of a support group for clergy molestation victims are urging "anyone 
who experienced, witnessed or suspected abuse by Paul Shanley" to come 
forward to law enforcement. (SNAP, 2005, January 5a) 
 
…we urge you to finally come clean about Poole's abuse and church officials' 
cover-ups - and urge other victims of Poole to come forward, get help and 
contact criminal authorities. That's when real healing can take place. (Clohessy 
letter to Fr. Whitney; SNAP, 2005, April 6) 
 
“We hope the outcome of this trial will encourage others who are still suffering 
in shame, silence and self-blame to come forward, report to police, get therapy, 
and seek justice in the courts." (Clohessy; SNAP, 2005, March 24) 
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We hope that this ruling will encourage victims of abuse to speak up, get help 
and report their abuse to criminal authorities. … We in SNAP believe that 
children are safer thanks to the many brave survivors like Erin Brady, who have 
come forward, reported abuse and exposed their alleged abusers. More 
importantly, we hope that Erin Brady will be validated too knowing that she has 
a right to seek justice in the courts for these alleged crimes and expect to find 
support and comfort by meeting with other survivors of clergy sexual abuse in 
SNAP. (Grant; SNAP, 2005, April 19) 
 
SNAP consistently positions successful crisis management within a context of 
law enforcement, legal structures, and support groups. It also problematizes the 
USCCB’s managerial context, at times setting the two contexts in tension: 
It's real progress when sex crimes are handled by independent law enforcement 
professionals, instead of biased, untrained church officials. It's real progress 
when abuse victims can seek justice in the open, time-tested American court 
system, instead of in the secretive, untested internal church proceedings. (Blaine; 
SNAP, 2005, February 17) 
 
Bishops have devised the rules of play, hired the umpires, chosen the players, 
and in about an hour, will declare that they're winning. … They wrote the 
Charter, they hired their own so-called watchdogs, they decide who gets 
interviewed and who gets heard. … This is crucial - prior to January 2002, each 
bishop was in charge of handling sex abuse in his diocese. Today, each bishop 
essentially still is. (SNAP, 2005, February 18) 
 
SNAP also points out where the context of management has failed: 
"This is at least the second time Cardinal George has clearly violated the US 
bishops' guidelines on abuse" said Clohessy. "His flock deserves some straight 
answers, and Fr. Yakaitis' victims deserve a strong public apology." (SNAP, 
2005, February 8) 
 
Time and time again since Dallas, bishops have moved backwards toward the 
failed policies of the past, not forwards toward real prevention in the future. 
(Blaine; SNAP, 2005, June 16) 
 
Clearly, what the USCCB positions as a solution, SNAP positions as an ongoing 
problem. From this perspective, both the hierarchy’s historical and current management 
have failed. 
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A fascinating picture emerges in a comparative reading of the discursive contexts 
for this crisis. The USCCB situates the crisis and its resolution within the Church, 
particularly within hierarchical control. VOTF agrees with Church as context, but argues 
for a lay-influenced, participative Church. This shift is rejected by the hierarchy, putting 
the two organizations at an impasse for the first several years of the crisis. In order to get 
past this deadlock, VOTF repeatedly clarifies its intent to strengthen the structure of the 
Church rather than challenge it. In so doing, VOTF and the USCCB appear to step 
toward a more similar (Church) context for crisis management. 
In contrast, SNAP acknowledges the context of Church (i.e., hierarchical control) 
only to problematize it. SNAP alone contextualizes crisis management in an arena 
comprised of support groups, law enforcement, and the court system. Interestingly, 
SNAP is critical of the judicial system, even while promoting it. On the other hand, 
SNAP offers no criticisms or cautions about support groups or law enforcement. This 
being the case, it is interesting to note that the USCCB draws heavily on Catholic 
members of the law enforcement and legal communities to staff its crisis-specific 
committees, boards, and offices. It seems, then, that although SNAP and the USCCB 
disagree on contextualizing the case in the Church, and although they debate one 
another’s tactics in the legal arena, they share some degree of respect for law 
enforcement and legal entities. This may indicate an area of common sense-making 





This chapter has offered three ways in which the context of a crisis may be 
analyzed from a dialogical perspective. By assessing the discursive presence of each 
stakeholder organization across time, it is possible to track how a variety of stakeholders 
communicatively engage the crisis. This is an essential orienting mechanism, especially 
in the case of a crisis being addressed through web posted press statements and releases. 
In the clergy abuse crisis, it appears that the USCCB dominates the floor initially, but 
relinquishes it once it deems the crisis ‘resolved.’ This opens the door for SNAP, a silent 
presence at the beginning of this chapter of the clergy abuse crisis, to become a 
gradually predominant voice on the crisis. Even a simple assessment of VOTF’s 
discursive presence in the crisis indicates its relatively low-power position in the crisis. 
It appears on the scene in response to the crisis, spends its early PR on establishing its 
identity, and relinquishes its lead in the larger crisis discourse nearly as soon as it gains 
it. Tracing the discursive presence of each stakeholder organization sets up an essential 
context for a more particular analysis of how language is used in this case. 
By sifting each organization’s use of dialogic terms with its meta-communication 
about dialogic processes, it is possible to identify politicized uses of dialogic terms. This 
serves as a revealing backdrop for a more specific assessment of the dialogical 
interactivity in each stakeholder’s crisis communication, as the next chapter will show. 
At this point, it is clear from VOTF and SNAP’s response to the USCCB’s discourse 
that, although the latter attempts to cultivate a dialogical image, it patently fails to 
convince. Both VOTF and SNAP mark a gap between the USCCB’s assertions of 
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dialogicality and its monological communication. The inherent monologicality of the 
bishops’ PR discourse is underscored by their non-responsive communication, their 
decreasing discursive presence across time, and their focus on managerial control. What 
becomes clear in a dialogical assessment is that the USCCB’s ‘politically savvy’ use of 
dialogical terms actually marks its duplicity. Ironically, the bishops’ attempt to cultivate 
a dialogical image serves to mark its lack of dialogicality. 
On one hand, although the bishops’ monologic orientation blinds them to the 
holes in their PR, their position of power may insulate them from any significant 
ramifications of this lack of self-awareness. On the other hand, by contextualizing the 
crisis as either an internal issue over which they ought to have (nearly) exclusive 
authority or an inevitable social ill, the hierarchy blinds itself to important alternative 
contexts. For example, in the first few years of the crisis, the hierarchy found itself in a 
reactive position in the media and legal arenas. This occurred because Church leaders 
refused to consider the possibility that what it deemed an internal matter could be forced 
into an external context. Not only did this presumption prove wrong, but it led the 
bishops to take actions that were patently offensive. Thus, the leadership has made itself 
vulnerable by believing its own contextualization. 
By identifying and comparing the discursive context each organization constructs 
for the crisis, it is possible to delineate points at which stakeholders share or contest one 
another’s understanding of the crisis and possible ‘solutions.’ Where this points to 
fundamental tensions among organization’s understandings of the crisis, it indicates 
likely points of intractability and frustration. However, where it points to basic 
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agreements among contexts, it indicates pathways for the productively managing the 
crisis. What emerges from the current analysis is an indication of two potential areas of 
overlap among the stakeholder organizations. Although they disagree on the definition 
of Church, both the USCCB and VOTF situate the crisis within that organization’s 
jurisdiction. Their inability to interact productively largely centers on differing 
definitions of the Church as an organization. Then, despite significant differences 
between how the USCCB and SNAP contextualize the crisis, they do seem to have a 
mutual respect for the law enforcement. For anyone interested in generating dialogue 
among stakeholder groups, a similar analysis might reveal both what is limiting dialogue 
and where it could be productively rerouted. 
By mapping how each stakeholder organization manages its verbal presence 
across the crisis, frames the concept of dialogue, and contextualizes the crisis, this 
chapter has sketched a broad context for the clergy abuse crisis. The key stakeholders are 
more or less present across time, evidence key alternate between actual and political uses 
of dialogic terms and practices, and position the crisis in a variety of contexts. At a broad 
level, one might paint this crisis as a situation in which the source organization shows an 
early predominance but quickly recedes, evinces a transparently politicized application 
of dialogic terns, and positions the crisis as both a well-managed internal problem and an 
inevitable social ill. In contrast to this are VOTF and SNAP. VOTF is a relatively 
consistent, yet non-dominant presence in the crisis; in contrast, SNAP turns its late debut 
in the crisis discourse into a dominant discursive presence. Both organizations points out 
the USCCB’s patently non-dialogic communication, while submitting (to a greater or 
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lesser degree) to a Catholic Discourse. Whereas VOTF affirms the hierarchy’s 
contextualization of the crisis within the Church, SNAP shares the USCCB’s respect for 
the law enforcement as a context for this crisis. The next chapter fills in this broad 




ANALYSIS II: INTERACTIVITY 
The previous chapter took a broad perspective of the crisis communication produced by 
three key stakeholder organizations in the clergy abuse case. First it tracked each 
organization’s discursive presence in the crisis across time, then it mapped each 
stakeholder’s ideological orientations to dialogic communication, and concluded with an 
assessment of how each organization contextualized the crisis. Since the current study 
applies a dialogical lens to crisis communication produced by disparate organizations 
across time and space, such a review is essential in order to draw the data into a shared 
frame. The assumption is not that these organizations are in dialogue in a traditional 
sense, but that their discourse can be assessed by a dialogic framework. 
Monitoring the organizations’ mutual discursive presence in the crisis is an 
important first step in this process. In this case, it appears that the USCCB predominates 
early on, taking the opportunity to engage in traditional apologia. By mid-2002, VOTF 
becomes a consistent voice, first establishing its identity, then responding to the 
USCCB’s rhetoric and actions. In time, VOTF’s presence plateaus, and SNAP’s spikes. 
It seems that VOTF settles into organizational status quo, while SNAP continues to take 
the lead in issue management in the public arena. As the USCCB quietly fades to the 
background, SNAP takes the floor, becoming a strong offensive voice in the crisis. 
(Note: The use of offense/offensive and defense/defensive in this chapter parallel their 
use on sports teams.) This analysis reveals how the selected organizations make their 
discursive presence felt across the period studied. 
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The second step presented in the previous chapter set each organization’s use of 
dialogic terminology as a background for its actual discursive practice. In this way, it is 
possible to distinguish between policitized applications of dialogic terms and actual 
attempts to either enact or constrain dialogic communication. Here, it begins to be clear 
how much the stakeholder organizations reflect on the communicative practices of the 
source organization. Both VOTF and SNAP emphasize the hierarchy’s politicized use of 
dialogic terms and its tendency to restrict access to dialogic practices. 
The third analysis in the previous chapter painted a complex picture of the 
contexts each organization uses to make sense of the crisis. Although the USCCB and 
VOTF both contextualize the crisis within the Church, their understanding of ‘church’ 
differs. One relies on a hierarchically controlled church, while the other argues for a 
participative church structure. VOTF is required to ‘clarify’ its position on structural 
change and lay involvement in order to be acknowledged by members of the hierarchy. 
SNAP contests Church as context, instead situating the crisis in what it portrays as 
overlapping arenas of support group, law enforcement, and legal system. There is a 
definite tension over how the crisis of clergy sexual abuse is contextualized.  
These broad analyses set the stage for a more particular analysis of the crisis 
discourse. Although it is impractical to apply a traditional micro-level discourse analysis 
to as large a data set as the current one (and arguably inappropriate for a mediated 
communication situation), it is possible to adapt such an analysis to track the discursive 
strategies each organization uses to manage the interactivity of crisis communication. To 
do this, the current study adapts Linell’s (1998) discourse analytic approach. 
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In his work on dialogue and dialogicality (i.e., an epistemological orientation 
focusing on contextualized interactions), Linell specifies a number of ways in which 
dialogue functions within discourse (p. 7). Although his framework is directed toward 
traditional face-to-face dialogues and foregrounds the collaborative aspects of dialogue, 
it is a productive starting place for the current study. The following three analyses, 
adapted from Linell’s framework (1998, pp. 169-171), are arguably the most salient of 
his tools to a dialogical assessment of crisis communication. Keeping in mind the units 
of analysis offered by Linell, this chapter looks at individual press releases/statements 
and topics. 
First, this chapter addresses initiative/response patterns, comparing this to the 
general offensive/defensive orientation inherent in crisis communication. Second, it 
assesses the way in which topics are pitched, carried, and/or dropped among the three 
stakeholder organizations. Third, it looks at how the selected stakeholders manage power 
by discursively constructing one another’s participation in the crisis. Each of these draws 
on a traditional element of dialogicality in order to illuminate some aspect of crisis 
communication. 
Tracking Initiative/Response Patterns 
One aspect of dialogicality that Linell addresses is a comparative analysis of 
initiatives to responses. On one hand, looking for a direct initiative/response sequence is 
problematic when the communication flows along an asynchronous, virtual channel (i.e., 
the Internet), as it does in the current dataset. On the other hand, regardless of the 
channel that carries it, crisis communication emerges in response to real-time events. 
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This being the case, there are points at which it is possible to determine whether a press 
release/statement is an initiative or response. In fact, given the nature of VOTF and 
SNAP as organizations that exist in response to the clergy abuse crisis, much of their 
communication is overtly responsive to the rhetoric and actions of the USCCB. Further, 
there may be strategic power in ‘punctuating’ the discourse in particular ways in order to 
shift the blame or craft a particular version of the crisis narrative. 
Although it must be applied carefully to web-based PR due to its nature as 
asynchronous rather than temporally linear communication, an initiative/response 
analysis is especially apropos to crisis communication, given the tradition of 
conceptualizing crisis rhetoric as attack/defense sequences. Assumptions about 
initiative/response are implicit in any delineation of a press release/statement as either 
offensive or defensive. Thus, one way to adapt Linell’s initiative/response assessment to 
crisis communication is to compare initiative/response patterns to defensive/offensive 
orientations in the discourse. In doing this, the current study looks for ways in which 
each organization uses offensive-initiatives (i.e., being the first to levy an attack), 
offensive-responses (i.e., responding to another’s discourse with an attack), defensive-
initiatives (i.e., using a preemptive defense), and defensive-responses (i.e., responding 
defensively to an attack). Defensive-responses (c.f., apologia) and offensive-initiatives 
(c.f., attack) are perhaps more common than are offense-responses (c.f., kategoria 
apologia) and defensive-initiatives (c.f., stealing thunder). Each, however, appears in the 




Even though it would make sense that the discourse of an organization in the 
defensive position would be marked by responses (given the responsive nature of a 
defense), this does not play out in the current case. In fact, the opposite is true. Here, the 
discourse of the ‘source’ organization, the USCCB, is comprised predominantly of what 
appear to be proactive initiatives. This is the case as it announces meetings, rolls out new 
policies, marks organizational changes, and narrates its managerial strategies. Although 
the USCCB’s crisis communication comes from an essentially defensive orientation in 
the overall crisis situation, its language is comprised of initiatives.  Its discourse, then, is 
comprised of defensive-initiatives, marked by such words as announced, resolved, 
named, and appointed. Although these strategic actions are taken in response to the 
larger crisis situation, they are communicated in a proactive, declarative way. Typical 
examples follow. 
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) announced today 
that the convened membership of the conference … approved a new Charter for 
the Protection of Children and Young People. (USCCB, 2002, June 15) 
 
Two hundred ten priest canon lawyers received training in the canonical 
procedures for implementing the Essential Norms for Diocesan/Eparchial 
Policies Dealing with Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests or 
Deacons. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), in 
conjunction with The Catholic University of America (CUA), provided the 
training. (USCCB, 2003, February 27) 
 
Note the declarative tone in these quotes. It is as if the USCCB is rolling out a new 
policy and training its ‘priest canon lawyers’ of its own accord. The larger context of 
crisis slips away in such language, the proactive tone almost outweighing the defensive 
stance of the organization. Similar language permeates the USCCB’s press releases. The 
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predominance of defensive-initiative discourse may be indicative of the hierarchy’s 
power in the crisis. It clearly positions the USCCB as proactive and in control. Note that 
the USCCB focused one of its earliest press releases on “two decades of efforts by the 
nation's Catholic bishops to address the problem of sex abuse in the Church and to assist 
those who have been affected by it” (USCCB, 2002, February 15). 
One of the few cases in which the USCCB’s discourse is defensive-responsive 
comes in the face of a critique of a particular Vatican document. This 1962 document, 
unearthed in 2003, was criticized as implicating the hierarchy in a strategy of cover-up. 
The USCCB responded in the following way: 
Crimen sollicitationis … issued March 16, 1962, is being portrayed by some in 
and outside the media as a "smoking gun" allegedly proving that there was a 
"ground plan" for "covering up" the crime of sexual abuse of minors by clerics.  
 
The essential point in response to those making this claim is that they are taking 
the document entirely out of context and therefore distorting it completely. … To 
contend that the document is intended to create a "chilling effect" on reporting 
civil crimes is to attribute to it an intention it simply never had. … To suggest 
that it was intended as a "ground plan" for handling these matters in the United 
States (or in any particular jurisdiction) is ludicrous. … 
 
The 1962 document is also being treated as evidence of the fact that the "Church 
knew there was a problem." As already indicated, both the 1917 and the 1983 
Codes of Canon Law publicly recognized the sexual abuse of minors by clerics 
as a serious crime which is to be punished with a serious penalty. The gravity of 
such sexual abuse is based on the Decalogue. (USCCB, 2003, August 7) 
 
Here, the defensive orientation of the hierarchy is underscored by its direct response to 
external (i.e., public) criticism. There are only a handful of press releases, though, in 
four years’ time, that take a defensive-responsive tone. A more typical response is 
silence or nonresponsiveness. This is called out specifically in the following SNAP press 
release about the lack of response received from a bishop. 
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Mahony did not respond to SNAP’s letter.…  SNAP is troubled by Mahony’s 
silence and non-responsiveness to their request. 
 
“Surely, the Cardinal can do SOMETHING…. We are convinced that he can find 
a way to help these men and other victims”, says Manny Vega, SNAP Leader. 
 
Leaders of SNAP are writing Mahony yet again, urging him to take a responsible 
role to stop the culture of intimidation in the church. (SNAP, 2004, December 
22) 
 
(Other evidence of their general nonresponsiveness comes from Governor 
Keating’s angry comments that they refused to cooperate with the NRB’s request for the 
disclosure of information, bishops’ refusal to open documents or publish the names of 
the accused, or frequent descriptions of the hierarchy as having a ‘culture of secrecy.’) 
By consistently applying defensive-initiative language (and largely avoiding 
responsive language), the USCCB strategically downplays the crisis situation and frames 
its actions as positive and proactive.  
VOTF 
VOTF is situated in an interesting position in the crisis, being disassociated by 
the organization with which it identifies. Although in seeking to “shape structural change 
within the Church” (one of its organizational goals), VOTF orients itself as an offensive 
force in the crisis, VOTF’s struggle to justify its existence in the Church’s eyes puts 
VOTF on the defensive. This defensive orientation is clear in the following quote. 
Voice of the Faithful is profoundly concerned by the recent bannings from 
church property…. It is our responsibility to point out that the very parishioners 
who have been erroneously labeled as "anti-Church and ultimately, anti-
Catholic" are the same mainstream Catholics welcomed to Sunday morning Mass 
and encouraged to financially support the very properties from which they have 
been banned. … 
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We must also remind our bishops that as an association of Catholic laity, Voice 
of the Faithful has formed properly under the meaning of Canon 215, which 
states, “The Christian faithful are at liberty freely to found and to govern 
associations for charitable and religious purposes or for the promotion of the 
Christian vocation in the world; they are free to hold meetings to pursue these 
purposes in common.” In addition, the teachings of Vatican II clearly articulate 
the right — and even the obligation — of laypersons to form associations and 
make their voices heard on matters concerning the good of the Church. (VOTF, 
2002, October 11) 
 
Clearly, VOTF is on the defensive here, using defensive-responsive language. This is 
typical of VOTF’s press releases about the bannings.  
Although VOTF is on the defensive about its identity as a legitimate Catholic 
organization, it attempts to be an offensive force on other issues in the crisis (e.g., 
naming systemic complicity). Even its offensive discourse, however, is couched in 
responsive terms. By situating itself as responsive to the hierarchy, VOTF undermines 
the power of its offensive strategy. That is, in responding to the hierarchy’s actions so 
faithfully (albeit critically), VOTF marks itself as a follower. Its discourse is marked by 
passive, low power words like call on, has learned, and seeks. Its identity as “an 
organization … formed in response to the sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic Church” is 
underscored by its consistent use of responsive discourse (be that offensive or 
defensive), as the following quote shows. 
Voice of the Faithful (VOTF) announced today that the Archdiocese of Boston 
Policies and procedures for the Protection of Children are welcome, if overdue. 
The long delay in issuing these policies is regrettable, but these provisions can 
move the Archdiocese of Boston in the right direction if they are implemented 
aggressively. … 
 
Luise Dittrich, a VOTF co-founding member and spokesperson, commented on 
Bishop Lennon's letter, "If Bishop Lennon meant what he wrote about 
compassion, a pastoral response, and a commitment to reconciliation and healing, 
the Archdiocese will move immediately to settle the outstanding lawsuits with 
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survivors, and will move to restore unity to the Archdiocese by ending the 
banning of Voice of the Faithful from Church property. These divisive, non-
pastoral stances continue to erode trust in the moral voice of this Archdiocese." 
(VOTF, 2003, May 30) 
 
This is just one example in which VOTF responds in a blow-by-blow fashion to the 
USCCB’s actions. Throughout the crisis, VOTF adopts responsive discourse both to 
defend its identity and to critique the hierarchy. This deferential critique is in accord 
with VOTF’s position as an internal dissent organization. Further, the reliance on 
responsive language for both offense and defense marks VOTF’s submission to the 
hierarchy. Indeed, this may be one reason VOTF’s discursive presence in the crisis 
plateaus in time. 
SNAP 
SNAP uses more initiatives in its discourse than VOTF does, and largely relies 
on an offensive orientation in its communication. Interestingly, where SNAP does 
respond, it often responds to incriminating behaviors of the hierarchy rather than to the 
hierarchy’s discourse. The following quote gives an example of SNAP’s offense-
response to behaviors of the hierarchy. 
The resignation of Bishop Dupre after allegations of abuse left a gaping hole in 
the Diocese of Springfield. The problems in Springfield reflect decades of 
mismanagement, cover up, protection of perpetrator priests and their criminal 
behavior, and possible destruction of diocesan documents. Let us not be naive in 
assuming that this could be rectified quickly by the right bishop. The problems in 
the diocese reflect the actions of its former leader, Bishop Thomas Dupre, but 
also his inner circle. The diocese was not the domain of one corrupt man, and 
cannot be "cleaned up quickly" by one honest man. (SNAP, 2004, March 9) 
 
In this quote, SNAP leverages its response to Bishop Dupre’s resignation as an 
opportunity to point out the corruption permeating the Springfield Diocese. This is 
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clearly an offense-response based on the behavior rather than the PR or policies of the 
hierarchy. 
In another example, SNAP turns its response to a cardinal’s legal tactics into an 
attack on the hierarchy: 
Several times, Maida has sought to have civil sex abuse lawsuits against Detroit 
area priests tossed out because of the statute of limitations. SNAP maintains that 
church officials should not "hide behind" a "restriction that encourages abusers 
and their supervisors to destroy evidence, intimidate witnesses and threaten 
victims." 
 
"If you insist on fighting men who were raped and sodomized by an abusive 
priest, at least have the decency to fight fair, and not fight dirty," said Clohessy. 
"Fight on the merits, not on technicalities and loopholes like the archaic and 
dangerously restrictive statute of limitations." (SNAP, 2005, January 5b) 
 
This attack on a representative of the hierarchy clearly illustrates SNAP’s strategic use 
of offense-responses. Where VOTF uses responses to defend itself against the hierarchy, 
SNAP uses responses to attack the hierarchy, at times pointing out discrepancies 
between the church’s rhetoric and its actions (as noted in the section on politicized uses 
of dialogue terms). 
Across time, SNAP levies an increasingly forceful stream of offense-initiatives 
on a multitude of issues (see Table 7). This approach accords with SNAP’s identity as an 
activist organization, and exemplifies what one might think of as a typically offensive 
orientation. Initiating attacks against the source organization is a key function in any 
crisis. By naming a variety of issues, SNAP broadens the possible scope of the crisis. 
However, where these issues are not engaged by other stakeholders, they are effectively 
dead-ended. Thus, although the introduction of issues is potentially powerful, it is 
dependent on some response or engagement by other participants. In this case, many of 
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the offense-initiatives SNAP presents are not addressed (at least in this venue) by the 





Sampling of SNAP's Offensive-Initiatives 
_______________________________________________________________ 
• Discloses names of ten Northern California abusers to be named in lawsuits. 
• Comments on the possible ‘fraudulent transfer of assets’ in the Diocese of Baker, OR. 
• Accuses McChesney (head of OCYP) as lacking understanding of hierarchy’s ‘game.’ 
• Leaflets a perpetrator’s neighborhood in St. Louis. 
• Traces the possible transfer of Nevada priest to MO treatment center. 
• Comments on incriminating 1962 Vatican document. 
• Encourages Catholics to bypass bishops’ annual appeals. 
• Demands apologies and restorative action from complicit leaders. 
• Exposes abuse cover-up (i.e., 40 cases in which archbishop knew of prior crimes). 
• Urges Bishop of Maine not to interfere with pending (small claims) trial. 
• Urges NY bishop to investigate abuser living in upstate NY. 
• Asks Albany’s bishop to investigate abuser living/working locally. 
• Asks Cardinal to ‘rein in’ parishioners showing support in court for accused CA priest. 
• Asks judge to more strongly enforce probation for convicted OH priest. 
• Urges victims/survivors not to join in Archdiocese of Cincinnati’s compensation fund. 
• Notes bishops found in contempt of court for refusing to turn over documents. 
• Calls for bishop accountability; criticize ‘fraternal correction.’ 
• Names abusers who live in/work around Vatican. 
• Calls on church leaders to disclose names of molesters. 





What emerges from this analysis is a more complex understanding of how 
stakeholders orient to crisis communication. Rather than simply being on the offense or 
defense, they are better described by comparing their offensive/defensive orientations to 
the balance of initiatives/responses in their discourse. Although each organization uses 
both initiatives and responses, and may alternate from offense to defense as the crisis 
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unfolds, each seems to exhibit one orientation more than the others. As the preceding 
paragraphs and quotes indicate, the USCCB seems to favor defensive-initiatives, VOTF 
to use offensive-responses on crisis issues and defensive-responses on identity, and 




Discursive Orientations to Crisis Communication 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 Initiative Response 
Offensive SNAP VOTF & SNAP 





These paradoxical discursive orientations have interesting implications for crisis 
management in the current case. The USCCB offsets the vulnerability of its defensive 
position with a masterful, proactive tone. VOTF, on the other hand, attempts to 
counterbalance its responsive (and thus weak) identity with offensive discourse. SNAP 
shares this offensive-responsive strategy with VOTF, but augments it with a more 
powerful offensive-initiative discourse. Whereas the offensive-responsive approach does 
little for VOTF or SNAP, the offensive-initiative approach to PR advances SNAP’s issue 
management goals. When viewed from a dialogical perspective, these discursive 
orientations reveal how each organization’s PR affects the unfolding crisis. To begin 
with, the USCCB’s lack of responsive language (at least in this venue) dead-ends 
discourse. Then, VOTF’s failure to initiate restricts its influence on how the crisis 
unfolds. Finally, SNAP’s alternating use of initiatives and responses positions it as 
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having the greatest potential dialogically (although this is stymied by the USCCB’s non-
responsiveness). 
This approach to crisis discourse extends the traditional dichotomy between 
offensive and defensive orientations to a crisis. It shows the strategic power of offense-
responses. It also raises the potential that defense-responses may give an organization 
more credibility than reliance on defense-initiatives does. This has important 
implications for the communicative construction of any crisis, indicating both potential 
challenges and strategies in crisis communication. 
Tracking (Non)Topicality 
Another way to apply Linell’s (1998) dialogical framework to crisis 
communication is by assessing (non)topicality. Linell advocates tracking a dialogue’s 
content by coding focal or nonfocal responses. Focal responses are tied to the main 
content; nonfocal utterances are not. This implies that the ‘main content’ of a dialogue 
may be indicated by the mutual attention of participants to a particular issue. This is 
adapted to the current dataset by tracking topic that receives attention from all 
stakeholder organizations, and contrasting that to a series of nontopical press 
releases/statements. This is a way to map shared attention and non-shared attention to 
crisis issues; it is also a way to explore the implications of whose issues do or do not 
become ‘main content.’ 
Topicality 
In a face-to-face interaction, a topic is jointly produced across talk-turns, and is 
one component of dialogic coherence (Linell, 1998, p. 183). Understanding how 
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stakeholders manage topicality, or ‘sustained matters’ (p. 182) in mediated 
communication is important to foregrounding the dialogicality of the clergy abuse crisis. 
Although this foregrounds points of shared focus and dialogic coherence, it in no way 
assumes that stakeholder organizations treat a topic in similar ways. It requires 
identifying a point of focus shared by all stakeholders (much like a thread in an online 
discussion), while acknowledging differential ways in which that topic is managed by 
each stakeholder organization. 
Perhaps the most obvious topic or thread in the clergy abuse crisis is the creation 
of the Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People. This document may be 
considered the core of the USCCB’s policy response to the crisis. The creation of this 
document spanned several months and garnered attention from all stakeholder 
organizations. It was the subject of direct and indirect communication from the release 
of the first draft in June 2002 through the end of the data collection period. No doubt it 
continues to surface in the ongoing discourse, since it is held by all stakeholder 
organizations as one (albeit imperfect) standard for evaluating the USCCB’s ongoing 
crisis management. The contested construction of this document is traced in brief here as 
an example of (contested) topicality. 
The original draft created by the USCCB’s Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse 
was announced publicly prior to the USCCB’s General Meeting in June 2002. It was 
detailed in a lengthy USCCB press release prior to the bishops’ June General Meeting. 
This draft was approved by a vote of 239 to 13 by the bishops. The USCCB described 
the Charter as: 
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… the definitive response of the U.S. bishops to the laity's, the clergy's, and the 
public's concern over the issue of sexual abuse of minors by clergy. (USCCB, 
2002, June 15) 
 
It was described further by then USCCB President Bishop Gregory as “an unprecedented 
milestone” in four ways: 
“First, the bishops have resolved to create national standards and policies for 
dealing with the devastating pain and sorrow of abuse victims. Second, we have 
established national standards and processes for protecting all children in the 
future. Third, we have committed to and established national processes for 
consistently and vigilantly dealing with clergy abusers - with no tolerance for any 
abuse and for barring from the ministry all abusers. Finally, we are committing 
dioceses and the national organization of the conference to greater involvement 
of the laity in all these new procedures." (USCCB, 2002, June 15) 
 
This approved draft (and accompanying ‘Essential Norms’) was sent to the 
Vatican for ‘recognitio’ or official recognition. Upon receipt of the draft, the Pope called 
for a Mixed Commission (comprised of four Vatican officials and four U.S. bishops) to 
revise the document. The naming of a committee empowered to revise the Charter called 
out a response from VOTF that was initially uncertain, yet positive:  
VOTF has received reports that the Vatican has rejected some elements of the 
U.S. Catholic Church’s new sex abuse policy. Early information indicates that 
Vatican objections concern elements of the proposed policy that would violate 
the individual rights of accused clerics. …VOTF stresses that the proposed 
Charter must protect the rights of accused priests as well as the rights of victims. 
… 
 
The Vatican’s decision seems likely to place more pressure on individual 
American Bishops to work with the laity to establish an effective system of 
protection. … VOTF stands ready to work with bishops, priests, survivors, and 
the laity to shape and implement the best possible protection policy. (VOTF, 
2002, October 17) 
 
Within 24 hours, VOTF’s response turned negative: 
VOTF today expressed its deep regret regarding the Vatican's decision to reject 
the U.S. Roman Catholic Church's new sexual abuse policy. … “It is deeply 
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troubling that the Vatican has concluded that the judgment of those closest to the 
problem and to the 64 million members of the U.S. Catholic community is so 
severely flawed," said Jim Post, president, Voice of the Faithful. (VOTF, 2002, 
October 18) 
 
The shift seems to mark VOTF’s further reflection on the implications of the changes. 
Whereas VOTF first read them as stimulating bishop-lay collaboration, they quickly saw 
them as discounting the bishops’ assessment of the situation. Regardless of VOTF’s 
reaction, a revised document was quickly produced by the Mixed Commission, and just 
as quickly approved at the USCCB’s November 2002 General Meeting. Despite the 
document’s general approval within the USCCB, its increased focus on protecting the 
accused and decreased role for the laity did not meet with support outside of the 
USCCB, as the following quotes indicate. 
Voice of the Faithful (VOTF) expressed its deep concern regarding … news of 
the Vatican’ s decision to re-apply a 10-year statute of limitations on sexual 
abuse accusations against priests in an apparent retreat from aspects of the U.S. 
Catholic bishops’ “zero tolerance” stance proposed in the Dallas Charter. 
(VOTF, 2002, November 1) 
 
Voice of the Faithful … today addressed the limitations contained within the 
Vatican's revised Charter…. "This current revision significantly reduces the 
laity's role by limiting us to simply 'advising the bishop in his assessment of 
allegations of sexual abuse of minors…' rather than actively participating in the 
'assessment of allegations' as outlined in the June Charter." (VOTF, 2002, 
November 10) 
 
“VOTF supports the bishops in honoring their moral commitment made in 
Dallas, TX and urges their firm commitment to bridge the gap between the 
pastoral intent of the Charter and the diminished administrative and judicial 
guidelines of the [Vatican approved] Norms. ….” said Steve Krueger. (VOTF, 
2002, November 13) 
 
The USCCB responded to such criticisms by writing: 
"Norms for Diocesan/Eparchial Policies Dealing with Allegations of Sexual 
Abuse of Minors by Clergy or Other Church Personnel, which the USCCB sent 
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to the Holy See for its recognitio, substantially confirms the decisions made at 
the June general meeting of the U.S. Catholic Bishops. 
 
"Contrary to many news reports, the Holy See did not reject or even 'soften' this 
work.… In elaborating the canonical procedures to be used in dealing with 
allegations of sexual abuse of minors, the Holy See has shown a legitimate 
concern for the rights of the accused while fully supporting the obligation of the 
bishops, in the governance of their dioceses, to ensure these rights and the right 
of the faithful to be protected" (Bishop Gregory; USCCB, 2002, November 1) 
 
The final draft of the Charter was then sent back to the Vatican, where it received a few 
minor edits and a quick ‘recognitio’ by the Vatican. At this point, SNAP weighed in, 
criticizing the approved Charter and Norms: 
"The Vatican has okayed a very flawed document that has already been 
implemented sporadically across the country. It will mean a diminished role for 
Catholic lay people as well as greater secrecy, and less reporting to law 
enforcement officials when abuse allegation arise with in the church. Recent 
priest sex abuse cases in Michigan, New Jersey and Ohio, are proof of the failure 
of this policy." (Vercelotti; SNAP, 2002, December 16) 
 
Despite all the attention the creation of the Charter (and Norms) garnered, its 
recognition was provisional, meaning that it would come up for review within two years 
of its ‘recognitio.’ The ongoing construction of this document leaves this as an open 
thread in the larger crisis discourse. Indeed, each of the stakeholder organizations 
continues to address issues related to the Charter through the end of the time studied. 
This shows an interesting contrast to typical organizational strategy of quick closure in 
crisis management. Thus, as a point of common attention spanning many press 
releases/statements across time, the construction of the Charter is easily defined as a 
topic in the crisis discourse. However, it is important to note that it marks dialogic 
coherence as much through its consistent contestation as it does through its consistent 
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presence in the discourse. It is also important to note that the creation of the Charter is 
merely one of several possible examples of a topic addressed in the current case. 
Nontopicality 
A dialogical perspective must be as attuned to non-topicality as it is topicality. 
The key here is identifying threads that are introduced by one stakeholder organization 
without being taken up by others. This may be indicated by what Linell (1998) calls 
competing communicative projects. According to Linell, in addressing dialogue as a 
struggle to achieve intersubjectivity or discursive power (rather than coherence), it is 
essential to address the emergence of competing communicative projects (p. 89). Where 
the assessment of focality draws attention to mutual (if contested) topics, the assessment 
of competing communicative projects draws attention to the plurality of topics 
introduced in a speech event. 
In the current case, each stakeholder organization introduces potential topics that 
are ignored by the others. One of the few dropped threads to come from the hierarchy is 
its attempt to broaden the scope of the crisis to the societal dilemma of child sexual 
abuse. Especially in the early months of the crisis, the USCCB’s discourse refers to the 
abuse of children “in society.”  
"The attention to this issue also gives me the opportunity to renew the promise of 
our bishops that we will continue to take all the steps necessary to protect our 
youth from this kind of abuse in society and in the Church," he said. (Bishop 
Gregory; USCCB, 2002, February 19) 
 
The draft Charter also contains a proposal that the USCCB "cooperate with other 
churches, institutions of learning, and other interested organizations in 
conducting a major research study" about sexual abuse of children and young 
people in our society. (USCCB, 2002, June 4) 
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However, rather than responding to the USCCB’s attempt to broaden the focus to the 
issue of child sexual abuse in society, both VOTF and SNAP keep their discourse trained 
on the more specific issue of clergy sexual abuse. 
VOTF has a number of dropped threads throughout the discourse, many of which 
come from its initial quest to gain organizational legitimacy in the eyes of the hierarchy. 
The willing submission of VOTF to the organizational church affects how VOTF’s 
competing communicative projects play out in the larger discourse. That is, the 
discursive enactment of what might be described as a childish or adolescent role in the 
quest for organizational legitimation and crisis management undermines VOTF’s goals 
of democratizing the church and challenging the infantalization of the laity. This being 
the case, it is not surprising that many of VOTF’s legitimacy-oriented topic pitches 
(although perhaps addressed by the hierarchy in other venues) are not addressed in 
USCCB press releases. 
VOTF also introduces threads about its organizational activities and growth 
which are not picked up by either the USCCB or SNAP. For example: 
Voice of the Faithful … today announced the opening of its global headquarters. 
(VOTF, 2002, August 1b) 
 
In an open letter to Voice of the Faithful membership, President Jim Post 
signaled the group's intention to build "an informed, credible and effective voice" 
for lay Catholics by announcing the retention of Ladislas Orsy, S.J. as the group's 
professional outside consultant in canon law and related matters. (VOTF, n.d., 
“Voice of the Faithful Names”) 
Voice of the Faithful … today announced the results of the VOTF Winchester 
Parish Affiliate's survey of 30 Catholic Priests from the Archdiocese of Boston. 
… Winchester-area VOTF member and a co-author of the priest survey Christina 
Hurley, admits that the results are not "all-inclusive opinions" from Boston's 
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clergy however, the survey does reveal an overlooked view into the daily pain of 
priests faithfully serving the Catholic Church. (VOTF, 2003, February 19) 
None of these issues or events is addressed in the PR of the USCCB or of SNAP. Such 
unaddressed threads serve to narrate VOTF’s life-cycle without engaging the other key 
stakeholders. 
Similarly, one of the ‘competing communicative projects’ SNAP offers is a 
tracing of its organizational history and actions. For example: 
The nation's largest support group for clergy molestation victims grew "like wild 
fire" last year and now has 44 active monthly support groups meeting across the 
country. … (SNAP) started 2002 with less than 3,000 members and 9 active local 
chapters. The organization now has more than 4,500 members in virtually every 
state, and monthly support group meetings in 44 cities. …SNAP began 2002 with 
groups that met sporadically became re-invigorated and started to meet more 
regularly. (SNAP, 2003, February 6) 
 
This excerpt, representative of SNAP’s organizational narration, is not surprisingly 
ignored by the USCCB and VOTF. 
More frequently than tracking its actions, SNAP’s competing communicative 
projects emerge from the legal arena or its detailed tracking of global Church 
(mis)management. For example: 
… (SNAP)…today sent a letter to … Bishop Donald Wuerl urging him to 
provide SNAP free, full-page advertising space in the Diocesan newspaper…. 
This request comes on the heels of Wuerl's purchase and production of a half-
hour television commercial…. Wuerl, who hosted the commercial, discussed the 
clergy abuse crisis with a prominent church defense lawyer. SNAP calls the 
program "one-sided, shameless public relations" and criticized Wuerl for not 
including any victims on the show. (SNAP, 2004, March 5) 
 
This quote is representative of SNAP’s attempts to spotlight (particularly unfavorable) 
actions of the hierarchy. This excerpt serves a dual purpose, marking both the actions of 
a particular bishop and SNAP’s attempt to engage the bishop about the situation. This 
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strategic topic pitch, however, is met by an equally strategic non-response from the 
USCCB’s PR. 
SNAP’s press releases and statements are rife with similar topic pitches which 
are left unaddressed by the USCCB or VOTF. (For example, SNAP alone notes an 
abuser who says mass in Alaska, Alaskan church leaders who identify a St. Louis priest 
as abuser, and a St. Louis Catholic center that houses an abuser within 20 miles of his 
former victim.) A comparison of SNAP and VOTF’s PR indicates that each organization 
selectively notes those actions of the hierarchy that are particularly salient to that 
organization. The effect, when taken together, is a laundry list of disparate notations 
about the hierarchy which are dropped in the larger crisis discourse. This raises the 
question of whether those topic pitches are taken up by other stakeholders (e.g., media 
and laity). It also raises the question of whether it is more strategic for stakeholders to 
introduce competing communicative projects or to collaborate on turning one another’s 
topic pitches into topics. (Chapter VIII addresses the latter strategy.) 
These questions aside, it is important to trace one of the most pervasive 
competing communicative projects in SNAP’s PR: a focus on the legal/juridical 
treatment of the crisis. In its press releases and statements, SNAP gives a running 
commentary on legal aspects of case, almost like a sports announcer giving a play-by-
play. In 2004 alone, SNAP’s PR draws attention to: 
• A relevant report by the Maine Attorney General, 
• Allegations against and criminal investigation of a Massachusetts bishop, 
• Legal restrictions in Wisconsin against prosecuting church leaders, 
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• What victim/survivors want out of a mediation process in Milwaukee, 
• The freeing of convicted sex offender in St. Louis, 
• Bishop Gregory’s use of ‘hardball legal tactics’ against victim/survivors, 
• Bishops being found in contempt of court for refusing to turn over 
documents, 
• A former Brooklyn priest given a life sentence, 
• Sentencing/plea agreement of a Cincinnati priest, 
• The release of document in a Massachusetts case, 
• A Missouri ruling opening the door for delayed prosecution of child 
molesters, 
• Two former seminarians settling a civil suit against their abuser (Missouri), 
• A Stigmatine priest’s guilty plea, 
• The lifting of a Nevada priest’s probation, 
• The dismissal of a suit against the Rochester, NY diocese, 
• The arrest of a Wisconsin abuser, 
• A priest who loses his slander suit against his accuser (Tulsa), 
• 14 victims/survivors who settle Chicago lawsuits, 
• Two civil suits settled against the St. Louis Archdiocese and one of its 
priests, 
• The Missouri Supreme Court decision not to hear an appeal by alleged 
abuser, 
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• Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent that treats clergy abuse differently from 
other types of molestation, 
• A Michigan court ruling in favor of statute of limitations, and 
• The bankruptcy of the Diocese of Spokane. 
 One could look at each of these topic pitches individually, noting that none of 
them is addressed in USCCB or VOTF press releases. One could also look at these topic 
pitches as a single competing communicative project, one which attempts to reframe the 
crisis within the juridical arena. (Remember from the previous chapter that SNAP 
positions the crisis within the legal arena.) Either way, SNAP is caught in a double bind 
as it attempts to expand the crisis in ways that the other organizational stakeholders do 
not pick up.  
So, by narrating its own actions, select actions of the hierarchy, and unfolding 
events in the legal arena, SNAP attempts to reframe the crisis in strategic ways. The lack 
of response from the hierarchy is just as strategic, since dropping these topic pitches may 
decrease the attention and thus credibility they gain in the larger discourse. Non-
responsiveness from VOTF seems less strategic, since engaging any one of these topic 
pitches would turn it into a topic. VOTF’s failure to do so dead-ends what could be a 
strategic reframing of the crisis. 
Since each topic pitch mentioned in this section is effectively ignored by the 
other stakeholder organizations, it remains underdeveloped, and generally is mentioned 
in a single press release. Although this section does not give an exhaustive review of 
each organization’s dropped threads, it shows that each organization, to varying degrees, 
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attempts to introduce topics which the others fail to engage. This underscores Linell’s 
(1998) point that, since topics are jointly produced, the best a speaker can do is to pitch a 
possible new topic (p. 183). If there is no “sequence of contributions bound together by 
response links,” there is no topic (Linell, 1998, p. 183). Although the linearity inherent 
in Linell’s assertion is problematic in a speech event unfolding across space and time via 
the Internet, its underlying focus on joint construction remains salient. 
In this case, it appears that one source of discursive power is that of non-
engagement. That is, by failing to acknowledge or respond to another stakeholder’s 
proposed topic, an organization reduces the chance that ‘pitch’ has of becoming a full-
fledged topic. This is particularly evident where the USCCB remains silent on the 
multitude of legal/juridical topics pitched by SNAP (and periodically by VOTF). The 
strategic intent of the hierarchy’s silence on these issues (at least in this venue), is 
underscored by its reliance on a ‘culture of deference’ from the legal/justice system (The 
Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002, p. 8) and by its overt resistance to the opening of 
court documents and depositions once legal action was inevitable (Boston Globe 
Spotlight Team, 2002). Thus, although the USCCB has been enmeshed in legal battles 
since before the 2002 story broke, this is a topic it strategically fails to engage in the 
crisis discourse. Despite its passive nature, this strategy of silence has the potential to be 
a powerful rhetorical tool at the disposal of each organization. (Conversely, taking up 
another organization’s topic pitches gives momentum to the agenda of the first 
organization.) 
 164
As indicated previously, what might be called ‘dropped topic pitches’ are 
essential to a dialogical understanding of a speech event. Although not taken up by other 
parties, these pitches may reveal key or strategic issues for a stakeholder. If a given 
thread is repeatedly introduced by a stakeholder and ignored by others across the crisis, 
this may indicate a point of resistance, frustration, or intractability. In such a case, the 
initiating organization may be marking issues that are particularly salient to it (as VOTF 
and SNAP do when narrating the hierarchy’s actions). Alternately, dropped threads 
indicate ideas or issues that have little weight across the stakeholder pool. Thus, the 
USCCB’s attempts to broadening the scope of the crisis to an unavoidable societal ill are 
not acknowledged by the other stakeholder organizations, perhaps because this would 
deemphasize the hierarchy’s culpability. Further, although VOTF is intent on gaining 
organizational legitimacy, the other organizations do not seem to find this central to the 
crisis. Similarly, the legal arena, so central for SNAP, is downplayed by the USCCB and 
largely ignored by VOTF. (Note the previous chapter’s discussion of how each 
stakeholder organization contextualizes the crisis.) 
Non-topicality may also indicate the flow of power in a crisis, if one addresses 
whose topic pitches are picked up and whose dropped in a crisis situation. As per the 
previous discussion on initiative/response patterns, the USCCB’s PR is carried almost 
exclusively by initiatives, VOTF’s largely by responses, and SNAP’s by a mixture of 
initiatives and responses. What emerges is a speech event in which the majority of topics 
are introduced by the USCCB and SNAP. In time, however, those topics that gain the 
attention of more than one stakeholder organization (at least in this venue) are generally 
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those presented by the USCCB. Although VOTF and SNAP work together (as will be 
shown in the next chapter), VOTF seems more likely to take up the USCCB’s threads 
than SNAP’s. Although this serves VOTF’s goals for organizational identification, it 
does not serve its goals for organizational change. 
It is not surprising that VOTF and SNAP have more dropped threads than does 
the USCCB. If the USCCB does not respond to VOTF or SNAP, then the only way they 
can engage dialogical communication (which they seek, given the USCCB’s position of 
power) is to respond to the topics it pitches. This constrains VOTF and SNAP’s 
discourse, since their primary access to communication with the hierarchy requires them 
to engage its agenda. In this way, their responsive (although conflictual) orientation 
actually advances many of the USCCB’s topical initiatives. (It is important to note at this 
point that this study does not address the agenda-setting capacity of uncontrolled media. 
This is one of many mitigating forces which is downplayed in order to foreground the 
dialogicality among the selected stakeholders in this crisis). 
In sum, a dialogical orientation to communication is premised on the tension 
between mutual and divergent attention to (potential) topics. Thus, a dialogical 
assessment of any speech event must address both topics that are attended to (although 
not necessarily agreed on) by multiple participants and potential topics that are 
introduced by one participant without being acknowledged or addressed by other 
participants. A comparison of engaged and dropped topic pitches illuminates the 
complexity of communicatively constructing a crisis. It also hints at the subject of the 
next section: the enactment of power and resistance in a crisis situation. 
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Tracking Power 
In his (1989) review of post-structuralism and Foucault, Clegg offers some 
insights that frame the following exploration of power in the clergy abuse crisis. 
Important for a dialogical analysis of discourse is Clegg’s conceptualization of power as 
a relational, and thus interactive, phenomenon (p. 207; see also Clegg, Courpasson, & 
Phillips, 2006, p. 230). Just as important is the post-structuralist notion that power is 
“implicated in attempts to fix or uncouple and change particular representational 
relations of meaning” (pp. 151-2). The key here is a focus on strategies of discursive 
power, which are marked when an individual or organization’s representation of 
meaning is treated as natural and/or right (p. 152). For Foucault, agency and structure, 
both keys to power, are constituted discursively (Clegg, 1989, p. 158). In tracing three 
types of power (disciplinary, bio, and sovereign), Foucault conceptualizes power as a 
fluid force which always implicates resistance (Clegg, 1989, p. 154). In this line of 
thought, power is an interactive practice enacted (and resisted) through discourse.  
In their (2006) review of organizational power, Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 
concur with Foucault that power can only be known through its effects (p. 230). In order 
to trace power, then, one must note the techniques which “induce appropriate forms of 
conduct in those whom they target” (p. 231). It is important to note here that the target 
may be self or other (p. 231). From Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips’ Foucauldian 
perspective, “power is always embedded in those forms of rationality with which actors 
will be held accountable” (p. 234). Here, power is not about access to resources, real 
interests, or ideology; instead, it is about the discursive construction of knowledge 
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systems within which individuals construct their identities (p. 234). According to 
Peltonen and Tikkanen (2005), power is “’a question of ongoing and active structuring 
of the possible field of action of the others – a process that is open to resistance, 
transformation, and renegotiation’” (p. 275; in Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006, p. 
240). Inasmuch as fields of action are constituted discursively, discourse constitutes the 
social structures which, in turn, constrain it (pp. 301-3). According to Clegg, 
Courpasson, and Phillips, discourse analysis (which informs the current study) is tuned 
to “(u)nraveling the complex dynamic between discourse and power” (p. 294). This 
lends credibility to the following paragraphs which trace the (contested) enactment of 
power and resistance through each organization’s use of language in a crisis. Further, 
this analysis follows Foucault and Clegg’s preference for tracing “the possibilities of 
how anyone is able to exercise power; how the fields or arenas in which power is 
exercised are structured in such a way that power could be exercised” rather than in who 
has power (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006, p. 254). In this way, it is possible to 
open up the analysis beyond traditional conceptualizations of organizationally 
legitimized authority (e.g., Katz & Kahn, 1966, p. 219-220). Rather than focusing on the 
influence of one organizational actor over another, a discursive analysis of power traces 
how organizational actors use language to “make up and interpret the rules as they go 
along” (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006, p. 255).  
One way a dialogical framework illuminates the enactment of power is by 
comparing soliciting/obliging and non-soliciting/non-obliging initiatives. According to 
Linell (1998), the former demand direct responses, while the latter invite, but do not 
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demand, continuation from listener(s). The dichotomy between directive and invitational 
discourse indicates how a speaker orients toward power. Ostensibly, an organization that 
relies on invitational discourse takes a lower-power position than does an organization 
that relies on directive discourse. This leads to the contention that organizations may use 
more or less powerful discourse in order to meet their strategic goals. Although one 
might expect a correlation between an organization’s socially legitimized authority and 
its attempts to discursively enact power, a dialogical assessment of power reveals a more 
complex picture. 
USCCB 
Although Linell directs attention to directive and invitational initiatives, 
the USCCB primarily draws on a third type of initiative: declarative. What results 
is monological orientation to crisis communication in which ‘actual’ power is 
embedded in seemingly neutral discourse. In essence, the USCCB’s press releases 
are a long string of announcements that neither demand, nor invite a response; 
they simply narrate the USCCB’s actions, as the following examples illustrate. 
The Administrative Committee of the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops has put the problem of sexual abuse of minors by clergy on the agenda 
of the June General Meeting of the full body of Bishops. (USCCB, 2002, March 
14) 
 
Belleville Bishop Wilton D. Gregory, president of the U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops (USCCB), announced today the restructuring of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Sexual Abuse (AHCSA) and its new membership. (USCCB, 2002, 
September 5) 
 
Safe environment programs to protect children and youth should be in the 
planning process by June 20 and fully implemented for the 2003-2004 school 
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year, said Kathleen McChesney, executive director of the U.S. Bishops' Office of 
Child and Youth Protection. (USCCB, 2003, March 7) 
 
Although each of the organizations makes announcements and statements, 
the USCCB stands out for not augmenting its reliance on declarative discourse 
with invitational or directive discourse. What results is a sterilized language that 
creates an aura of distanced objectivity (what Burke (1961) might call a ‘priestly’ 
orientation). Even where the USCCB acknowledges victims/survivors, the laity, 
or other stakeholder organizations, it generally fails to require a response, as the 
following statement shows. 
We understand that your children are your most precious gift. They are our 
children as well and we continue to apologize to the victims, and to their parents 
and their loved ones for this failure in our pastoral responsibilities. … 
 
The Priesthood is a unique treasure of our Church, and I give you my assurance 
that we are doing everything to ensure that we have worthy and healthy 
candidates for the Priesthood and to strengthen the many priests who faithfully 
fulfill their ministry on behalf of all of us. … 
 
This is a time for Catholic people bishops, clergy, religious, and laity to resolve 
to work together to assure the safety of our children. These events serve to 
remind us all that the cost of preventing these terrible misdeeds in the future is a 
careful watch that cannot and will not be relaxed. We bishops intend to maintain 
that watch together with and on behalf of our people. (Bishop Gregory; USCCB, 
2002, February 19) 
 
In this statement, Bishop Gregory, then president of the USCCB, addresses the laity 
without inviting or directing any particular response from them. He simply makes 
naturalizing, ontological statements about how things are (e.g., “your children are…,” 
“the Priesthood is…,” “we are doing everything…,” “this is a time to…”). In essence, 
Gregory is interpreting the crisis for the reader, a powerful move found throughout the 
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USCCB’s PR. This is especially powerful, given the persona Gregory constructed of a 
leader empathetic to the plight of sexual abuse victims/survivors.  
Where the hierarchy does demand a particular response from the laity, (as noted 
in the section on ideological orientation), it does so through an implicit or indirect 
directive (e.g., ‘now is the time to…,’ ‘let us…,’ ‘now is the time for Christians to…’). 
More often than not, the USCCB merely states what is, without requesting or requiring a 
particular response from other stakeholders. One effect of this discursive practice is to 
imply that those who take alternative positions are either not Christians or traitors to the 
faith community. The USCCB’s discourse is marked by a lack of continuation 
mechanisms throughout, as the following quote indicates. 
"My heart goes out to all who have suffered, and I assure them especially that the 
bishops are committed to fully implementing the Dallas Charter and will 
continue to work with the Office of Child and Youth Protection and the National 
Review Board to reach out to victims and prevent such abuse from occurring in 
the future." (Bishop Gregory; USCCB, 2004, February 16) 
 
In this quote, Gregory talks about victims/survivors, without inviting or demanding any 
response from them. By drawing on declarative discourse, the USCCB’s discourse is 
primarily monological, albeit empathetic, in orientation. Where it is dialogical, this 
comes through an indirect, implicit use of directives levied to the laity.  
VOTF 
As a nascent grassroots organization, and one that is disowned by the 
organization from which they seek organizational legitimation, VOTF operates from a 
lower power position in this crisis. This being the case, it is not surprising that VOTF 
consistently ‘calls on’ the hierarchy for particular responses. The image that emerges 
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from VOTF’s PR is that of a child calling out to its parent in need. In this way, VOTF 
uses discourse that is strongly invitational, seeming to offset its powerlessness by calling 
urgently. However, where it ‘calls on’ or ‘urges’ the hierarchy to respond in a particular 
way, VOTF implicitly affirms the hierarchy’s greater power. In the following quotes, 
note that the discourse is strong, without being directive or demanding. It respectfully 
urges the hierarchy to respond. 
We call on those bishops who have banned us to rescind their bans. And we 
encourage Bishop Lennon and other bishops to establish common ground with 
Voice of the Faithful for the good of our beloved Church. (VOTF, 2003, January 
6) 
 
We also urge the bishop of every diocese to publicly release all applicable 
documents associated with allegations of sexual abuse by clergy and other 
personnel. (VOTF, 2003, February 10) 
 
New Hampshire Voice of the Faithful (NH-VOTF) today called on Bishop John 
B. McCormack and Auxiliary Bishop Francis J. Christian to resign their positions 
as bishops of the Diocese of Manchester, NH. (VOTF, 2003, April 6) 
 
We urge Bishop DiMarzio to make the sexual abuse crisis his first priority in 
Brooklyn. (VOTF, 2003, August 1) 
 
At other times, VOTF takes a more forceful approach. By doing this, the 
organization positions itself as the hierarchy’s equal. This is an unsurprising, if risky, 
move given the tension between the hierarchy and VOTF over democratizing the 
Church. Despite the potential for appearing rebellious and thus risking dissociation by 
the hierarchy, VOTF chooses to use both (strong) invitations and directives, as the 
following quotes show. 
An additional and impartial survivor of sexual abuse by clergy must be appointed 
to the National Review Board monitoring the compliance of Catholic bishops to 
new policies for disciplining sexually abusive priests, say leaders of Voice of the 
Faithful … Voice of the Faithful has previously called for "vigorous 
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enforcement" of the bishops' publicly stated commitments. (VOTF, 2002, August 
1a) 
 
“This … underscores the moral imperative for the U.S. bishops to firmly and 
immediately affirm the ‘zero tolerance’ policy on their own. …U.S. bishops can 
still use discretionary authority – their rough equivalent of ‘states’ rights’ – to 
implement the intent of the Dallas Charter in their own dioceses, and we strongly 
call on them to do so.” (Steve Krueger; VOTF, 2002, November 1) 
 
Voice of the Faithful is calling on every bishop to release the results of the 
written report provided to him by the OCYP in its entirety. … Finally, Voice of 
the Faithful is calling for the vigorous and effective implementation of 
educational diocesan programs to protect children and young people. … Bishops 
must insist that all dioceses comply with implementation of these programs and 
must provide the necessary funds and resource to ensure their implementation. 
(VOTF, 2004, January 6) 
 
As an internal dissent organization, VOTF is in an interesting position. It faces a 
dilemma of seeking to change the system that constrains it. To circumnavigate this 
challenge, VOTF either uses strong invitations or dovetails invitations with directives. 
The intent seems to be to promote its agenda powerfully, yet deferentially. 
Unfortunately, this renders VOTF largely impotent in the situation. By taking the tone of 
an adolescent petitioning a parent, VOTF discursively affirms the paternalism inherent 
in the priest-lay structure. Rather than taking this opportunity to fundamentally challenge 
the Church’s structure or extend lay agency, VOTF discursively positions itself as a 
respectfully dissenting child. Its conflicted discourse leaves little doubt that filial regard 
is a higher priority than is substantive (structural) change to this organization. By failing 
to critique or resist the fundamental alignment between the laity and the leadership, 





Much like VOTF, SNAP uses both invitations and directives to get the hierarchy 
to respond. They intersperse ‘calls’ on the hierarchy with direct demands, as the 
following quotes show. 
"The Cardinal needs to decide who runs his archdiocese. When it comes to the 
sexual abuse of kids, he either has a 'zero tolerance' policy or a 'turn a blind eye' 
policy. The Cardinal must choose." (Blaine; SNAP, 2004, March 4) 
 
“Please do not allow yet another pedophile to evade justice. This may be the best 
and only way for child abusers everywhere to understand the extent of the 
damage done to children and they must be held accountable for their terrible 
crimes.” (Clohessy; SNAP, 2004, May 20) 
 
A support group for clergy sex abuse victims is asking a Catholic pastor to 
publicly apologize for not stopping a fellow priest who victimized youngsters. 
(SNAP, 2004, August, 3) 
 
In addition to noting the combination of directives and invitations, it is important 
to note one particular way in which SNAP uses its discursive power. Due to its position 
outside the Church, SNAP does not have access to Catholic victims/survivors who have 
not ‘come forward’ yet. One of the ways SNAP tries to contact those victims/survivors is 
through the hierarchy. This is a challenge, given the gulf separating the USCCB and 
SNAP. SNAP, however, is not bashful in trying to leverage the hierarchy to get to the 
victim/survivor community. Here again, SNAP uses a combination of powerful 
invitational language and directives. The former allows SNAP to maintain a respectful 
posture while pushing for its goals. (Perhaps in order to retain its credibility in the legal 
arena, SNAP has constrained itself to using a respectful rather than agitating, combative 
style.) The combination lets SNAP press into the hierarchy as strongly as it can. Note the 
following quotes. 
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[SNAP] today sent a letter to … Bishop Donald Wuerl urging him to provide 
SNAP free, full-page advertising space in the Diocesan newspaper…. The 
purpose of the ad is to inform clergy abuse survivors that they are not alone in 
their pain and that there is help and independent support available. (SNAP, 2004, 
March 5) 
 
The group will also demand that Mahony notify all parishioners of the number of 
children who have allegedly been abused since he became Cardinal (in 1985), the 
names of those perpetrators and their assignments. (SNAP, 2004, April 25) 
 
Leaders of the nation's largest support group for clergy molestation victims are 
writing the bishops in three states, urging them to follow the lead of the St. Louis 
Archdiocese and call for victims of a convicted pedophile to report their crimes 
to law enforcement. (SNAP, 2004, May 24) 
 
In a letter to Archbishop Sheehan, leaders of the Survivors Network of those 
Abused by Priests (SNAP) are asking that the archdiocese actively and 
aggressively seek out victims who may be suffering in silence, by placing ads in 
the diocesan paper…and church bulletins encouraging anyone who has been 
abused, witnessed abuse or suspected abuse to contact law enforcement officials. 
(SNAP, 2004, July 30) 
 
In each of the quotes above, SNAP tries to elicit a particular response from the hierarchy 
through (strong) invitations or directives. Although SNAP has no control over and little 
influence on the hierarchy, its PR belies this. Examples of efforts to get the hierarchy to 
convey SNAP’s message to the victim/survivor community abound in SNAP’s PR. 
SNAP’s reliance on written correspondence (a large component of its PR) 
illustrates another way in which the organization attempts to gain responses from the 
hierarchy. SNAP underscores the interactive intent of its correspondence when it closes 
letters with implicit requests for response. For example: 
‘We look forward to your (prompt) response.’ 
‘We look forward to hearing from you soon.’ 
‘We await your reply.’ 
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In each closing, SNAP implicitly invites a response from the hierarchy. SNAP letters 
vary in the intensity of their appeal for response. At times they hope for a response; at 
other times they demand a response: 
…we hope you will consider our moratorium proposal, that would prohibit the 
treatment centers from accepting any new molesters for the next year. (Dorris & 
Clohessy letter to Bishop Burke; SNAP, 2005, January 26) 
 
In light of this confirmation, coming from a high ranking Archdiocesan official 
within your administration, SNAP demands that Fr. Yakaitis be fired 
immediately. (Clohessy & Blaine letter to Cardinal George; SNAP, 2005, 
February 8) 
 
In sum, it seems that SNAP uses discursive power in similar ways to VOTF, 
although for different reasons. Both organizations use a mixture of (strongly) invitational 
and (politely) directive language in order to engender responses from the hierarchy. Both 
organizations seem to moderate the strength of their requests at times - VOTF deferring 
to the USCCB’s management, SNAP leveraging the USCCB’s access to 
victims/survivors. In contrast, the USCCB seems largely disinterested in any response 
from either SNAP or VOTF. Tracing the discursive power in crisis communication 
indicates that stakeholder organizations speak with a greater or lesser degree of accord 
with their positional power for a variety of strategic purposes. 
Conclusion 
 The focus in this chapter has been on the interactivity in the press 
releases/statements of three key stakeholders in the clergy abuse crisis. By adapting 
Linell’s focus on the balance between initiatives and responses to crisis communication, 
it is possible to extend traditional understandings of the offensive and defensive 
orientation to crisis communication. What emerges it a hybrid typology of crisis 
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communication orientations, including offensive-initiatives (i.e., being the first to levy 
an attack), offensive-responses (i.e., responding to another’s discourse with an attack), 
defensive-initiatives (i.e., using a preemptive defense), and defensive-responses (i.e., 
responding defensively to an attack). 
 When applied to the clergy sex abuse crisis, this typology reveals ways in which 
each organization either offsets or compounds any weakness in its rhetorical position. In 
particular, the USCCB offsets the weakness inherent in its defensive position by 
leveraging initiatives. VOTF less successfully attempts to offset the weakness inherent 
in its responsive orientation by engaging offensive discourse. In addition to sharing this 
strategy, SNAP employs what might be deemed the typical rhetorical strategy of attack: 
offensive-initiative discourse. This approach allows SNAP to advance its agenda for 
crisis-related issues.  
 By tracking topicality and non-topicality, it is possible to identify what 
stakeholders treat as the main content of a crisis. Further, by assessing which 
organization(s)’ topic pitches are sustained and which dropped, it is possible to make 
educated inferences about the flow of power among stakeholder organizations. It is 
likely that those organizations with more actual power will have fewer dropped topical 
threads than will those with less actual power. In the current case, each organization 
made topic pitches that went unaddressed by the other organizations. Further, the 
USCCB clearly had a number of topic pitches that were faithfully followed by the other 
organizations. Although the current study introduced and sought to trace the concept of 
(non)topicality in the context of crisis discourse, a thorough understanding of the 
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implications of topicality may require a quantitative assessment of dropped versus 
accepted topic pitches. That is, in order to explore the implications of (non)topicality, it 
would be necessary to track how many topic pitches were made versus how many 
engaged for each organization. Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of the current 
study. 
By tracking how stakeholder organizations enable or constrain responses from 
one another, it is possible to gain a more complex understanding of how actual power 
interfaces with discursive power. What emerges is a picture of lower power 
organizations using strong invitations and polite directives in order to call out responses 
from the higher power organization, and a higher power organization using declaratives 
to downplay opportunities for responses. In particular, the USCCB’s discourse shows an 
accord between its actual and its discursive power. It relies on directive language which 
naturalizes its power. VOTF and SNAP, on the other hand, try to offset their low-power 
status by using moderately powerful (i.e., strongly invitational and politely directive) 
language. Both organizations mark (and unintentionally substantiate) their relatively 
low-power status by tempering the requests they make of the USCCB. 
What emerges from this assessment is an awareness of how each organization’s 
discourse is constrained by or rooted in its positional power. This, in turn, draws 
attention to the driving tension between hierarchy and democracy in this crisis. The 
hierarchy’s conceptualization of the Roman Catholic Church as a closed system 
constrains VOTF’s goal of democratizing the institution and SNAP’s goal of affecting it 
through democratic mechanisms (i.e., the public sphere and legal arenas). The next 
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chapter touches on how conflicting understandings of ‘the Church’ constrain the 
construction of this crisis. Key here is the ongoing debate over how the U.S. Church 
manages (global) expectations for hierarchical control with (local) expectations for 
democracy. At a fundamental level, this crisis is affected by the dialectical tension of 
attempting to be a closed hierarchy embedded in a democratic society. 
Thus, by adapting Linell’s focus on initiative/response patterns, (non)topicality, 
and (non)soliciting initiatives, this chapter highlights three key areas in which 
interactivity illuminates the complexity of crisis communication. The next chapter steps 
back from the particular findings of the data analysis in order to articulate the analytical 
framework for analyzing the dialogicality of crisis communication that has emerged in 
this study. It also discusses the limitations of this study, augmenting each with an area 




In order to test the analytic capacity of dialogue for public relations, the preceding 
chapters construct and test a particular dialogical model for understanding crisis 
communication. They present a descriptive mechanism for sifting PR discourse through 
a select set of dialogical principles. By drawing multiple stakeholder organizations into a 
single analytical frame, this model is able to foreground both the holism and tension 
(Stewart, Zediker, & Black, 2004, pp. 23-29) inherent in the situation. 
Stepping away from the detail of the previous two chapters, this chapter seeks to 
name and clarify the process and findings that have emerged from this grounded study. 
In particular, it is essential to further articulate three key elements that have emerged: the 
role of the researcher (facilitator), the central process of the research (discursive 
reconciliation), and the driving goal of the research (an assessment of collective 
proprioception). Each is addressed in turn, with special attention being given to the 
salience of assessing collective proprioception in a church-based crisis. The study 
concludes with a brief review of limitations and areas for future research. 
Researcher as Facilitator 
Although the notion of a facilitator is more prominent in prescriptive views of 
dialogue than descriptive, it is not irrelevant to a descriptive application of dialogism 
such as this one. In fact, important parallels may be drawn between the role of the 
researcher in a dialogical assessment of crisis communication and that of a facilitator in 
a face-to-face dialogue. This section uses Gerard and Ellinor’s (1995) conceptualization 
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of the role of a dialogue facilitator to clarify the role of the researcher in this dialogical 
analysis of PR. 
According to Gerard and Ellinor, a facilitator acts as a still center, bringing out 
the tensions and difficulties across the polyphony of the dialogue. This person does not 
control the outcome of the dialogue, but stimulates it. A facilitator’s goal is to hold the 
key question(s) of the dialogue open, delaying closure so that the dialogue can unfurl. 
His or her role is to stand as ‘witness’ to the collective wisdom of the group. According 
to Gerard and Ellinor, a dialogue facilitator must be comfortable with chaos, have a 
strong capacity for self-awareness, and be tuned in to both what is being said and what 
needs to be drawn out. However, a facilitator must not ‘rescue’ the group at points of 
tension. Instead s/he must speak from a place of receptive attentiveness which leads the 
group to an increased collective self-awareness (Gerard & Ellinor, 1995). 
Despite the rather idealized language that Gerard and Ellinor (drawing on the 
work of Bohm) use to describe dialogic facilitation, the preceding is surprisingly 
representative of the capacities and functions essential to enacting this study. This 
assessment required the researcher to take an inclusive approach to the crisis discourse 
produced by multiple stakeholder organizations. This macro-focus required the 
researcher to bring out tensions across alternately collaborative/competitive discourses, 
to explore the context of the larger speech situation, and to defer closure throughout the 
analysis. As will be addressed later in the chapter, this allowed the researcher to trace the 
collective proprioception (or absence thereof) among stakeholder organizations. Each of 
these functions paralleled Gerard and Ellinor’s conceptualization of facilitation. 
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One way in which this study did not echo Gerard and Ellinor’s conceptualization 
is the presumption that a facilitator is necessary at the front end of a face-to-face 
dialogue, but decreasingly necessary as the dialogue unfolds. According to Gerard and 
Ellinor, as time goes on, the group itself takes on the role of facilitator, becoming a self-
guiding system. In the current analysis, however, this sequence was reversed. In order to 
understand the contested discursive framework of the crisis, it was important to wait 
until a sufficiently complex collection of discourse had been cached and could be drawn 
into a single analytical frame. Thus, although the researcher functioned much as a 
facilitator, the salience of this role to the crisis situation emerged later than it would have 
in a face-to-face dialogue. 
At this point, it is essential to acknowledge the power inherent in positioning the 
researcher as a type of facilitator. This is especially important in the present case, in 
which the abuse of power is a central issue. Three (albeit limited) checks that operated in 
the current study find parallels in Gerard and Ellinor’s model. First, a facilitator should 
contribute only what is additive to the communicative situation. In this way, the 
facilitator responds to the emergent discourse rather than directing or ‘seeding’ it. Such a 
responsive orientation is essential to many applications of dialogical principles (see 
Stewart, Zediker, & Black, 2004, p. 25 and Wood, 2004, p. xvi). In the dialogical model 
generated in this study, a responsive orientation positions the analyst in dialogue with, 
rather than in control of, the data. In essence, the researcher-facilitator is bound by the 
frames generated and contested by stakeholders. 
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Second, a facilitator should act as a servant leader and process coach whose goal 
is to help the group become increasingly self-aware rather than to ‘resolve’ its key 
questions or to ‘rescue’ it. In a dialogical analysis of crisis communication, this means 
focusing on the communicative process rather than the crisis outcome. It also means 
viewing some stakeholders’ attempts to close the crisis in concert with other 
stakeholders’ attempts to keep it open. Further, since this is an inaugural attempt at 
mapping crisis discourse from a dialogic perspective, it is essential to describe rather 
than prescribe the process. Thus, in contrast to Gerard and Ellinor’s (1994, 1995) 
prescriptive orientation to dialogue, the current study seeks to generate a polyphonic 
awareness of the crisis rather than to prescribe strategies for resolving the crisis. Here, 
the study functions according to Barge and Craig’s (in press) notion of mapping 
grounded practical theory in which the theorist describes both the communication 
strategies used by practitioners and their outcomes. 
Third, as noted in the discussion of the diminishing role of the facilitator across 
time, the facilitator’s power is checked as it is increasingly assumed by the group. The 
implication is that shared power is less likely to be abused than that singly held. 
Although this is difficult to apply to a dialogical assessment of crisis communication, it 
does delimit the researcher’s role in understanding the crisis situation. Although the 
researcher-facilitator’s function may emerge later in the crisis than in a face-to-face 
dialogue, it still must decrease in time. The goal of a dialogical analyst must be that of 
diminishing involvement and relinquishing power to stakeholders. Although this may 
seem a moot point due to the researcher’s position as external to (and distant from) the 
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crisis, it is important to reiterate, given the propensity of dialogic scholars to both live 
and work from dialogical beliefs (Stewart, Zediker, & Black, 2004, pp. 29-31). That is, 
dialogical researchers must be aware of and bound their own constitutive role in a crisis. 
Despite (or perhaps because of) their seeming naiveté, these checks on the power 
of a facilitator do clarify the work of a researcher-facilitator. In working from within 
these specifications, a dialogical analyst will play a temporary, responsive role in the 
understanding the on-going construction of a crisis situation. Analyzing crisis 
communication this way served as an important check on the power of the researcher as 
facilitator in this study, and would do so in other analyses. 
Having reflected on the role and power of a dialogical analyst, it is important to 
address the central process in a dialogical analysis: ‘discursive reconciliation.’ 
Analysis as Discursive Reconciliation 
Although reconciliation may refer to the process of making diverse elements 
harmonious or congruous (clearly not the intent of a dialogical assessment), it may also 
refer to the process of checking one record against another. In the latter 
conceptualization, multiple reports are sifted against one another for accounting 
purposes. Additionally, if one traces the etymology of the word reconcile, it leads to the 
word conciliate, which, at its root, comes from the Latin word concilium, meaning 
assembly or council or the Latin conciliatus, which means to bring together. This 
etymological lead is important, because it grounds reconciliation in the context of 
dynamic polyvocal interactions. From this, one can conceptualize reconciliation as a 
 184
process in which multiple accounts, emerging from some social body, are sifted against 
one another. Understood this way, reconciliation is clearly a dialogical process. 
From this notion of reconciliation, the current study proposes the process of 
discursive reconciliation as the central analytical process of a dialogical assessment of 
crisis communication. To a large degree, this is the process that unfolds in the two data 
analysis chapters. By sifting multiple discourses against one another, the researcher is 
able to identify points of collaboration and contest across the dataset. This process uses 
each organization’s discourse as the background against which each other organization’s 
discourse is heard. In this way, the discourses of multiple organizations are mutually 
revealing. This process is anchored in what Stewart, Zediker, and Black (2004) position 
as the two essential characteristics of dialogue: holism and tensionality (pp. 23-29). 
On one hand, discursive reconciliation draws the discourse of multiple 
stakeholders into a ‘coherent’ (i.e., single, but not necessarily unified) frame. It is only 
by assessing multiple streams of discourse in concert that one can begin to understand 
PR as a contested process. This aligns with basic assumptions in dialogic philosophy that 
balance “tendencies toward analysis, separation, and categorization with attempts to be 
aware of and understand a totality” (Stewart, 1994, p. 26). To offset the risks of a 
totalizing, static, homogenizing holism, the process of discursive reconciliation proposed 
in this study foregrounds the ways in which multiple texts contribute to the fluid, 
dynamic, co-construction of a single communicative situation (Stewart, Zediker, & 
Black, 2004, p. 27). The current study serves to map the clergy sex abuse crisis as a 
complex, yet ‘coherent’ communicative situation. 
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On the other hand, discursive reconciliation draws on the tension inherent in the 
communicative construction of a crisis. Stewart, Zediker, and Black (2004) see this as 
another commonality among the work of Buber, Bakhtin, Bohm, Freire, and Gadamer 
(p. 27). Unfortunately, this notion is less developed in Stewart’s work than is holism. 
Sandoz links this concept with Plato’s metaxy or “in-between reality” (in Stewart, 1994, 
p. 27), and Stewart links it with Bohm’s “suspension” (1994, p. 29). It may also be 
linked to Boden’s “facticity in flight” (1994). In order to tap into the tensionality central 
to dialogue, discursive reconciliation listens for the dissonances, disagreements, 
disunities, silences, contradictions, clashes, etc. that occur within a communicative 
situation. These have clearly been drawn out in the preceding analysis. 
As with any grounded research process, discursive reconciliation is a relatively 
messy process in which key assertions, themes, and/or sections are foregrounded in view 
of the entire dataset. The process of discursive reconciliation is most likely to be fruitful 
where a set of interdependent organizations are in communication with one another. In 
such a situation, the discourse of various organizations will ebb and flow in 
noteworthiness for a variety of reasons. Units of discourse that indicate connectivity, 
responsiveness, or intersubjectivity on one hand, or differentiation, absence, or 
disconnection on the other hand, are likely points for analysis. Setting such points 
against the other texts is a way to map the ‘tensile unity’ of the communicative situation. 
At a basic level, the process of discursive reconciliation might be defined as a process by 
which texts are drawn into council with one another in order to reveal the tensile holism 
of a communicative situation. 
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Although the two data analysis chapters illustrate the analytical process of 
discursive reconciliation, the implications of a dialogical analysis of crisis 
communication for crisis stakeholders have yet to be explored. In order to begin this 
exploration, the next section introduces the driving goal of a dialogical analysis of crisis 
discourse: tracing collective proprioception. 
Goal as Tracking Collective Proprioception 
Again drawing on Bohm, Gerard and Ellinor (1994) note that one of the goals of 
a dialogue facilitator is to cultivate (for this study, track) collective proprioception. Akin 
to self-awareness, proprioception is an organism’s responsiveness to internal stimuli. For 
a biological body, it is the capacity to ‘hear’ (and thus respond to) input from internal 
organs. This sense allows one to know the relative position of one body part to another, 
for example, allowing one to touch one’s nose while blindfolded or walk through a dark 
room. For a corporate body, one might conceptualize proprioception as the capacity to 
receive and respond to stimuli from within the collective. This sense would allow 
members of a group or organization to know where each is in relation to the others, thus 
enabling effective (however that may be defined) interactions. This study argues that the 
process of discursive reconciliation is one way to assess the proprioceptive capacity 
among a group of crisis stakeholders. Key here is noting whether stakeholders are aware 
of, responsive to, and collaboratively involved with one another. This goes beyond 
tracing intersubjectivity or co-orientation to assessing whether or not stakeholders act 
together out of a mutually responsive awareness. 
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Given the theoretical framework of this study, it is necessary to allocate the 
concept of collective proprioception in a slightly different way than one would for an 
individual. An assessment of organizational proprioception would trace an 
organization’s responsiveness to internal stimuli (e.g., how bishops respond to priests or 
congregations). This study, however, traces how stakeholder organizations respond to 
stimuli from one another. In this case, the analytical frame acts as a boundary delineating 
a collective of stakeholders. Once a reasoned selection of stakeholders has been made, a 
dialogical assessment (such as that in the preceding two chapters) makes it possible to 
trace collective proprioception across a crisis. Note though, that whereas Gerard and 
Ellinor position the facilitator as cultivating collective proprioception, this study 
positions the researcher-facilitator as simply evaluating the presence/absence of 
collective proprioception. 
Although this may seem idealized, this study argues that collective 
proprioception is a practical goal in a crisis situation. For example, even powerful 
organizations like the USCCB may face negative ramifications from failing to 
acknowledge and/or engage the contested construction of a crisis. The USCCB’s failure 
to engage collective proprioception with key stakeholder organizations arguably led to 
substantive damage to its image, an extended state of crisis, and reduced influence over 
the construction of the crisis. Such a disconnected, unconscious approach to crisis 
management is, at a minimum, not strategic. For less powerful organizations like VOTF 
and SNAP, tapping into collective proprioception is a key way to understand the 
dynamics of the crisis as it emerges, to leverage collaborative power, and to engage the 
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source organization to the greatest effect. Admittedly this raises two practical concerns 
for PR practitioners. First, they must determine with which organizations to cultivate 
collective proprioception during a crisis. Second, they must be aware of the potential for 
the co-optation of collective proprioception for a single organization’s benefit. 
Despite these concerns, inasmuch as crises are sites of contest, stakeholders, for 
reasons altruistic or strategic, must stay connected to the interactivity driving crisis 
management. A dialogical sensibility stands as an essential mechanism for fashioning 
such an awareness. It is only from a dialogical framework that one can effectively hear 
and respond to the alternately conflictual and collaborative interplay of multi-party crisis 
discourse. This is especially important in a case, such as the clergy sex abuse crisis, in 
which stakeholder organizations make direct and indirect references to one another, 
manage one another’s capacity to speak on key crisis issues, alternate between 
independent and collaborative speech, and are circumscribed by a body metaphor (as 
will be addressed later in the chapter). The next section uses the findings from the data 
analysis to trace collective proprioception in the clergy sex abuse crisis. This is an 
important final step in teasing out practical implications of a dialogical analysis of the 
clergy sex abuse crisis. 
Tracking Collective Proprioception in Current Case 
In order to assess collective proprioception in the clergy sex abuse crisis, one 
must trace how the stakeholder organizations use discourse to constrain or empower one 
another. Through their crisis discourse, the organizations may be seen to work together 
collaboratively (mutually empowering or mutually constraining) or conflictually (one 
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empowering, the other constraining). This section explores the level of collective 
proprioception operating among the three stakeholder organizations in this study. 
To begin, it is helpful to articulate the distinct goal each organization has for the 
crisis. Here, each organization’s goal is posed in the form of a question to represent its 
chief pursuit in the situation. For the USCCB, the driving question seems to be: How can 
we get this situation under (our) control and move past it? For VOTF, the key question 
seems to be: How can we get the hierarchy’s ear? For SNAP, the motivating question 
seems to be: How can we put an end to (systemic) clergy sexual abuse? These questions, 
loosely derived from each organization’s crisis discourse, reveal some important things 
about how they orient to one another, and thus manage the possibility of collective 
proprioception through crisis communication. 
The USCCB’s question aligns with its monological orientation to crisis 
discourse. For the USCCB, speaking is more important than listening or responding, and 
the image of dialogicality is deemed more strategic than the enactment of dialogic 
communication. Goals of closure and control preclude any substantive discursive 
interaction with other organizations. Interestingly, this leaves the USCCB disconnected 
from the crisis, which effectively derails any opportunity for collective proprioception 
among stakeholders. In this way, the bishops protect their power by precluding 
collective proprioception. The bishops stand as a ‘poster-child’ for traditional 
(monological) apologia. As such, they typify those Wood (2004) describes as being 
disinclined toward dialogue “whose social locations do not motivate them to risk their 
material well-being or their comfortable conceptions of self and social life” (p. xx). As 
 190
Wood (2004) notes (drawing on McPhail’s (1994) work on race and racism), this leaves 
“those who seek dialogue vulnerable to being silenced, frustrated, or exploited by those 
who do not” (p. xx). This is clearly the case for VOTF. 
VOTF’s question reveals its preoccupation with its paradoxical position within 
the Church. By seeking to affirm and be included in the system it seeks to change, 
VOTF finds itself in a double bind. Although it seeks to influence the institutional 
Church, its fundamental, voluntary submission to the hierarchy bounds any impact it can 
have on the system. This tension emerges from the parent-child relationship between the 
hierarchy and the laity, marked by VOTF leaders as the ‘infantalization’ of the laity. 
Thus, despite its goal of changing the Church, VOTF does much to affirm the power 
structure of the institution. Without a more radical orientation to the institution, VOTF 
may find itself unable to answer its driving question. Indeed, the laity (as represented by 
VOTF) may have to consider the dilemma marked by Wood (2004), who notes: “Those 
who historically have been denied voices may reasonably believe that in some 
circumstances nondialogic alternatives are more empowering and have greater potential 
than dialogue to compel members of the dominant group to recognize and respond to 
them” (p. xxii). 
SNAP’s question clearly marks its agenda. It seeks to use whatever resources it 
can to stop clergy sexual abuse. If this means working in the court system, the policy 
arena, the institutional Church, or with the laity, then so be it. This organization exhibits 
a broad repertoire of communication and relational skills, and uses them interchangeably 
across time to advance its mission. Although this unreciprocated bilingualism is the 
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mark of a marginalized group (Wood, 2004, p. xxi), it has allowed SNAP to gain an 
increasingly strategic position in the crisis. By working in multiple arenas 
simultaneously, SNAP has been able to promote its agenda consistently, regardless of 
roadblocks. Where it is shut out of one discursive arena (e.g., the Church), it enters 
another (e.g., the legal arena). Further, as the Church hierarchy grows increasingly quiet 
on the issues of clergy sexual abuse, SNAP’s voice (seems to) become louder. Although 
it has taken years to occur, and to some degree has been out of SNAP’s control, SNAP 
stands poised at a strategic position of potential influence in the crisis. 
When reviewed independently, these questions reveal how each organization 
orients to the others; when reviewed in concert, they reveal how the potential for 
collective proprioception is managed vertically (i.e., between the USCCB and 
VOTF/SNAP) and horizontally (i.e., between VOTF and SNAP). Vertically, there is a 
general disconnect. Early in the crisis, the hierarchy involves SNAP symbolically 
(inviting members to address the bishops at the 2002 General Assembly in Dallas) and 
VOTF conflictually (banning them from Church premises). However, these responses 
quickly turn to silence, so that for the larger part of the crisis, the USCCB is non-
interactive with other stakeholder organizations. Despite this virtual non-responsiveness, 
both VOTF and SNAP consistently anticipate and try to cultivate mutual awareness and 
engender responses from the hierarchy. Unfortunately, the USCCB’s monological 
orientation to crisis communication short-circuits VOTF and SNAP’s desire for 
dialogicality, thus debilitating the potential of vertical collective proprioception. 
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For VOTF, the pursuit of responsiveness is fueled by a naïve trust in the power 
of dialogue with the leadership to resolve the crisis. The uncritical nature of this pursuit, 
in the context of an overt rejection of VOTF by many bishops, forces a prioritization 
between VOTF’s paradoxical goals of changing and affirming the Church. In order to be 
acknowledged by the hierarchy (a passive response), VOTF submits its goal of 
democratizing the Church to the hierarchy’s goal of returning the Church to status quo. 
For SNAP, the pursuit of responsiveness by Church leadership is fueled by an 
awareness that the hierarchy has access to unidentified abuse victims among the laity, 
one of SNAP’s primary publics. Although this leads SNAP to retain a relatively 
respectful posture to the USCCB, its pursuit of a response is more tempered and strategic 
than VOTF’s. In fact, SNAP’s attempts to elicit a response from the hierarchy rival the 
USCCB’s rhetorical power at times by echoing the hierarchy’s powerful, declarative 
language. 
For both VOTF and SNAP, the pursuit of responsiveness by the hierarchy 
requires deference to a standard Catholic Discourse. This deference is marked by the use 
of Catholic jargon, bending to the hierarchy’s authority, and an overall attitude of respect 
for the leadership. This volitional deference to a Catholic Discourse may be one of the 
clearest indicators of the dependence of VOTF and SNAP on the hierarchy (and its 
position as the ‘source’ organization in this crisis). Both organizations, despite their 
goals of changing the Church, defer to the hierarchy. VOTF defers due to its definition 
as a Catholic organization; SNAP defers due to its dependence on the Catholic 
leadership as an intermediary target. Regardless of the reason, both organizations 
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position themselves (to a greater or lesser degree) under the auspices of an organization 
that is either non-responsive or minimally responsive to them. 
The lack of any substantive response from the hierarchy is not surprising in light 
of the power divide separating the organizations. However, it does reveal the complex 
interrelationships among the stakeholder organizations. Since SNAP defines itself as 
external to the Church, it is no surprise that its attempts to leverage the hierarchy fall on 
deaf ears. The hierarchy’s lack of response to VOTF, an organization comprised of self-
described mainstream Catholics, is more surprising. However, it turns out to be a 
strategic choice. By banning (a negative response) or ignoring (a non-response) 
members of VOTF, the hierarchy emphasizes its power over the laity. Given the speed 
with which VOTF clarified its goals and emphasized its alignment with the hierarchy, 
the hierarchy’s strategy clearly served the bishops’ goals. By stonewalling, downplaying, 
or ignoring both VOTF and SNAP, the hierarchy effectively shuts down every invitation 
for vertical collective proprioception VOTF and SNAP gave them. (Note that this 
communicative strategy was as ineffective in controlling the hierarchy’s public image 
and maintaining its jurisdiction over the crisis as it was effective in controlling the laity.) 
Perhaps the more interesting analysis comes when one addresses the horizontal 
interactions between stakeholders. (Since there is no peer organization for the USCCB, 
this section defaults to an assessment of VOTF and SNAP’s discourse.) Clearly VOTF 
and SNAP cultivate horizontal collective proprioception. From the data, it is possible to 
come up with 12 single-spaced pages of quotes in which VOTF and SNAP indicate a 
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responsive awareness of one another. These quotes reveal a series of ways in which the 
two organizations exemplify a mutual awareness that allows them to work in tandem. 
Two of these capacities seem unique to VOTF: giving the floor to SNAP and 
listening to survivors. The former may be a result of VOTF’s position as internal to the 
Church; that is, since it has constructed a Catholic identity, VOTF deems itself capable 
of offering discursive space to survivors. The latter is clearly the result of SNAP’s 
constitution as a victim support organization; listening to members of SNAP is one way 
to meet VOTF’s goal of supporting victims/survivors. It may also indicate VOTF’s view 
of itself as a representative of the Church, and thus as responsible for and/or capable of 
restorative listening. Beyond these positionally-bound strategies, however, VOTF and 
SNAP seem to share a set of collaborative discursive strategies, which may be grouped 
into three main categories, as follows. 
First, they speak and act together. They attend the same meetings, use quotes 
from one another as sound bites, speak at one another’s events, and disseminate nearly 
identical statements. For example, early in the crisis, VOTF notes that it joined SNAP in 
a meeting with NRB chair Governor Keating (VOTF, 2002, October 4). In describing 
that meeting, VOTF quotes a SNAP representative as saying that, “The governor heard 
and seemed to agree that victims need to be listened to by the bishops, in the same way 
we have been listened to by Voice of the Faithful” (VOTF, 2002, October 4). Not only 
are they at the same meeting, but SNAP serves as a sound bite for VOTF. In this 
instance (one among many examples), VOTF and SNAP underscore one another’s voice. 
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A similar effect occurs when representatives from one organization speak at an 
event sponsored by the other organization. This happens regularly, and is marked in each 
organization’s PR. In these instances, the organizations showcase one another’s voices 
and messages. They also emphasize the overlap between the organizations, essentially 
narrating their interdependence. Note the following excerpt of a speech given by then-
president of VOTF, James Post at a SNAP conference: 
I wanted to be here with you in Chicago this weekend for two reasons. 
First, I want to say to each of you … that we stand together in the fight for social 
justice for survivors of clergy sexual abuse. Voice of the Faithful and SNAP 
continue to cooperate in a fight to rid the Catholic Church of one of the great 
evils of our lifetime –clergy sexual abuse. (VOTF, 2005, June 11) 
 
Here, the organizations are shining the spotlight on one another in order to highlight 
their collaboration and unity. 
At other times, VOTF and SNAP essentially echo one another’s voices. Note the 
two nearly identical paragraphs that appear in VOTF and SNAP press releases on May 
31, 2004, as the organizations attempt to influence the USCCB’s national meeting. (The 
miniscule differences are italicized.) 
The Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests (SNAP) and Voice of the 
Faithful (VOTF) are calling on the U.S. Catholic Bishops to open their national 
meeting in June to public scrutiny and participation. The groups are also asking 
the Bishops to recommit to the Charter for the Protection of Children and Young 
People that they passed in Dallas in 2002. (VOTF, 2004, May 31) 
 
The Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests (SNAP) and Voice of the 
Faithful (VOTF) are calling on the U.S. Catholic bishops to open up their 
discussions of sexual abuse in June to public scrutiny and participation. The 
groups are also asking bishops to recommit to the Charter for the Protection of 




A similar overlap happens in December 2004 when the groups share a call for 
independent audits. Clearly, posting the same content on the same day indicates that the 
two organizations are working in concert. Similar interaction happens when they co-sign 
letter a letter to Bishop Skylstad about the strategy of bankruptcy (SNAP, 2004, 
December 1). 
 Second, they mark one another’s actions and advance one another’s goals. 
Although the latter is not the most common use of coordinated speaking and acting 
between VOTF and SNAP, several excellent examples emerge in the dataset. In one, 
VOTF encourages its members to participate (as activists) in a 2003 Lenten prayer 
service in Boston. One of the things they ask members to do is to prepare a donation for 
SNAP or another survivor support group (VOTF, n.d., “Massachusetts VOTF 
members”). By asking VOTF members to bring a check made out to a survivor support 
group, VOTF is simultaneously rerouting money away from the archdiocese and 
supporting the work of SNAP (and other survivor support organizations). In another 
example, SNAP restates, affirms, and extends a local VOTF chapter’s agenda regarding 
an abusive situation. Similarly, immediately after SNAP successfully stops a Ford truck 
ad that played on the issue of clergy sexual abuse, VOTF affirms SNAP’s action and 
extends it, ‘calling on’ Ford officials to meet with clergy sex abuse survivors (2005, 
February 3). By affirming and/or extending one another’s organizational goals, both 
VOTF and SNAP evidence a responsive awareness of one another. 
They also use their press releases to draw attention to one another’s actions. For 
example, SNAP describes the increasing engagement of the laity by saying: “We are 
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also hopeful because regular Catholics are doing more. …through organizations like 
Voice of the Faithful, they're supporting survivors in more ways than we ever dared hope 
five or ten years ago (SNAP, 2003, June 18). In this statement, SNAP traces VOTF’s 
actions and their effects. Similarly, VOTF notes when members of SNAP meet with the 
NRB and the lack of closure that meeting engenders (VOTF, 2004, December 13). 
Selectively marking one another’s actions may be seen as an indirect form of 
publicizing, affirming, and advancing one another’s goals. 
Third, they defend and honor one another. Here, the organizations exemplify an 
empathetic awareness of one another that is marked actively and symbolically. For 
example, when VOTF found out that the Diocese of Worcester had subpoenaed SNAP’s 
records of all those alleging abuse in the diocese, it expressed “deep disappointment” 
and decried the subpoena as a disturbing tactic that would "only serve to inflict more 
pain on the survivors of sexual abuse," (Post; VOTF, 2002, September 23). By 
publicizing the action of the diocese, VOTF makes a passive defense of SNAP. 
Similarly, SNAP offers a defense of VOTF in light of the bannings. In July 2003, the 
organization calls on the new archbishop of Boston (Sean O’Malley) to “immediately 
lift the ban on Voice of the Faithful. Doing this will show that he understands the value 
of genuine, independent lay voices in healing this fractured, dispirited church” (SNAP, 
2003, July 1). Each organization shows an awareness of and willingness to publicly 
defend the other’s vulnerabilities. 
They are also aware of and willing to publicly celebrate one another. For 
example, VOTF introduces two key SNAP leaders as “honored guests” at a press 
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briefing before the June 2003 USCCB general assembly (VOTF, 2003, June 19). Then, 
in September 2004, SNAP gives its “Survivors Lifeline Award” to Jim Alvord, Regional 
Director of VOTF in the Bridgeport Diocese. They applaud him “for his work on behalf 
of survivors” and describe him as “a strong and vigilant voice in support of survivors” 
(2004, September 21). Perhaps the best example of VOTF’s honoring SNAP comes from 
a speech given by James Post at SNAP’s conference in June 2005. There, Post is quoted 
as saying: 
My second reason for being here today is to publicly thank SNAP and its leaders 
… for your support of Voice of the Faithful. Your participation in the work of 
VOTF has made a great difference to us. You have told the story of your 
experience, an experience that is deeply personal and painful. We know it is not 
easy to speak about these matters, even to a sympathetic audience, and that 
makes us all the more appreciative of the trust you have placed in us. Thank you.  
 
You have also helped us mobilize and motivate thousands of people to leave their 
“comfort zones” and take actions they would not otherwise have done. …You 
have stirred the conscience of Catholics across this nation, and set in motion 
processes of change that will help us one day achieve justice for survivors and 
safety for all children and adults in our Church. (VOTF, 2005, June 11) 
 
Not only does this illustrate how the organizations speak and act together (as noted in the 
previous paragraphs), but it also illustrates how they honor one another. By expressing 
gratitude for SNAP, Post clearly honors the organization’s role in the crisis. 
Although this is not an exhaustive review of the ways in which collective 
proprioception is at work between VOTF and SNAP, it does mark a thread of mutual 
awareness that allows the organizations to function in concert. In order to trace 
horizontal collective proprioception, then, it is important to note whether stakeholder 
organizations are markedly conscious of one another, and if so, whether they are 
oriented collaboratively or conflictually, and if they are (discursively) interactive with 
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one another. In the current case, it is clear that VOTF and SNAP are conscious of and 
collaboratively oriented toward one another. Further, they are both discursively and 
actively involved with one another in the crisis. This marks a strong horizontal collective 
proprioception in the crisis. 
From this perspective, the crisis is a communicative situation in which VOTF 
and SNAP evince a willingness and capacity for collective proprioception, both 
vertically and horizontally. Where they meet the USCCB, there is a blockage of any 
potential collective proprioception due to the USCCB’s discursive strategies. Where they 
meet one another, there is a thriving (horizontal) responsive other-awareness. Assessing 
the differential levels of collective proprioception among stakeholders becomes 
especially relevant for a church-based crisis, as the next section shows. 
Collective Proprioception in the Church 
To more fully understand the implications of how the USCCB, VOTF, and 
SNAP manage the potential for collective proprioception in this crisis, it is necessary to 
set the analysis back into the context of ‘the church.’ (Not only is this crisis based in the 
Catholic Church, but each of the organizations studied is directly linked with the 
Church.) An assessment of collective proprioception is especially apropos to a crisis in 
the church for two reasons. One on hand, collective proprioception is a concept based on 
the human body. On the other hand, the church has historically been described as a body. 
Indeed, one of the central Biblical metaphors for the church is that of a body, as the 
following quotes illustrate. 
Just as each of us has one body with many members, and these members do not 
all have the same function, so in Christ we who are many form one body, and 
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each member belongs to all the others. (Romans 12:4-5 New International 
Version) 
 
The body is a unit, though it is made up of many parts; and though all its parts 
are many, they form one body. ... Now you are the body of Christ, and each one 
of you is a part of it. (from I Corinthians 12) 
 
…I fill up in my flesh what is still lacking in regard to Christ’s afflictions, for the 
sake of his body, which is the church. (Colossians 1:24) 
 
The image that emerges through these New Testament references and others is that of 
the church as the metaphorical body of Christ. As such, it is a collection of diverse, yet 
interdependent parts. However, the metaphor of a body is constructed in different ways 
by each of the organizations studied here. This different understanding of the body may, 
in turn, affect how each organization orients to the potential for collective 
proprioception. 
The notion of church-as-body is clearly evident in VOTF’s discourse. Given the 
intermediary function VOTF serves between the defending source organization (i.e., the 
USCCB) and the external dissent organization (i.e., SNAP), it is not surprising that 
VOTF uses the body metaphor in a similar way to the biblical writer, Paul. For VOTF, 
the church is a broadly inclusive spiritual body comprised of a diversity of parts. Note 
the following quotes from VOTF press releases. 
“We are all members of the body of Christ. Leadership, we are told in the 
scriptures, is ordered to service in the community. If these words are to be real, 
then risky and radical action is often required of the members. The victims and 
survivors of clergy sexual abuse have risen up and spoken to the entire Catholic 
community…. Together we have demanded accountability, justice and 
compassion of our bishops. We have not found it.” (Doyle letter to NH-VOTF; 
VOTF, 2003, May 16) 
 




“Voice of the Faithful…seeks to…call forth the talents of all members of the 
Body of Christ.” (Ward; VOTF, 2005, June 17) 
 
In both their own words and in strategic quotes by people like Rev. Doyle, VOTF 
leaders hold up the ideal of the church as an inclusive, interactive organism comprised of 
a diversity of valued members. This notion of church as body clearly guides VOTF’s 
attempt to cultivate collective proprioception with other stakeholders in the crisis. The 
body metaphor allocated by VOTF also draws attention to ways in which the hierarchy 
enacts a differing notion of the body. 
In its (infrequent) use of this metaphor, the USCCB is more likely to refer to the 
Bishops’ council rather than the larger Church. In this way, the hierarchy strategically 
delimits any notion of organic interdependence to the USCCB. Where it broadens this 
metaphor beyond itself, the USCCB retains its focus on managerial bodies that will, 
ultimately report to itself. Note the following quotes. 
The Administrative Committee of the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops has put the problem of sexual abuse of minors by clergy on the agenda 
of the June General Meeting of the full body of Bishops. (USCCB, 2002, March 
14) 
 
The draft Charter will be voted on at the meeting of the full body of Catholic 
bishops…. “…we felt this possibility had to go the full body.” (Archbishop 
Flynn; USCCB, 2002, June 4) 
 
"To assist diocesan/eparchial bishops," they will have a review board which will 
function as a "confidential consultative body" to the bishop/eparch in discharging 
his responsibilities (revised norms, #4, opening). (USCCB, 2002, November 4) 
 
“We are grateful to the body of bishops and to the Holy See for the strong 
support and ultimately the recognitio that have enabled us now to implement 
these measures.” (Archbishop Flynn; USCCB, 2003, February 27) 
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Note how the formal, managerial allocation of the body metaphor contrasts to VOTF’s 
use of an inclusive, spiritual body. Implicit in the bishops’ discourse is an 
acknowledgement that power resides in a decision-making, policy-making body. Despite 
calling for some collaborative action by members of the Church (see Chapter VI), the 
bishops ultimately tie the power of collective action back to managerial entities. 
Interestingly, SNAP’s application of body metaphors is similar to the USCCB’s. 
Body metaphors that appear in SNAP’s press releases and statements tend to refer to 
particular decision-making entities appointed by the hierarchy. For example: 
"…it's hard to see this body [the NRB] as being unbiased." (Serrano; SNAP, 
2002, July 22) 
 
Curtiss, on the floor of the annual bishops conference meeting … recommended 
that the body "censure bishops who had transferred priests accused of sexual 
abuse of minors from parish to parish." (SNAP, 2002, November 14) 
 
We applaud those conscientious Catholics who serve on this body [diocesan lay 
review panel overseeing abuse cases]. (SNAP, 2003, July 28) 
 
… only a handful of bishops ever publicly criticized him [Cardinal Law] and the 
conference as a body has never seen fit to publicly call him to task for the severe 
harm he has caused to so many. (SNAP, 2004, November 16) 
 
In these quotes, SNAP’s use of the body metaphor aligns with the USCCB’s. Here, a 
body is a group vested with decision-making power by the hierarchy. SNAP’s 
contribution to this metaphor for collective action is a criticism of its managerial bias. 
Whereas the USCCB naturalizes the power inherent in its managerial bodies, SNAP 
problematizes and seeks to influence it. 
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In contrast to its emphasis on managerially controlled bodies, SNAP does make 
an allusion to the church-as-body in a letter co-signed by SNAP and VOTF 
representatives. 
…A few weeks ago, Pope John Paul … talked of the need for a "shared 
responsibility" between the lay faithful and the hierarchy. We hope you will 
listen to and embrace his call for greater collaboration within the body of the 
church. (Hardy, Pember, & Pember letter to Bishop Skylstad; SNAP, 2004, 
December 1) 
 
Here, SNAP echoes VOTF’s view of the body. That this allusion is in a letter co-written 
by SNAP and VOTF raises questions about which organization is the source of the 
reference. Despite this uncertainty, it shows SNAP to be aware of an alternative 
application of the body metaphor. In essence, SNAP is conversant in two understandings 
of ‘the body.’ 
From this vantage point, it is clear that the three stakeholder organizations use 
the body metaphor differently. VOTF retools its original vision of an inclusive spiritual 
body to request a hierarchically ordered body that is (to some degree) participative and 
responsive. Further delimiting the scope of the symbol, the USCCB draws on uncritical, 
self-referential body metaphors. The bishops view themselves as an exclusive 
managerial body. As such, they do not align themselves with the other organizations. 
SNAP takes a rather complex view of the corporate body. On one hand it critiques and 
seeks to influence managerially controlled bodies (i.e., committees/boards); on the other 
hand, it leverages the potential of an inclusive, collaborative body (i.e., church). The 
complexity of this position indicates an alignment with both the USCCB’s notion of a 
body and with VOTF’s notion of a body. 
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Here, it is interesting to return to New Testament writings on the church-as-body. 
In his first letter to the church at Corinth, Paul indicates two interesting dis-membering 
phenomena possible in the church-body. On one hand, members may distance 
themselves from the church out of shame (i.e., "Because I am not an eye, I do not belong 
to the body."). On the other hand, some members may disown others out of pride (i.e., “I 
don’t need you!”). Paul argues against this dis-membering action by declaring the body 
as a multiplicity combined by God. The warning is that dis-membering the church (by 
divorcing oneself from it or by disowning others from it) is counter to the church’s basic 
organizing principle. In advocating for a heterogeneous organization, Paul positions the 
church as a social organism comprised of diversity within a larger unity. This stands as a 
fascinating backdrop to the findings of this study. 
Inasmuch as VOTF is (contestedly) nested within the ‘body’ of the Catholic 
Church and SNAP is comprised of current and former Catholics who submit to the 
Discourse of Catholicism to some degree, there is an intimate connection among the 
three organizations. Strikingly in line with Paul’s word picture in I Corinthians 12, the 
USCCB paints itself as head of ‘the body,’ VOTF protests against being disowned by the 
body, and SNAP, having separated itself from the body, speaks from the complex 
position (c.f., the subject position of ‘insider without’ in ethnographic research). What 
emerges from this case is a picture of the church as a dis-membered body. Interestingly, 
though, there seems to be a re-membering of that body where VOTF and SNAP are 
functionally interrelated. That is, even as the bishops refuse to function with the laity and 
survivors, the latter two form an empathetic, reciprocal connection, as the assessment of 
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collective proprioception indicates. Only time will tell how this dis-membering and re-
membering of stakeholder organizations will affect the Church. 
At this point, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the interactive 
potentials in the current case in light of the body metaphor. First, the USCCB’s goals 
(closure and control) are antithetical to and thus preclude collective proprioception. 
Church management seems to have bought into and been made vulnerable by its own 
rhetoric of defensibility. To offset this risk, the hierarchy must open itself to a different 
type of vulnerability – that of listening, learning, and being responsively aware of its 
constituents. Second, VOTF is strategically positioned between those inside the Church 
and those outside of it. From this position, it could access key internal publics (e.g., laity 
and victims/survivors still in the Church) that SNAP has not been able to access through 
the hierarchy. Third, SNAP’s broad, yet dogged focus on key issues could offset 
VOTF’s tendency to relinquish its mission in deference to the hierarchy. Its role and 
capacity as agenda setter or issue manager could redeem VOTF’s tendency to focus on 
identity-based, deferential issues. There is clearly potential for more (inter)action as the 
crisis continues to unfold. 
Limitations and Future Study 
As with any study, there are numerous limitations to the current dissertation. 
Several are reviewed here. First, the data set used for this study is comprised only of 
press releases and statements posted on the organizations’ web pages. Although this 
provided a mode of PR communication that could be compared across the organizations, 
it in no way exhausts the public relations discourse produced by each organization 
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during the timeframe. There has been an overwhelming amount of public relations 
discourse (textual and non-textual, traditional and non-traditional) produced in the clergy 
abuse crisis. A fuller study might address ways in which the stakeholder organizations 
engage crisis communication across a variety of communication channels and forms. 
Second, since this was a preliminary attempt at mapping a particular dialogical 
model for analyzing crisis communication, it runs in two directions at once. That is, this 
dissertation sought to both construct and apply a particular analytical framework. Had 
the goal been to apply a preexisting analytical framework to the dataset, the analysis 
could have plumbed the depths of the data more fully. Given the recursive goals of 
constructing an analytical methodology and generating a case analysis, case-specific 
findings are constrained. The primary emphasis of this grounded approach was on 
crafting a tool for later analyses. Although it was applied to the clergy abuse data, it was 
done more to test the utility of the framework than to exhaustively engage the case. This 
was a difficult, but necessary choice, given the constraints of the project and the size of 
the task. A next step would be to apply the mechanism more fully to reveal the case 
rather than to prove the tool. 
Third, in charting a dialogical framework for crisis communication, an 
interesting quandary emerges. On one hand, the research on dialogue is vast and 
complex. On the other hand, the research on crisis communication is relatively under-
developed. Trying to work with these literatures simultaneously is like trying to lift 
weights with one well-toned arm and one atrophied arm; one vacillates between 
protecting the weak arm and challenging the strong arm. It is difficult to make the 
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simplicity of the crisis literature keep pace with the complexity of the dialogue literature. 
This dissertation has attempted to balance the two literatures by offering a clarified 
notion of dialogue and a more complex notion of crisis communication. 
Fourth, discourse analytic approaches to dialogue generally focus on face-to-face 
interactions. This study takes a non-typical approach by adapting Linell’s work to a 
mediated communication situation. One of the challenges in this approach was applying 
a micro-level analysis to an extensive dataset. Although understanding the ways in 
which language is used is essential to understanding the construction of a large-scale 
communication situation, it is difficult to do discourse analysis on an extensive data set. 
Finding ways to analyze linguistic particulars on large quantities of crisis discourse 
would be helpful. Further, a fuller exploration of the risks and benefits of adapting 
discourse analytic (i.e., micro-level) approaches to non-face-to-face communication is 
necessary. 
Fifth, in addressing the press releases/statements as texts rather than as computer 
mediated communication (CMC), the current study leaves many fascinating questions 
unaddressed. Although this study acknowledges the virtual nature of this crisis 
discourse, it deserves to be studied in its own right. The research on CMC could 
certainly be brought to bear on the current analysis, indicating ways in which the 
asynchronicity of CMC may or may not affect crisis management. A general reading of 
the PR literature on the use of ‘new’ technologies shows practitioners using new 
technologies in old ways. However, in the current case, there are some interesting 
hybridizations of communication mechanisms. For example, SNAP and VOTF use CMC 
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to both enact and narrate their own PR. It is important to address ways in which CMC 
affects the communicative construction of a crisis. It is also important to explore whether 
CMC is a mechanism for bridging the power divide, given its capacity to equalize, or 
whether it merely gives the illusion of equality, which might ultimately serve to short 
circuit actual inter- and intra-organizational engagement. 
Sixth, this study fails to address the role of media in the construction of a crisis. 
Although this is not a problem for the current study, since the data set is comprised of 
controlled rather than uncontrolled media, the role of media in any public relations 
situation cannot be overlooked. The media plays a central role in PR, serving as an 
intermediary audience between an organization and its publics. What is unclear in the 
current study is how a dialogical framework might illuminate the media’s role in crisis 
communication. It would also be interesting to apply a dialogical framework to 
controlled and uncontrolled media in a crisis. This might unearth ways in which 
organizations manage the context and interactivity in their discourse, depending on how 
much control they have over that discourse. 
Seventh, in contrast to the bulk of crisis research, this study focuses on three non-
profit organizations. It takes as its ‘source organization’ a powerful religious 
bureaucracy that spans space and time. VOTF is an agenda-driven grassroots 
organization with a debated position in the Church. Also agenda-driven, SNAP is a 
grassroots organization that positions itself as external to the Church, yet defines itself in 
relation to the Roman Catholic Church. Although the research on crisis management and 
communication applies to all sectors, one can’t help but wonder how the sectoral 
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orientation of an organization and the sector(s) within which a crisis is managed affect 
the crisis. More research is needed to understand these affects. Further, although the 
current study indicates the salience of a dialogical framework for understanding any 
organizational crisis, it does not address how that salience might change in the profit and 
governmental sectors. 
Eighth, the current study does not address ways in which the type of crisis may 
affect the illuminatory power of a dialogical approach. More study is necessary to 
determine whether a dialogical approach is more or less salient depending on the type of 
crisis. Although it is a rich way to understand the dynamics of the current case, a moral 
scandal, this does not address how revealing it would be for other types of crises (e.g., 
product-safety incidents and accidents). 
Conclusion 
Despite these limitations and the need for further study, this dissertation offers an 
important contribution to the literature. By viewing crisis communication through the 
lens of a particular notion of dialogue (i.e., a sustained, symbol-based, contextualized, 
collaborative-agonistic process of interactive social inquiry which creates meaning and 
a potential for change), it is possible to trace how stakeholder organizations use public 
relations discourse to co-construct an organizational crisis. By proposing discursive 
reconciliation as the central process of a dialogical analysis of crisis communication, it 
is possible to sift the discourses of stakeholder organizations against one another, using 
each as a standard for evaluating the others. By marking collective proprioception, it is 
possible to illuminate how stakeholder organizations manage the potential for 
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communicative interactivity. What emerges from this study is an inaugural attempt to 
articulate a dialogical model for analyzing public relations discourse. The complexity of 
the process and the richness of the findings indicate the illuminatory potential of such a 
model. Despite its limitations, the dialogical approach to public relations discourse 
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